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PREfACE 
lhe idea fqr this study arose from a course I teach in Managerial 
Economics at Colorado State University. The general skepticism of stu-
de?).ts with respect to the relevance of econo111;to theory to actual man-
agement problems and the lack of available illustrations of theory in 
action made it apparent that a need exists for more studies to be made 
into the operations 9f a single industry and firm. Thus, this disserta-
tiqn was undertaken in an effort to identify and document actual mana-
gerial decisions mi;lde on the basis of theoretical economic concepts, 
methods of analysis by whtch these concepts have been made operational, 
and environmental conditions encompa.1;1sing decision-m~ing. The accessi-
bility of Frontier Airlines c;tnd willingness of company officials to 
provide data prompted the 1:1election of this particular firm and the 
airline industry c;l.S objects of study with which to attack ele111ents of 
these general problems. 
Like so many.who h~ve gone before, but unp.oul;>tedly more so than 
they, I am deeply indebteq to Professor WilsonJ. Bentley. Without his 
concern, patience, and encouragement,. I co1,1ld not have finished tl:;te 
degree~ · And I am especially grateful for the pri v::Uege of having been 
al:lle to spend time i:n, personal d:l,sc1,11;isions and in observation of :ti.is 
"approach" • · 
To the other members of my graduate committee - Professors S. Ko 
Adams, E. J. Ferguson, and R. L. Sandmeyer - I express a sincere thanks 
iii 
for their time and effpvt spe;p.t in thit:;1 capacity. 
I owe ~pectai acknowledgement and appreciation ta Mr. John ClaTk 
Coe, Director c:>f Eco~omic Pl~i~ c;,f Front:t~r Atrlines, for provid:i,ng 
company docume~t;:; a,µd sacrificing conr;;tderable time from a hf;lavy scl1,ed-
ule tq d;tscuss all aspects of ttie study .. 
T~e final typing was done by Miss Veld~ Pavis;. for this and 
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CHAP~ER I 
IN':CROOUCTION AND PURPOSE 
Int;i:-oduction 
~pe;rience, bo~h as a stud~nt an"' ~s an instructor, has persuaded 
the autho:r th~t most ~anag;ement students~~ not convinced of the prac-
tiea,l ~e].evanc~ of the ~raditional ecQnomic theory of the firm to man~ 
ageinent peci1;1ion-making. More presentatton of the:ory frequently 
conoe:ptl? ra.ther _tl;la:o, refleqt r~ality, has not served well in making 
discipl~~· Expositions of the allal.ytical tools accepted by theorists 
as ll'equisi te · to enl,j.gµtened decision..,.mald.,ng are abµndant. . TJ:iel:'e i~, 
however, a .d:;trth of 1;1tudi1:3s ani;i illust:rations of a<rtua.1 managerial 
applications • .l\ithou~h the stated fl.Ulot~on of texts in m~agerial 
eqonomics i~ to ni:µ-row the void between theory i,md practice, much of. 
the literature is theoretical and admonitor1 rath,.er than descriptive. 
The;r;te is Uf:iuall;y a serious :f a,:ilure 'to establish i3- sense of the complex, 
. . . . 
dyn~iQ ~ontex~ ir\ which such dec;i.sions ?,re made and. an even greater 
fa+lu:re to apec~fy 'by :real example.or de(!Jc.ri;ption just how ;f'irrns go 
a.bout makin.g tb,e nec~(:!sary analysis. 
b 
All, sour~es examin~d to- date,: ornitti:p.g texts in operations 
research, which purport to establish the effic1;1oy of ecpnomio theory in 
. decision.~makin.g, generally follow one of four patterns:· 
· ·1. ~i~hlY' ma.thematicai, theoretical models der3.l-ing wit~ 
l 
m~rginal coat functi,;ms of public; ut:tlity-t;ype firms. 
:?. Quest;!,onnaire is-q;rveys of selected. l)Tivate firms to 
ascertain i;f' thosljl f:trms ~ ~n general use certain 
eeonomic concept~ in deoision-ma,king. 
3. Oocali:i?J.qnal citations l;>y autnors of "exainples" d:r:,awn 
from studies of various industries to illustrate a 
partiq~lar concept. For exl;ll'llple "proof" of the 
' ' 
relev~c~ of price el~sticity of demand analysis 
invariably consists of stud!es made for vapious prod-
ucts in agr;tculture or perhaps ste~l; the industry or 
firm cited, however, changes when anotAe~ principle is 
introduced and the 1'pr9oflt of applioation, .if an1 is 
given~ comes ~rom another industry bett~r suited to 
illustr~te the CQ~cept~ 
' ' ' 
4. ~tremely si~ple, fabricated illustrations devised in 
~ attempt to put "me~t-on~the-bo~es" of pure theory. 
2 
lt must be stqte~ that although the above co~tributions are valuable to 
bot~ stµdents and instructors, they ~re incomplete and often incon-
vip.cing. More detailed study needs to be made into the operations of a 
· sip~le ;tndustry and firm to ide:n;l;;if;y ~nd docum~nt d~cisions actually 
made ()n the 'basis of theore~ical economic concepts~ methods of ana],ysis 
by ~hichthese.conc;:epts have been made operational, and env:t,ronmental 
condition.a e'1c9tqpassine;.decisiqn-ma.king. J;:n sho;r:-t, there i1:1 a. need for 
. inve13tigatton :l,nto g~nu,i,ne1 p:ractical applications of theory as well as 
for oont;i'butione to theo~y itself. 
As objec~s of study with whieh to attack elements of these ~eneral 
:prolllemei, tl+e ~i:rline indu.~try was chosen fo:r analy1::1:ts, with specific 
}···· 
attention. givep. to a single fi,rm in the indµstr;y-, Frontier Airlines. 
· Objectives of the Study 
The major·thesis of this stugy may be st~ted in a threefold 
proposition; namely, 
l. '?hat economic theory~ applied in maxi.agerial practiee 
in the airline indu~try • 
. 2. That ev~n in the face of insurmountable obstacles to 
qµaxi.tify all or any ijaiient variables, theoretical 
ooncepts nevertheless form highly µseful frameworks 
within which decisions a.re formulated and precipitated. 
,. That in less hol\ltile envi:rons, reasonal:>le q1,1antitative 
approximations to theo:retical functions .are i:Q. fact 
calculated and 1,1sed with confidence in decision-making. 
3 
In the proce$s of validating the thesis; the study will narrow the 
v9id between theory c1-nd practioe by presenting a more rea:J_istic picture 
of e~onoll\iC theory in action. More specifically, it w:tl;L 
+• Establ1.E:lh a more authentip sense of the nature of the 
political, sociai, ~nd economic environment in which 
decisions are made. 
2. Identify in detail actual procedm,ee used.to make the 
economic a.na.J,yses pertinent to decisions. 
3. Note modtfications :j.n economic theory necessary to 
render concepts operational in drnamic business situa~ 
tione. · Limi tat:l.o:p.s and ·compleJ!;i ties of exact applica-
tion of theory will be indic~ted. 
4. ld~ntify and discuss sources of economic d~ta and 
assumptions t.UJ.derlying their use. 
5. Ascertain, where possible, actual results of 
decisic;,ns, 
4 
Th,;l.s stuq.y does not attempt to cover aJ,.l aspeots of eithex, manage ... 
mentor e~o~om;l.cs, but deals with fundamental theoretical economic con-
cepts tvadition~lly cited in mana~erial economics texts, A summary of 
these l;>asic principles, adapted largely from Leftwich (1), is presE?nted 
in AppE?ndix A. 
Overview of the Study 
If tre logic of fundamental conqepts comprising the traditional 
economic theory of the f~rm is practically applied by management in 
decision-making, then analysis o~ economic decisions should yield 
i;n,c;leive evidence i;md information. Therefore, in order to accomplish 
the objectives of the study, a tw@-phase analysis of airline m.wiagement 
decisions 1s made. 
First, a search c,,f recent lit~rature is conducted in order to 
l. Pevelop a portrait depiqting important aspects of the 
political, economic, .;Uld soqial environment of the 
domE;istic ai:r transportation industry and of Frontier 
Airlines as it functions generally in tllat indust:ry. 
2. Pi,scovell evic:ience of the prevalence of managerial 
application of theory, both suojectively and quanti-
tatively, in decision~making throughout the industry. 
This :t.nitial phase is su'bsequent;Ly pursued in 
Chaphrs IJ and III. 
Chapter II di~cusses industry environmental characteristics such 
as economic asp~cts of governmental regulation$ which circ~mscribe the 
areas .for corporate economic actions, impo:rt811it distinctions between 
classes of commerical air carriers which n.ave s:i,gnificant be!,U'ings on 
competitive conditions and, thus, greatly influence the economic deci-
sions of i~dividual fi~ms, and product, marketing and operating cost 
vharacte:ristics wn.ich fu;r-ther identify major constraints within which 
individual firms must operate. 
Chapter III delves into economic facts of demand analysis in air 
tr&n:sportation, a.p.d the kind and amount of &ttention given by the 
industry to determi,nants of demand, price elasticity of demand, and 
pr:tcing strategies; in addition, it sets the stage ;for a subsequent 
analysis 9f F:ront:i,er M.rlines' revolutiona:i;-y ,50 pe:r cent stan<;lby f!,U'e 
dePi!:iiQn.. 
5 
The s~cond phase of the study, contained in Chapter IV, consists 
of detailed case an~yses of selected economic decisions made by 
· Frontier Ai;rlines in 1966. Info;i:-mati,9n and data. were obtained from 
company documents and interviews with persons having partial responsi-
bility for the decisions and related economic evaluations. 
'l'h.e basic o~jective o! ca~e analysis is to determine how the logic 
of eoonomiq theory is made applicaqle in practice, both when reasonable 
qua:;ntitative approximations of theoretical functions can be calculated 
and whe:;n they cannot. Th.is objective is. accomplis4ed by demonstrating 
the mechanics of 13,nalyticai procedures used by Frontie~, identifying 
sour~es o! input data, specifying underlying assumptions, flll.d noting 
environmental conditions. Theoretical econ~mic concepts providing the 
rational foundations for tpe decisions include price elasticity of 
~ema,nd, c~oss elasticity of demand, pric~ discrimination, marginal 
6 
(inqremental) cost, &nd marginal (incremental) revenue. The four deci-
sions ~nii+yzed are a m~jor pricing decision, two new ~oute application 
decfs:j,on9, and a fl1,.ght schedul:l-ng decision. 
CHAPTER II 
ASP~CTS OF THE GENERA!., ENVIRONMENT OF THE DOMESTIC 
AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
B~nard (2) ha~ demonstrated that it is possible to generalize 
extensively from experience in the m~agement of every sort of business 
i:µid to foim some notions.that apply to a. variety of industri~s. The 
same il:i true of the applicability of certain econqmic concepi;a.in 
decision-mak~ng. But, by confini:ng a study of applied economic concepts 
to a single :i,.nduist:ry and a single company, one can generalize to a 
greater extent. One should find more in common and fewer differences 
in pri.ncfple and p;t>actice from one firm to another, and an inv.estigatton 
of the relevance of certain·economic concepts in a single firm should. 
. pl"ov;i.de reliable insight into th~ operations of others similarly situ-
~ted. jui; p.owever much there is in common from one airline to another, 
there c;3.;r-e 1;1till important differences. ' All airlines are not brought 
into being under sim~lar circumstances, nor do the different geographi-
cal, economie, social, and political environments in which they con-
t:J.n~e pvovide them with equal profit oppo:rturd ti es. 
&i:Q.ce the end of Wq;rld War II, the airline industry has emerged 
as one of the nation's major industries. Increased speed of air 
travel, improved comfort, convenience and service, lower fares and a 
7 
~hift ~n tne ~ation's travel habits have all contributed to the 
sp~ctacill.a.r growth rate 9f airline passenger traffic, whi<;:h in the 
last t~ree yeai-s has averaged over 16 per cent annually. 
8 
~n order to further build the framework for the study, it is 
desirable to establish ~ome of the relevant facts oo~oerning the general 
environment of the domestic air transportation ind~stry and of Frontier 
Airlines as it functions in that industry. 
~onomic Aspects of Federal Government Regulation 
The present system of federal economic regulation of civil air 
transportation in the United States was established in the Civil 
Aeron~utics Act of 1938. S;l.nce 194o, economic regulation of the domes-
tic airl;l.nes has rested.in the hands of a five-man Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB)~ Air::!.in.es management prerogatives anc;i competitive prac-
tices are circumscribed by the Bo?I"d's edicts. 
Some of the more impqrtant economic regulations pertinent to this 
st¥dY are summarized below (3). The analysis and discussion in future 
chapters will reflect their influence on management thinking and 
practice$. 
l. Certificates of p~blic convenience and neceesity are 
required of air carrie;r"s to operate in interstate 
commerce, ?he cert~ficates are to oover particular 
rqutes and may Qe restricted as th~ Board sees fit. 
For :i,nstance, the Board can reqtdre a carrier to make 
certain intermediate stqpa between two points. But· 
the Boarq cannot restrict the right of a carvier to 
add or otherwise change schedules. 
2. A carrier cannot transfer or abandon a certificate 
without the Board's approval, and once certified, is 
under ol;,ligation to furnish reasonable service with 
safe ~nd adequate equipment and facilities. 
3. ~pplications for certificate~ are to be granted if the 
Board finds 
••••• that the applicant is fit, w{lling and able to 
perform such transportation properly a11d to conform 
to the provisions of this Act and the rule$, regula-
tions and requirements of the Board hereunder, and 
such transportation is required by the public conve~ 
nience and necessity (4). 
4. The Board may require operating reports from air 
.carriers and may prescribe the system of accounts. 
5. The Board may investigate alleged unfair or deceptive 
~ractices or unfair methods of competition in air 
transportation, and may order the carriers to cease 
and desist from any such practiqes. 
6. Rates a.nd fares are to be published and strictly 
adhered to. Charges must be open to public inspec-
tion and filed with the CAB. 
7. The Board must have 30 days notice of changes in 
rates and fares and has the power to suspend proposed 
changes for 180 days. 
8. Carriers are to charge j~st, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory fares. 
9. The Bo,;il.r'd has authority t;o reject, modify or revise 
q.py tariff. It can set exact domestic fares, minimwn 
or maximum limits, or both. Either upon complaint or 
upon its own initiative, the Board may conduct a 
9 
htilaring to decide whether a particular liomestic rate, 
classification, or p~actice is unjust or un,duly pref-
erential. It may suspend any proposed.tariff cha:µge 
tq determiti.e its II lawfulness 11 • 
10. The Civil Aeronautics Act contains a "rule of r~te-
making" wh:i,ch r.eads as follows (3): 
In exercising and performing its powers and duties with 
respect to the determination of rates for the carriage 
of perspns or property, the Board shall take into con-
sideration, amo;ng other factors: 
1. The effect of such rates upon the movement 
of t.paffic. 
71. The need·. in the public interest of adequate 
and eff;icient transportation of persons and 
property by air carriers at the lowest cost 
consistent with the furnishing of such 
service. 
3. Such standards Ile spec ting the. c;harac ter · and . 
quality of service to be rendered by air 
carriers as may be prescribed by or pursuant 
to law. 
4. The inherent; advantages of transportation by 
aircraft. 
5. The need of each air carrier for revenue suf-
:f'icient to enable such air carrier, under 
honest, economicl and efficient management, to 
provide adequate and efficient air carrier 
service •. 
Classes of United State1;1 Colll!lleroial Air Carriers 
There are nine generally recognized <;:lasses of operators in the 
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air transport industry of the United States. These classi;f'ications are 
used by t;l).e Civil Ae.ronautics Board in connection w:tth the economic 
regulation of the industry and, . under the Federal Avh.tion Act, a.re 
~ased largell on the scope of operations authorized or allow~d by that 
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Act. Seven cla1;1ees of carriers nave certificates qf oc;,n,venience and 
n.eoessity au.tl'l,orizing them to co;riduct :regularly scheduled services (5). 
1h.e two mo~t important and widely lmpwn.cla.sses.and the ones germane to 
thii:;i study 8,];'e: 
· l. The Domestic Trunk Carriers. T~ere are our~ently eleven 
trunk lines, most of which operate, long ... h~ul, high-. 
density traffic routes between, the principal tr.af;f'ic 
centers of the United States. The a:i,rlip.ee incl1,1ded a:re 
Aineridan Delta Northeast United 
. B:ran:f,ff · E:astern Nc;,rthwest Western 
Continental. .Natiori.al Trl;ins Wo:rld 
2. ~he Domestic iocal Servipe Carriers. These carriers. 
operate relatively sh,ort-~ul routes of 1¢ssE;l:r, traffic. 
den,si ty b$tween the srt1aller traffic center!$ and between. 
these centers and principal centers. T~e thirteen air-. 
·lines comprising this cla~s are 
AlJ,ee;heny ~e Cetl tr~ Ozark Southern 
Bonanza Moh;a.~ Pacific Trans~Te;xas 
· Central ~orth Central P:tedmont West CQast 
Fron tie~ 
Locai Service.Carriers 
:Xn 1945, a separate class of dqme~tic airlines, .known as local 
service carrie~s, was established .to serve t:P.e passenger markets of 
. ~aller ·cities. Origi:qally, twenty ... th.r~E;l carriers were established . . . 
but due to abandonments ~d merges, only thirteen are presentiy 
oper1;1tin~~ 
F:rom their beginn,;ln.gs, · l.<:>cal serviqe · carr;iers ha.ve oper~ted at a, 
disadvantage. Wi~h respect to. the trunk car:riel"s. 
1. Traffic potential has.been limited due to· 
a.· competition f'rQm well establ:!,sh19d forms of surface 
transpo;t"tation, especially the a,utomobile. 
b. llel~:t;ively ~ort lenith of hops. Thi,s greatly . 
· reduces the inherent advantages Qf .air t;ranspQrta-
tion over surface transporta~ion,na.mely, speed arid 
f~equency of sehe~ule~ service. 
2. The relatively short length of hops and small a.moll.l'l.t of 
traffic make the type of plane adapted to trUAk opera-
tionq not as wel;L s:u.ited for local service,. Yet on many 
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roµtes, t.rU1'1.~. and local service carrie;t>s compete for the 
~vailable traffic. 
· 3~· Air transportati9n fares are at a comparatively high 
level with respect to sll?'face trilllsportation and th:i,s, 
· coupled, with lowe:r traffic potential, he,s thrown a sub-
~tantia~ burden on. the gove;mment :i,n the form of 1;1.i:f-
mail s~bsidy paymente •. 
~u~line oa:-riers' primary i~teFest has b~~n a.n.~ is in the long~ 
· llaUl . ~z,~f:t'ic. With this .. in. mind, the l3oard established local.,..eervice 
qarriers for the speoific purpose.of developi:ng tb.e.short-hau.l, local 
· ma,:rkets. To p;r~veJi).t ·1ocal-servive qarriere are competing with trunks · 
l!µld to :l,neure adequate service at the. small~r communitie·s, the Board 
}ia,s frequently req~:red local..-e~rViOe Cat~ieI'S to serve 1;1.;l.1 points on . . . . . . . 
their rou.tes on all tiighi;.$. Restrictions of.this .sort are beiri.g 
li.beralized, especially !n Boa:rd atte1J1pts to reduce the subsidy 
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requ:trements qf .local-service c~vie:rs. For e:x:arnple, where new :r,outes 
~e authorized, tr+~ :B<;>ard perm:t ts llskip ... stop" service between terminals 
after each intermediate point has :received tWQ dirl,ly round tr;i.ps, w1 th 
·tne exception that whe:re a.trunk car;rier providee service between t;he 
te:rminats~ th, local-ser~ce carrier ;is ~ormaJ,.ly r~qui:r:-ed to make at 
lea~t one interrne~iate stop. 
Altholl,$h loca.1 ... 1;1erviqe car:r:-iers now have permane;p,t c~rtificates, 
· the Board h.as. the power to enforce a }?OJ.icy wh;ich requ,ires intermediate 
points named in a c~r:l,er 1.s certificab to show an average of at least 
five enplaned pasS1engers per day over a test period. to warrant authori-
zatio:n for pe~wient service. Under this so..-called "use-:t t ... or-lose-i t" 
pol.icy, service t;o su.ch points will. be withdrawn if thil:3 condition is · 
not met., 
to·cal~se:rivice carriers are }ieavily S¥PSidized QY means of air-mail 
paymen,ts in excess of the "service rate"• . ~e II service rc1.te" :i,s con-
. . . . . . . . 
sidered th~ II cost 11 of t;i:-ansporting air mail and. consists of two parts: 
· l.. -" uniform ·ton ... m:,.le rate of 30~;1..7 ce:µts ;Per ton ... mile. 
. . 
2. ,fl termi11al charge pel;' pound of mai]. enplan.ed which 
v~ies by class·of airport f'rorn·3,32 ~entsper po1.1nd 
. . . . . 
at the lafg~st a:i,rporte to 33~21 o·ents at the smallE1St 
ai;rpo;rtl:3. · 
All airlines are patd the same "serv:J.ce rate" for transpor"tri:P.g mail, 
. but tqe local aerv:tc.e ca:rri.ers r,ce:tve .addi tio:Q.al mail pay based on 
their "need''• T~e f'need" subsidy makes up tht;! d'iffereri9e between the 
. . . . . . .. 
carrier 1 1;1 ·cost$ .incurred by ''honest, eoonomi,c~. ~d .e:.e-'fiqient. 
managemen,tlf, i:,.nd its ~eVellU0S ~eoeived from II ju,st and, reasonable rates"• 
X.ooal service carrier.:1 are currently pa:td a subsidy rate per 
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seat~mile flc;>Wl.l pe;r mon.th which; varies ;tnve11aely with traffic deni~i ty 
. . . '. . . . ' 
as measure~ by the ave:rage nU!fl'Qer o:( a\rcra;f't departures per ·stat;ton/:per 
day. ~o prevent v~riere from reoei ving mo;re .eul:>si.dy th.an needed, an-
othe;r fo:rmula ... i;;ystem :t.s used to recoup eat-nings in e~cess of a p;re-
se:ribed rate . of I1eturn on investment.. A standard rate· of return is 
computed for each a,irline anq is a weighted (:lverage o:f' a return of 5.5 
per cent on debt cap1,tal, 7 ~5 per c;:ent <;m preferred stock, an.d. 21.35 
. .. . . . . . . . . 
per cent on co111mon stock eq1,.1ity, subj~ct to a maximum over-all return 
of 12.7.5 per ce;nt Md. a minimum of 9 per cent. Fifty per cent of any 
profit~ above the ~tandard rate of retur:ri, but no't e:x:ceeding 15 per 
ce:,;it of the standard, must be refunded, and 7? per·centof any addi-
t:J,onal profits must likewtse be refunded. The Boarg does not permit 
. . . : . . 
. . . . . . 
subsidy to be paid tor flights :perf'oI'l'!led on routes 11i(hich the BoaJ;'d 
designates as non ... sl,lbsidy or ·subsid;v-reduct:i,c;m rout.el:ll (3). 
Today, no trunk carri~r except· Eastern receives a "need" sµbsidy 
' . 
and the Board i~ attempting through a variety of means to graduai1y 
.reduce a.p.d eliminate the $65 mj,lJ,ionannual subsidy now :paid to the 
loci:µ.. serviqe c~~riers a.s we],l. Iiocal serv!c~ earrier£;J, particularly 
Fro~ti~l;' Ai:rli11es, !nsiat .that the 'be1?t way .to reduce ·subsidy is 
· th~ough rat,1te 1:>tre:ngthen:b1g. 
Product, Marketing, ~;id Oi>erating Cost C~racteriatics 
The Product 
M.~ ea:r:r;-iers !n essenqe c;:,ffer · op.e commod! ty ,.. ... arri va.ls. B1,1t for · 
purposij~ of al'l:alyi:;is and deci~!d.ori-making, it is necessary to thinlc in 
term.s. of "the product;"· 
Tn,e "product i, of' air c,:r;rie:ra ie the 1;3qm of the equipIJ1ent, 
se:rvice1;1 and achedu:J,.~s "fhich the;y prov;i.de for tlj.e trav~l;i.ng :p1.,1b1ic. 
The various elements of the product incl~e: 
l. Eq~p!llent. Modern eq~::lpment is a potent competitive 
weapon, 'and eqmpmt;int ~ri tj :l.$ v:1,rtually esseµtial 
to the matnteni:Ulce of a competit!,.ve posit:l.on~. Tl).~ 
custome:r appeal of. new equipment is diie.in part to 
Us increased speed, greater comfort, and improved· 
schedules~ The ~heer psycho+o~ical attraction of 
the "latest innovation" is also a maj~r factor. 
?, Se:h,eduling. Schedule freguency; ts.an impo:I'tant com ... 
. , I 
aervice or with less frequ~:p.t i>ervice than its com .. 
:petito;r is at a dis~civant~e beciauise it does p.ot offt;ir 
. . . 
the "fi.µl·line" av!:!-ilable on its com:pet:t.tor. 
Times of IU'rivaland depa:rtu:re at major traf:(ic 
po:ints l;lkewii;;e play a. o:rucial compet;i.tive role, as 
· does 9,ual~ ty; of schedules. . In the latter, th~ number 
. of :l.nterm~q.:t,ate stops, the type of !ilqt,1ipme:µt used; e,nd 
the qonfigllI'.atioP, basically determin~ ?1elati ve "quality"· 
Optimum .schedul:i,ng :t,nvolves a c::.om~risE! 'be~ween 
equipment availabi;Li ty an.d utilization on. th.e c)ne hand, 
~d the most attractive schedule pattern .for each route 
point served on the oth~r. 
~· In·flignt service. Meali;;, dri~s, movies,·. m-qstc,. 
att:i:-active stewardeijses and oth~r ltfri;t.ls" provided to. 
k~ep the passengers com:f'orta.ble and· happy are relatively 
low ... cost anQ. ar~ used_ compettt:ively :tn an attempt to 
~i.ffer~ntiat~ the prod1,1ct •. They ~re a ba~;i,9 pa,;rt of the 
"pl;loduct '' of;fered by· each carrie;r. 
4. Ground se~vices. Airlines a,lso try to offer services 
which wil;I. keep the passenger h,appy on the.ground as 
well as in th.e air. . · Whether .in suqh a:i;,eas as :i;,eserva-. 
tions, ticketing procedur$~, qr paggage nandling, there 
i~ considerable.l;'ivalry to bEI at.lea.st as goqd as the 
competit~on and preferably bett"r• 
Customers 
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In t:ti~ · airl:l.ne i:n~ustr;v, as in others, ,i the cµstomer matters most!'. 
Every ~anager must continua.lly·as~ him~e~f now his plans will affect 
t~e carrier'~ c~stomers, Questions of pricing, sehe4uli:ng, or adver-
ti~ing MiiY require detai::j.ed p;ro~ections antt aalcl,llatio119, .h11t the point 
of referen~e :f:rom which to co;f.l.sider most :l.f not all pol~cy dec;:isio;ns is 
th.at of customer reaction •. Thia requires a qonsideration of the people 
the c~rier desires to serve. 
'?here a.re a nU1T1ber of ways c;1f classifying pa13senge:rs •. Among the$e 
commonly re~arded as useful are (6): 
L fr,~uency .of travel • 
. a ... Refiulars are people wh,o l;llwi;cy:s fly by thfe papticl,llar 
a,i~line, and are valµable to any airline since over 
~ few years they may each spend hundred~ of dollars. 
They deser.ve that little extra a.ttention u.~ually 
paid, to the "good" cuE;it9rner who s1:1stains the fortunes 
. of the airline • 
b. Oc~as;i.gna~s are people who som~times f;ly by the 
particular airli~e. They eharacteristically choose 
a car,:r-ier becai.ise of its speci~l features or becaqse 
its schedules pe:nnit achievi,:ig desire(l. arrival 
tirne1;:1. 
c. First timers: 
(1) By the p(;U'ticulaf ~irline, They may never fly 
again by the particul~r airline, become 
occasionals, or become riegulars, 
(~) By a:ny airline. They may never fly again by 
~Y airline, or by the p~rticular airline, or 
they may become occasio~als or regular~. 
First-timers rep~esent a challenge becaµse 
they a:re ~committed; t~ey are the people who 
cause ~Y airline to grow. 
)?. l;p.come. Airlines must te.ke account of the different 
spending powers of their passengers, The element of 
prQl:iuct that is usually :,reflerried to as '' l:lervices 
eMtra~to-9arriage 11 is, within the limit~ of CAB re~ula~ 
tions, characterized py the i=!-bility of people to pay more 
· than just the bare minimum to travel by air from one 
place to another. l<::(1PW:j.edge of the distribution qf .tl+~ir 
passen~eFs' income-ranges enables ai~lines to direct 
their m~~eting wtth gre~ter precision, Tl+e importance 
of personal incomes if, of course, less in e~pense-
aecount travei. There, it i~ ne9essary to assess the 
prosperity of firms ~ather than individu~is. 
3. O~cupation, Knowleqge of the occupations of its 
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passengers provideG airl;i.neE;l With a mear,i.s of identifying 
them in thf9 ;pop~lation at large. This is pa:r-t;i.eularly 
~eful in considering ways of ~ttr~cting businessmen tp 
ai:r travel, but its usefulness is not conf;i.ned to bµsi-
ness traffic. Jt may be h~lpful to know, far example, 
that~ sizeable proportion of holiday traffic is composed 
of ~ohoolteache:rrs or prc,fessional men; then sales promQ-
tion efforts can bE! a,imed directly at these people, 
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~irlines usuall1 consider busine~s trav~lers and pleas"Ure travelers 
to be sign:i,:f'icantly di:t'f'erent so:1;1ts of traffic. Characteriet;i.cally, 
the former cont~ins more re~u+ars, ~d the latter more first-timers. 
B~sin~ssmen are usually more ponce~ned with fpeguency of s~rvice, 
regularity and punct'l,l.al,ity than. are ,plea~rnre travelers~ Travelers on 
. business have been tne la:rgeist source of demand for first.class eeats, 
·but r~cent significant changes in the travel habit$ of businessmen have 
caused.carriers to !ll~e substantial a;tter~tions in seating. 
cqnf'igUFations:;. 
Usefu'.1. designations for airline traffic are summarized in Table I 
(6), At ~resent, passen~ers form ~y fat' the large proportion of air• 
lin~ customers. Passeni?;ers are the ''raw materi&ls" of an airline 
organ,izatfon, and, as such the;r are mi:x:ed tip in the process of. 
pro4uctic;,p., 
TA~:C.E I 
CLAS~IFICATION OF ~IRLIN~ TRAFFIC 
~rline Customers Traffic Customers Generate 
Shippers. 
1. Passengers 
2 •. F:ree Allowance Baggage 
3. Exc~s(!;l Baggage 
4, H~d 1,3ag~age 
1, Mail 
2. Ord,inary Freight 
· 3. Exprei;;s Freight 
1. Bare Hull Charters 
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2. ~ircraft and Crew Charters 
{)sing var:loi,ts !~e :pl,ans, airlines ~ve diffe:rentiated conditions 
o:f' paese:nger carria,ge to develop separa~e mar~ets. Example$ of these 
mc;U'kets are given :tn Table Ii~ ~irlines mW;it carefully assess the 
value of these divis::i,ons of the passenger market,. If they do not rep-
resent abiding featui-es of demand, °Qut rathel;' i;trtificial;:J..y stimulated 
and te~pora~y phe~omena, then they may be ~ore nuisance th~ they are 
wQr.th, #rlinl;ls are justified eco;nomici9,lly in. (iifferentiating markets 
if; 
l. Some pa~se;ngers are ~ersuaded to le~ve a less profit-
a.ble 9-nd ente:r a more profital;lle market, an<:l/or 
2, $ome peop:J,.e are per~uaded, to fly who.would not other-
wise.have riown, and 
3. The increase~ net profit resulting from inQreased 
traffic di.le to :p~qmotional · fares exce~ds t.he decreased 
net profit resulting from·t~~sfer cust9mers, 
~egull:U' Fl;lres 
T~LE II 
MARK~TS OF PASS~GER CARRIAGE 
Mar~ets or Paasenger Carriage 




2. FEµ11ily . 
3 •. Youth 
4. Military St~dby 
,. Regular Standby 
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With resp~ct to reg~iar f~e service, some of the "extras-to-
p~ri~e". that ar~ used to d:j.stinguish t~ various classes of.passenger 
transport are: . . 
1. Separa,te cQmp~rtments. 
;2,. Mor~ leg.,.room and elbow-roam. 
3. ~etter food an<;i free drinks;. 
4. A h~gner proportion of c~bin attendants to each 
passeng;er, · 
H:owev~r ~cod the proquct, it s.till m.ust be sold~ Aside from pro-
. movione.;I. fare schemes, airl:i,p.e sal~l:l pr9granJs·typiqally include adver-
. ti~i:Q.$ and ::prqmot:ton as· the m9st impqrtant elements. The objective$ 
or ~hese etro~ts inqlu4e: 
1 1 ~stablishtn~ a uniqu~ and favo~able corporate identity. 
~ ... ~demtif;riJl.$ tl'ie c~rier w;i th, a. pal7tic,ular region, route, 
or deetinatie:m. 
3. Con,viX1-CiQ8 ~ustiomers o:f the superio:r product of the 
carrier. 
4. Persul!.l,dir,i.g peqp:I.,~ .to t;rave;L by a.ir. 
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In the air. tran1;3pcrrh.t:ion industry, '' otit:pµt" ;i.s meaeured in a num-. . 
ber of way~, clepe:ndiqg on the use of.the data. ;Revenue p1;1ssenger m:f..les 
an4 :reve:rnie ton miJ.es are frequep.tly uij~d, botµ teing measures of dis-
t~ce, ~hi.oh is what tb;e user of air se:rvice pays for. 
FQr eleve:q. t:rwikl.:tn<;1s the a,vera,~e unit l:j,ne.-h,aul operating cost, 
in cents per.reve~ue ton mile (~TM), is approximately $0,52, while the 
a'l('er~e ;for tllirteen lc;>Q~ serv:t.ge carriers is approximately $1.QO per 
~+M (7). . +he vast diffei1mtial in expense level between the trunklines 
.and th~ local service C;ll'riers is generi:l.llY agreed to be du,e to bal;liC 
diffe~enees tn carrier ro~te ~tructures al'l-d the characteristics of 
serviQ~ .and t:raf·fic e;ene:rat;ion whion a;e inherently dete:rlllined thereby. 
For e~a.inp:te, the ave:rage tll'W1kline flys about twice as m~y :route 
mi.'.l,es (appro:x:imate+Y Q,000) a,Ei the ave;r~e loc~ f;1e:rvice line (approxi .... 
·mat.ely 2,900)~ ~e average d:i,9ta.nce.b~tween $tations fSe;rved by the 
. t1elat:ively shc:,:r~-ti,aul local ca.:rriers .C68 miles) is approximately Qlle ... 
half that of the.relat:tvely J,.png.ha,ul t:r~l.ine oa:rri~rs (122 m::i,le$), 
. . . 
but th,e average.total nu.mbe:r of station~ operated is appro~imately the 
same (43 tp 46 stations). Tnus, loea;I. carriers service and staff more 
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sta.t:i,ons per rqute ini).~, puttj.ng ~hem at a.Ii automatic cost disadvantage. 
'l'~is "Qasic coi:;t h~dicap :ls fl.lI'ther com:i;,ounq.ed by c;:ertificate provisions 
lim1ting the lQQal's &bii:1.ty tP operat~ nonsto~ services justified by 
vraftic qemands ~d t~is f~ther incTea.§es the differ~ntial between the 
average aircr~ft s~a~e dista+i-c;:e of t;:tJie average trunkline (approximately 
37!:i m:t,les) a.a pompa;rep to that of the average loca.l c1;1rrier (approxi-
. mate+Y lOO m1.les), Also, sit:1-ce the averi9ge loca:I,. carrier generates 
lts traffic from sma,ller cities as cqmpare~ with the avefage trunkline, 
the lppal carri~r ~chieves less than 10 per cent of the ~aily traffic 
~eneration per roqte mtle achieved b~ the average trunkline (approxi-
mately 17 daily Rffl per route mile versus 197). 
',l'heae opel!'ating characteristics are representative of the kinds of 
d:1.fferen~e? in· Fout.e characteristics bet;ween locals and trunklines and, 
th~s, serve as a ~asis for iqe~t!fying the diffe~ences in unit line-
haul expense.a (7). l;n general terms, then, unit line-hau.l operattng 
· col;!tf.i (:t.~ c.e11-ts per RTM) v~y inver15e;J.y with di.$t~~ce of a,i:vcraft flight 
and traffic haul. There is le~s gen~ral ~gree~ent on the relative de-
gree to whJoh other cost-causative fa~tors influenc;e 'Ql'.l.it co~t levelso 
Th~e~ include: 
1 •. Sk~ll of ~~~ement. 
2~ · Difference of ~astc w~e ~d pri~e ievels between 
ea:rri~:rs. 
3, S.cale o:- 11 s.;iz~ 11 of operations, . 
· 4, · Volume· of traffic ~ervtced, 
5, P~r cent of oapaeity ut;i.liz~d (load facto:r>. 
Tbe~e ap.d other cpst-causative factors all. have their individual and 
cum1,1lative inf'l.uence on li~e .. ha1.ll. unit operating costs, 
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Airline costs are official;ty divided into two major categories, 
dillect c¢sts a:q.d ind:l:rect costs. 
:Pi:rect costs generally ;refer ta the co~ts of the.actual transpor--. 
t~t;ton the '\lse:r puye Oll the aircraft operating cost~. Aircraft aper-
a.ting costs, typically composing 50 per cent of total operatiD$ costs, 
consist of the expensee of: 
l. Fl,yi;ng Opera,tione. 
2. Pir,ct Ai;c-cpaft Mainte.nance. 
3. Aircraft Depreciation. 
4. A~plied Aircraft Maintenance Burden. 
'J.lh.ese costs are ba~ic~lly in~urred on a time basis, althoug~ there are 
a~eas for depate such as Maintenance Burden. Flying Operations and 
Pireot ~aintenance are closely related to hol.lI's of fligqt, and Depreci-
ation, al,thqugh an. annual char5e1 reduces to an hourly one depending 
'\lpon the aill).ual :rate of airc:raft uiiilization. 
Xt tn,e cqst of opel"lation fo:r a spec:ifio aircraft is reasonably 
pon~tant p~r hour, it follows that any measure of its line-haul costs 
(for in.stance cents per available ton inile) w;i.11 vary directly with the 
n1.W1ber of miles ;tt Ci;l,n fly in an hour- ..... tha,t is, realize<;i speed. 
l;p,d,qst;ry opera,ting statist;i.cs show· tp.at a$ epeed increases with in-
. . . . . 
creasi,ng sta.ge di~tance, the·:i.1ne .. naul d:lreqt; cost. per mile corre-
spo:q.din~ly <lecreases (7). Since it i1;1 les1;3 costly to fly the edrplane 
far each mile ~s the disti;:lllq.e between si;ops inoreases, it follows that 
the 4ireqt cost for each seat or avail~bl~ ton of capacity provided 
·~isa·be~omes·l~ss coatly on~ mil~age basis ae stage distance increases. 
~llij, the q:i,reyt u.nit ~ost qf Ct;ipacity utilized, ,measured in :rievenue ton 
mil~s, w:i,.ll l:f_kewise decrease. 
~ si~ilar result obtains when dir~ct i.w.it costs a.re compared as 
between two t~pes of aiJ?cra:rt, say a large jet as used 1;:>y trunklines 
versus the smaller ~win en.gi~e piston aircraft widely .used by local 
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carriers, .The large-capacity, high speed jet, used on route structures 
having long average sta~e distances and which generate sufficient 
traffic to ~easonably use the ~reat capacity available, shows a signifi~ 
cantly lower unit coet !n cents per RTM than th.e.sma,ller-capacity, 
slowe:r p,s~on aircraft used to service shorter average stage distances 
and c~ry smaller average revenue loads. 
Indirect costs gene:rq.].ly refer to the costs of selling .and 
'.~
servic;i.D$ the tria:ffic carried plus general g:round support and general 
s'l,lpervision of the.enterprise as a whole. Basic eategories of e:,q>ense 
accounts included are; 
1. :OirectGround Equipment Maintenanee. 
2. · Applied Ground Equi~ment Maintenance ~urden, 
3. Ground Equipment Depreciation. 
4. Ge?).eI'al Services a11d Administration. 
A. Pa~seng~r Service. 
~. Airoraf~ and Traffic Servicine;. 
C~ Promotion and Sales. 
D. General and Administrative. 
~n ~dd;i. tion. to costs of pl,9.nt and· station facili tie 13, these cate-. 
~~ries lncl~de such ~pecific costs as promotion, sales, reservations~ 
ticketing, ipacjine; 1;'1.nd unload;lp.g traffic, accoi:mting functions ani:l 
relate!i svp~rv:!sory pe:1;1:;:ionnel. The basic expense categoriee are 
rou~hlf proportional to the number of traffic ~its aerviped, primarily 
passengers, @Jld are not, in contrast to direct.001;,ts, closely related 
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to the Gours of flight. Even those ground expenses required solely to 
service airc;rii:1-ft at sta'l;ions are related, at least indireptly, to the 
volume of traffic since aircraft movements are basic~ly tailored to 
t:ra.ffic demand. 
Once all the gro1,lnd functions have been performed to pro~ote, 
eell, reserve $pace, ticket, and load a passenger on the aircraft, the 
'bulk of thel'iie servicing co[;3ts rw.ve been incurred. In terms of per 
passen~er expense, it then makes little difference the number 9f miles 
ne moves tn the aircraft; but it does mean that the passenger moved 
over a long distance will produce a lower line-haul uni~ cost (cents 
per Rf~) than one moved over a short distance. 
Qarrier operating cost~ in cents per RTM arising from the several 
vari~ble e,nd interrelated factors of ~oute structure, service charac-
teristics and traffic a.re a function of revenue ton miles per departurey 
the so-called Service and Traffic Index (S~I) (7). This relatively 
simple index, shown in Figure l, is widely considered to be accurately 
responsive to changes in any qf the basic service or traffic charac= 
teristics of an airline operation, e,ingly or in oombi:n.ati9n. The $TI-
Unit ~penses trend line is intended to show just that: ·the trend of -
unit cost in relation to ST::t; Value, rather than the precise cost level 
wnich should prevail for a given STI for all carriers. While the STI 
does not a.ccount, f'or the impact of all cost-causative factors, it does 
:respond to serv;i.ce and tra:l;'fic characteristics which exert primary in-
fluence on co~ts. The $TI-Unit ;Eacpense trend line does indicate the 
deg~ee of cost ohan~e which is expecte~ to occu:r if a carrier's STI is 
a.dvanced by improvement i~ the aforementioned characteristics. 
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Efficiency of effort may be expr~ssed by costs per ton and seat-
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mile flown and sold, But in the airline iµdustry this ratio is largely 
determined by factors other than the quality of management. Because 
e~ery journey, irrespective of its length, gives ~ise to broadly similar 
efforts in selling, ticketing, reservation, maintenance, embarkation~ 
anq. d.isembark.at:i,on, oosts per mile tend to vary inversely with the 
length of journey. The shorter the journey the higher the cost per 
mile flownbaqause the fixed costs of efforts in marketing and produc-
t~on are sprea~ ove~ fewer miles. Therefore, an airline wit~ relatively 
sho*t average ~ourney lengths must face higher costs per mile flown, 
all other th!n.gs being equal, than an. airline with relatively long 
average joµrneys, 
For decision~making, it is usually diffic~lt to establish the cost 
of a sing:)..e route. Nevertheless, a,n eE;itimate must often be made and 
~he following general cost classifications a;r'e useful in making the 
analysis: 
1. Variable~· Casts incurred solely for a route, and 
that increase directly with the amount the route is 
used. For example, an increase in fl;p.ng hours on a 
route would increase such costs as maintenance, fuel, 
oil, and landing fees, all directly attributable to the 
route. 
Fixed costs. -- Costs that do not vary with output in 
the short run and that can be attributed entirely to a 
route. For example, if an aircraft and crew were used 
e~clusively on a route, the total depreciation and 
Qrewing costs would be allocated to the route. 
Apportioned costs. 
I I ..__.,_ 
Unavoidable costs that are a portion 
of total costs relevant to more than one regional route 
and which are reasona,bly attributable.to each. for 
example, portions of the total cost of a station may be 
attributed to a number of routes w~ing some 1vrea.sonable 91 · 
basis. 
4, Overhead~· Unavoidable casti:;; that do not q,irectly 
perti';iin to routes but which must be ii ehare_d Ii arbitrarily. 
for example, legal and a~mi~istrative costs are real 
expenses that must be covered; but~ if a route or group 
of routes ceased to be operated, it is not likely that 




AreaG Requiring Economic Decisions 
The Civil Aeronautics Act sets forth a general declaration of 
policy designed to guide the Soard in all determinations of public 
convenience and necessity. ln that policy statement, one finds that 
the Board is to pursue the activities of both promoting a,nd regulating 
air traJ:1..:;;portation. Promotion and regulation in turn are to be carried 
out in pwsuit of multiple objectives; highest degree of safety, sound 
.economic conditions, proper adaptation to the needs of domestic com-
merce, the Postal Service, and the national defense. Competition is to 
be employed as a means "to the extent necessary"· 
Malcolm A. Macintyre, former president of Eastern Air Lines, lnc., 
set ~ort4 in a recent address th~ general competitive economic problem-
areas facing managerial initiative under governmental control (8). The 
. areas he identified will serve as additiona.l general framework within 
which the relevance of certain funQQ)'rlental E1conom:tc concepts of the 
theory of the firm to m~agerial decision-making will be analyzed •. 
They i.nclude: 
1. Price setting. 
2. New route applications. 
?· Produot development promotion and differentiation. 
4. Cost e$timating a,nd control. 
5, Equipment selection • 
. 6. Flight i;;cheduling. 
CHAPTER III 
DEMAND ANALYSIS IN AIR TRANSPORTATION 
Introduction 
The theory of demand in all its ramifications constitutes a major 
portion of the traqitional economic theory of the firm. And, on the 
application side, a progressive management must devote substantial 
amounts of resources to 13-nalysis of dete;r,m~nants of demand, changes in 
demand? elasticity of demand and pricing strategi~s since the economic 
facts of life definitive of these phenomena ultimately determine the 
firm'e sales and revenues. 
Th~s chapter ident~fies and discusses economic facts peculiar to 
demand analysis in air transportation. It also qemonstrates that firms 
in search of added profit formulate policies within the framework of 
economic theory and, thus, make theory practical and useful though 
lacking statistical measurements of important variables. The corporate 
actions reported with respect to product differentiation, advertising~ 
and various pricing schemes demonstrate specific attempts by firms to 
implement economic theory in crucial decision areas~ Finally, this 
f;iection, by describing important environmental characterist:Lcs, lays 
additiona;I. groundwork for, a subs~quent case analysis of Frontier's 
50 per cent stcµidby fare decision. 
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· Demand for Air Transpqrtation 
Demand for a product :i,E;i defined as the various quantities of it 
whieh consumers are willing and able to teke off the market at all 
possible a].ternative price~ during a given time ~riod, othel:' things 
constant. Factors which have been show,p. to have a sign:l,fioant influ-
ence on dl;:!mand for air transport between any two :points iri.clude (6): 
1. The pop~ation sizes of the two cities and the distanc~ 
between them. 
2~ The natural obstac].es to ground tr~sport and their 
effect on the time-saving of air transport. 
3. The occupation of the people who inhabit the area 
served, 
4. ';['he $tate of the pver-all economy. 
5. The various seasons of the year, days of the we~k, 
and the time of day. Traffic changes from winter to 
summer, from weekend ,to weE:lkday, fro111 c,iay to night, 
and f:rtom certain houvs of the day or night to others. 
6. The nunibe:i;- of stops. GeneralJ.,y, the less frequent the 
number of stops, the gree,teris demtmd. 
7. ·The frequency of service. A widely a~cepted rul.e in . . . . 
the industry is that traffic tends to incre~se mo:i;-e 
than proportionally W'!th increases in frequency of 
service. 
B. The timings· of services. As would be expeote~, 
certain timings, particularly arrival.times, are more 
attractive ,t;o customers than are others. 
In the air traneport ind1,1stry, quantity demanded seldom matches 
30 
31 
quantity supplied since usually either toq little Qr, more likely, too 
much capacity is provided a.t any given price. Since ld.rlinesare 
unab:j,.e to "produoell ou,tput in tirnes bf ].ow demand for stock accumula.:. 
tion to be sold. later at times Qf high d~ma.nd, they tend to equip them-
selves to deal with pea,k demand to avoid· losi:r.i.g any traffic. They then 
see~ to ut:tlize this idle capacity a.n,d redu¢e costE;; by schemes to 
ge?l,eriate more off-pea,k traffic. 
Demand fQrecasting is very important in the air transportation 
indust~,. •irlines list the following factors as relevant in the prep-
aration of a forecast (9): 
1. P~st company and industry growth. 
2. General eoonomio activity. 
3. Type a,nd c;apacity r;,f aircraft and equi,pment available •. 
4, Aotion of competitors. 
5, Seasonal vai;-iations. 
6. Probab:,..e effects of CAa decisiqns u,pon ~xisting · 
compet:ttion,. 
Judgment of company e~eout:i,ves. 
0 . 
The two leading forecasting methods are: 
1. Trend and qycle analyijis, using standard time series 
aµalysis Ql+ data provided hy historic sales records • 
. The objective· i1;1 to discover '.Long .. rU:n ~rowth ·tren,de 
and cyclical and Eieasonal fluotua.ti,ons. 
2. Judgment of company e:xecutives,.bas~~ on wide experi-
el').ce and a "feel'' for the rnark;e t. 
Al,l repor~s on the ~r t~an.sportation inqustry show pheriomenal 
growth ip in.dustry d,ema.nd .with growth rqtes in the near futeye expected 
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to l;>e around 15,,.17 per cent annually. Histo:rica,l.ly, l:lt ).east two-
thirds of all domestic commercial flying is done by businessmen, and 
· much of the increased de~nd over the pa$t few years can be accounted 
for by more business fly;J.ng, Much of" tl':\e increased business travel is 
essent:l.al, µaving been created by the expanding operatfc;,ns of many com-
panies wllicl-1 require repeated trips by company of:t'ici~l1;1 and profei;;-. 
1;;ional employees (JO). With no ;t'eduction in the national economic 
growth rate in sight, airlines c~ look forwa~d to a 9ontinQ.i.ng excel-
lent base. 
However, some business travel is not so essent~al. Firms with 
increasing earnings a.re sending more lower-echelon managers as dele-
gateq to conventions and conferences. Not only do such trips benefit 
the company but they also improve employee rela:t;ion$. With fast, 
medium.:..range jet service between more and. more cities, "trouble-
snooting" t:r:tps or customer :relati,onf:> trips can b~ made easily and 
quickly. Such flying impresses clients and seems to be gaining as a 
status symbol as we,il as a competitive necessity. 
The. most significant trend for airli;nl:ls today, .outside qf increases 
in rpilita,ry ... rela.ted travel, is the ip.crease in p;I..easu,re tr&vel. Due to 
the conttn.uing prosperity 6:f the econ9my, mqre discretionary income is 
going for trave;i.., particula.rly air.travel. ·Accord;i.ng. to Business~ 
(10), 
Flying is ti;lken so much for.granted, particul~r~y by young 
people, that a. whole new, and surprisingly large, market for 
airlines is emerging ....... what might be call,ed a.dvent\lre a.p.d 
impulfie flying. Astenuous aE? this business.sounds, many 
such travelers are likely to k~ep flying, for wnatever 
· reason, tb,e rest of their lives.· · · 
Competition fo.r passengers has been getting Pfogressi vel;y more 
inten.se and airlines have eagerly eought t.o increl:!.se traffic by means 
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othe;i- than price:red.iictions. Among the recent attempti9 to shift the 
:individual firm's derria,nd curve to the right .... and, as most firms follow 
suit, the indust::ry dernand curve .... is the decision. made by :American 
Airlines in·1964 to retain .the serv:l.ces of the big cred)l.t card company, 
America.rt Express (ll). ·,$ince .then, other carriers llave ·signed contracts 
with credit card companies. The objectiv~ :is to get m(l)re pleasure 
.travelers to :fly by lett!n~ them, as cre~it card holders, pa,y fc;:>r their 
Uckets in installments. The reasonin~ 1.s that for many trave_lerl;l, a 
trip now with a year to pay is t(l)o enticing to pass up. 
'fhufi, the firm and industry demand c~ves for a:tr t:r:-ansportation 
are $hifting to the right, due in part to ~m.e of the fat::tors named 
above~ 
'Changes inPemand for A1.r Transportation 
A change in demand results wl"/,en·the con<iitionl:i heid constant in 
.. . . 
defining a given state of demand change~ '?nus, inste1;1.(l of a pnce de-
crease, a giv~n firm may activelyEieek to incre&se the quantity it 
sells by, influencing coµswner pref~rences through produc:t differentii3.-
ti<:>n and prc;,duct advertising. 
Product.differentiation is defin!\!d t;i.s the eJd.stence of a prefer-
ence;.real or fancied, in the mind of the buyer for.the p:roduct of' a 
give:p.seller. The differenti~bility o!.an.indul'?try's·prod,uct is a very 
. important tra;i.t o:f market stx-uc.ture sine~ it w1:ii li~ely infiuE;ince the 
character of com~tition, p1;1,rticularly prbQ.l.\Ct competition. The objec-
tive of a :firm in a given i~dust:ry with rel:lpect to attempts to 
differentiate its product is to create a body qf c1.,1.stomers, present and 
prQspect:ive, who consider its "brand'' somewhat supe;rio;r to others.· To 
do so, it must make consumers think that its brand h,as unique and supe .. 
rior characteristics. If ~tis suc;cessf~l, it will, among other things, 
cause an in,crease in demand for itfi produc;t reil.ative to that of 
competi. tors •. 
At first glance, air transportation does not appear tc;, be a 
readily differentiable product becausE) airlines: 
l. C,:i.arge essentially the same fares~ 
2. Fly at t/:l.!:l same speeds, thus making elapsed timf:3s 
tietween oities equa;L. 
3. Use standardized aircraft. 
4. PFovide essentially the l;la.tnEl in ... flight comforts and 
amenities • 
. 5. Provide comparab;Le service in ~rcnmd passenger 
handl;i.ng facilities. 
6. a~ve comparable safety records. 
Thus, if twq airli~es serve the same c~ty-pair with compa;rable quality 
service, it may seem that., aside frc,,m a price differen.tial, one of them 
coul(i do very little to cause a sig;iif;i,ca,it preference 'l;iy e0nsumers for 
· its flight •. And yet, competitive produc~ improvements .and other at ... 
tempts at p:r,od'"1.ct differentiation a:re very important competitive prac-
tices on the part of airlines. 
The three main kinds of p:rod.uc~ improvement which p::t1oduoe 
"sucoe&eful" product differentiation are: 
1. Reducip~ scheq.uled time of flights. The speed advq!l-
tage of air trave;L over. other mec:µ\s is one of tl;te main 
,;-eaE;;Qns for the continued e;rowt;h of air: traffic rela. ... 
tive to, and at t:O.e expen~e of, other means of travel, 
J)art:iculax-ly on long hauls. · ifowever, ama:ll, .changee or 
advantagee in el.apeed :(light t;tme would seemingly be 
unnotiqed by passene;e:t-s o:r wou+<i nl!)t .be particul;ar:l,y 
. . . . . . . 
import~t due to long ground travel tiineis to and f:rom 
ai;rports. 
2. Increasing the frequency of available r:u:e;nts. A. 
widely· acce·pte<i notion among airline manae;ements is 
that air travelers a:re more apt to seek a reservqtion 
with a: c~rier wh:tch is known to offer .frequent 
.. !lign,ts. In fact, if a carrier e,x:periences a decreafiie 
in demand for its service between a c:t, t;y-... pair and is 
seeking some way to m;i.nimize.t:J:ie effect of the result-· 
ing lQw ... :J,oad factor on its over'l"all profits, it will 
us1.1ally not reduce the number. of flights offered per 
day. To do so may further redµce its lead factor as 
regular and potential .customerEi gray;l.ta;t;e to the otner 
ai:rlinef'l. Thus, i~ an attempt. to lower costs by 
rec;'l.uqing the .quantity of se:rvice offereq.,· such ·a carrier 
would likely· be faced with' even g:reater d~creases i:q. ·. · . . . . . 
revenue as traffiq is loat not only from fligq.ts can .. 
celed but also. frpm its· r~rn~ni.ng. flights a1p well .• 
3~ Employi~ faster, larger, and more cpmfortab~e aircraft. 
. . . 
In mar~etswhere new.aircraft. have be~n introduced, the 
carriers.rnaki:rie; tbe innovations have.consistently 
exper:i,enced significan.tincrea1;3es in traffic.among 
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people who wo-qld not otherwise hav~ flown, as well a.s 
transfer of traffic from c.ompeti to;rs not equi val en tJ,.y 
·equipped, ev~nwitb, higher prices. 
Wit:ti appare?ltly increasing vigor and enthusiaem, a.ir],;lnes are 
seeking to tap tb,e near wlirnited potential m~ket for air transporta .. 
t;i.pn. Cqm:petitive actions taken individually have the aj.m of shif.ting 
the d,ema?ld curve to the right for the individual firm ~th.respect to 
competit;ton. At tne same t:f.me, however, such aggres1;3ive competitive 
behavior serves to draw~ ever increas~ng number of cµstomer$ into the 
market, thereby increas~ng total market demand as well,· 
One costly aspeot of thiE;i qompet1-tion is t:ti.e race to secure air-
line stewar4esses (12), 
' ' ' 
Millio;nsof dollars are spent annual;ty to find.young ladies 
with the preciee qual:it~es that will insure their rapid de-
parture f:ro1fl. the company. The better the stewardess the 
girls will make, the betteX' are their prospects for marriage 
•••• Despite this apparent waste of money, the eearch for 
and trainin~ of these girls goes on at an ever costlier 
pace. 
Eacn. major airline maintains a lavish training· schPol, iilP,d the 
;i.nvestment in each girl py the. t.ime shE;) gradu1;1tes ranges from $1,000 to 
$3,000. Average :J.ength of ~mpJ.oyment is eighteen months. Iri fact, one 
. . . . . . . 
trunkline, American .Urlip,es, has recently bE;Je:P. rtmning a l':ierieEl ot 
c'?,rto<;>n-ads in lei:td::tng; national puQlioations depict:i,ug a :p~gular Cl).stom .. 
er who i,ss':U'pr1Eied to find that his :regular .:t'l:i,.f!:ht·no longer has his 
favorite stewardess serving :i,.t. The captain explains that she has just 
mai-tied. ~e mes~~e the airline is pro~otin~ is, of course, that it 
offers stewardesses who are socha,rming and.beiiut:i,.ful th~t it cannot 
. keep them and that the c~tomer will f;i.n,d his flJgb,t al;I. the more 
enjoyable bec~l.\se qf it. 
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Delta, Airline!:I also is using ads showing photographs of one qf its 
stewardesses as she :performs her duties with wide smiles. The caption 
reads that the airline's aim and heJ:' job ;i.s a "happy ship", that 
Delta's friendly stewardesses have a speci13.l kp.ack ;for helping passen-
gers enjoy their travel, and that Ctlstomers will thoroughly enjoy 
Delta's uniqu.e brand of person,;il service. The reason for these J,.arge 
. c;:om:petitive expe:q.dHures are obvious: to attempt to differentiate the 
product and to increase the individl,lal firm 1 $ demand. A report in 
Business Week concludes (12): -..--
Why are airlines so willing to run what one vice-president 
c1;1.lls "our school for brides"? Tney wouldn't have it any 
otner way. With most plan,es practically identical, the 
fares the same, and the food similar, the only noticeable 
differe'l1,ce is the quality of cabin service. For many 
passengers the charm and attractiveness of the stewardess--
or lack of it ...... personi;t'y the airline. 
Perhaps the most striking example of attempted product differentia-
tion is that of Braniff International. A new president took office in 
April, l965, and in a reported i:qterview said (13): 
On our present system, there's going to be an aggressive 
marketing program. Br~iff is going to J,.oo~ different 
than it's ever looked before--airplanes, interiors, ticket 
offices, uniforms. It's going to be a. new Braniff with a 
positive image and the customer is going to think of us as 
a warm company, We w:i..11 innovate. We're going to pursue 
actively the t;raffj,o available to us and we' re going to 
serve :it well. 
Later on in 1965, Braniff revealed its palns to gain more customers 
by f:!µch promotion. Among other things, Braniff 
l. P1,3,inted the fuselagE:s of all its jets in solid colors. 
·2. Fitted out its ho13tesses with~ series of quick:.change 
unifo:rims especialJ.y and uniquely dem,gp,ed by an Italian 
designer. 
3. Bani1$1'].ed plastic cups and di.::;lles from the airplane and 
begem serving all meals on china and all drinks in 
glasses. 
4. ~ssued permanent baggage checks to regular customers 
to speed up the check~in process and to build custom~ 
Business Week reporte~ (14); ·-
.All thi51--and more--is designed simply to attract attention 
to the airline, and th.e recoi;-d ahows that the application 
of such luxtU"iant icing to the basic means of ~ir trans~ 
portation can work wonder~. 
Product Advertisin5 
The most effective mea:Q.s of increasing quantity sold of a. product 
is ustJally a price decrease. But airlines generally are either denied 
or prefer to avoid the use of this competi ti.ve weapon and in large part 
resort to other means. Tb.e plac;e and purpose of advertising in the 
over-all marketing policies of airlines is to attempt to build customer 
'''brand" preferences. S;i.nce airline$ are not able to display their 
product to potential new~ first-time customers, they must attempt to 
c;:reate ~ p:referential notion of the supe;riority of their product in the 
minds of the potential customer. Since the productoffered is nothing 
more than "arrivals", most ads include \iestination and the points per ... 
tinent to destination.such as speed of the aircraft, 'frequency l;>etween 
city-pairs, on .... time perfo:r;-rnance, and speoi11l lil?leni'\;ies of'fereo. by the 
p~ticular a.ir:liin.e. · Much airline a.llvertisi.n~ has been '@d is directed 
to th.ose l:llready fly;Ln.g, fo:r the p:rup9~e of' diverting the e:d&i;;ing 
.market from o~e airline to another. 
A major objective of advertising is to oreate a distinctive corpo-
rate image o~ identi,ty in. a basically i:p.distin.ctive ppoduct l'llarket~ 
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?he prime current e:x:ample is Braniff' Internationa.1 1 $ so-.called innova-
~ions and subsequent advertising of those innovations. Braniff calls 
it "The End of the Plain Plane" and with color layouts of its new look, 
mentions the 17,543 changes have been initiated! Woven into these basic 
advertisements are facts concerning increased frequencies between major 
cities, $tepped up on-time average, faster jets, streamlined ticketing, 
6-minute baggage delivery, and new write-your-own-ticket service, 
~n 1961, Continental Airlines staged a big promotion by painting 
all its airplanes a brilliant gold, put its crews into gold uniformsj 
and its ground crews into gold overalls and astronaut helmets, Accord-
ing to Business Week (11+), "That certainly attracted attention to 
Continental and in the long run it paid off, too.'1 Currently, Continen-
tal is advertising itself as "The Proud Bird With the Golden Tail" and 
asks the question of ad viewers: 
How do you show something you can't see? How do you show 
the difference between Continental and the other major air-
lines? How do yoµ show pride? That's the difference. You 
can't see it~-you feel itl 
These ads go on to talk about how Continental employees maintain 
their individuality, interests,and involvement in how their airline is 
run due to the fact that Continental, as a major airline, is not a big, 
impersonal one. Then the pitch is made: "Come travel with Continental 
Airlines and feel the difference pride makes. 11 
United Airlines has been generally depicting situatioµs with wh::Loh 
individuals can identify. For example, Unit~d portrays a scene of a 
small girl taking her first flight witn her father who is actually on a 
businEll:lS trip Md the fun l;)oth are having; another is that of a wife 
II t;ricking II her b,usband into taking her along on hi.s weekend business 
trip and charging her fare 1;,ycre\iit ca:rd, Then follows the identifying 
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phra,se, "Fly the Friendly Skies of United. 11 
American Airlines' ml;l.in image-objective :i,s ".American built a,n air-
line for professional travelers.II The content of present ads generally 
start with some question such as, "If Gene Kelly doesn't wait in line, 
why should you?" The main message then describes the outstanding ser-
vice offered by American, its superb cuisine and so forth, all origi-
nally provided to meet the exacting demands of corporation presid.ents, 
ac,tors, and other professional travele:rs. The ads typical.ly c;t,ose with: 
"If you aren't a professional travelera yourself, we thought you 0 d at 
least like to know how to get the Sl;l.me serivice. Just take the same 
airline." 
Local service airlines have not so far made the same attempts to 
identify themselves with catchy phrases but have instead seemingly con-
centrated on informing the public as to just where they do offer service 
and how good it is. One <;:ommon a,d is that showing the route map of the 
carrier with major cities served pointed out. Like trunklines 9 they 
are quick to advertise the purchB).se and installati.on on routes of any 
newer, faEiter aircraft, particularly jetso 
Since air travel is not usually p\ll'chased frequently by those other 
than business traveleJ;'s, building up loyalties to a particular airline 
is thought to be difficulto Neverthelessj large expenditures are made 
each year in 1;1.n attempt to specifically do just that, ai;, well as pro-
mote air travel in general and management must decide just how much to 
spend on advertising in the first plcaoe. There are ni;:, known formulas 
which measure the return on a given outlay nor· is there a way to con-
cluqi vely isolate the effeqt of actvertising. Nevertheless, the deci-
sion must 'be made and. evaluated. 
Recently, Mohawk Airlines, a local s~rvice carrier which purchased 
nine BAC One-Eleven short-range jets, found itself in stiff jet service 
competition with American Airlines in the New York City-Syracuse market. 
Mohawk, the first local service ca.;rrier to acquire jets, put several 
into eiervice during July, 1965, between thie city-pair, offering six 
·flights pe:r dl.iY, with a one-way first-class fare of $17.90. American 
got into the market in March, 1966, witn the same aircraft, offering 
eight flights daily at a one-way coach fare of $15.55. The market is 
already made up largely of commuting businessmen, though the introduc-
tion of jets is expected to further increase business-comm~ting. 
Despite the new competition, Mohawk reported an 80 per cent i~-
crease in passenger travel the first two.weeks of April, 1966 over 
April, 1965. According to Business~ (15), "Mohawk credits much of 
the increase to a r·ecent heavy adve:rtising campaign :i,n the Syracuse 
newspapers." At the time of t}:).e report, American was countering with 
its own ad campaign. 
The importance of advertising dollar-wise can be seen in industry 
statistics.· In 1965, the average percentage of total revenue spent on 
advertising by the twel.ve trunklines was 2.7 per cent. The largest 
dollar amount was the approximately $20 million made by TWA. By com-
parison, Braniff spent $4.5 million, having doubled its expenditure 
over 1964, and Frontier spent $480,000, In 1966, Braniff alone spent 
$6.5 million on advertising and feels it received at least that much 
worth in free publicity (l6). 
Alth~ugh business travelers constitute the fol,lndation of the air 
transportation industry, the greatest potential for increased traffic 
lies in the yet untapped, tremendous-sized market of automobile 
travelers. This is pru;,ticularly true for local service airlines. 
Surveys have s~own that automobile travelers not only generally are 
unaware of the relative cost of air transportation versus automobile, 
but also have never really considered taking an airplane to a vacation 
spot for general pleasure or for visiting with family and friends on 
trips of around 500 miles or less. Hence, much current advertising is 
directed toward this major travel market, emphasizing the economy, 
safety, speed,and other advantages of air travel. 
But every dollar spent on advertising will have to be taken from 
some alternative use. Therefore~ management not only must decide how 
much to spend on advertising and its probable effect, but also where to 
do it, what media to use, and when. 
Price Elasticity of Demand and Pricing Practices 
Management may take one of two, or both, discretionary actions to 
influence the quantity sold of its product. It may attempt to increase 
the demand for its brand by various means of product differentiation 
and advertising, and/or it may reduce price in an attempt to increase 
quantity demanded. The extemt to which the latter is successful in 
bringing about increased sales and revenue depends in large measure on 
the price elasticity of demand not only of the firrn' s particula:J;' brand~ 
but also of the entire market since any individual competitive pricing 
action will almost ceFtainly be followed in an industry like air trans= 
portation. Thus, one of the crucial questions facing any airlines con-
templating a price change is how responsive will consumers be to the 
change; that is, by how much will quantity demanded change with a 
given price change, assuming all other determinantl:l of quantity taken, 
remain constant. 
Measurine; Price Elasticity of Demand 
for Air Transportation 
Attempts to accurately calculate the price elasticity of demand 
for ai.r transportation have, for the most p~rt, proven fruitless. The 
results of two studies are cited by Caves (4), one having been made by 
American Airlines and submitted as evidence in the recent CAB General 
Passenger Fare Investigation proceedings and the other from the Civil 
Aeronautics Board's Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics. 
American Airlines acknowledged that its calculations ''were of the 
roughest sort," but insisted that other plausible methods were just as 
rough and inconclusive. In the Board study, the statistical procedures 
were considered acceptable but the results unacceptable due to the high 
intercorrelation of the independent variables. The influence of both 
income growth and time could not be adequately held constant and so 
distorted the real effect of price changes on passenger-miles flown. 
Miller (9), in reviewing the same General Passenger Fare Investigation, 
c;i. tes part of the testimony of United Air Lines: 
The third matter for consideration is the effect of the 
increase in fares of 17 percent upon our market. There 
is no precise way of determining in advance what su.ch 
an effect will be. Lacking any scientific approach to 
this question, it then becomes largely a matter of 
judgment. In our judgment 1 the increase in fares which 
we propose will have no appreciable effect upon our 
market. 
American Airlines and the then Capital Airlines concurred with the 
statements of United, saying in fact that they believed, on an intuitive 
basis~ the demand for air transportation to be inelastic. 
Any attempt to meai;;ure price elasticity of demand for any product 
must contend with. s~ifts in the damand curve caused by any number of 
non-price determinants of quantities demanded at particular prices. 
· Furthermore, demand for ai:I;' transportation is divisible into at least 
two major classes, personal (or pleasure) travel and busiµess travel, 
both of which are further divisible into several sub-classes. Thus, 
~ elasticity of demand for air transportation, so-called, is an 
aggregative and necessarily more imprecil;le concept. 
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The qonclusion of two authorities in the field of air transporta-
tion summarize the present state of knowledge with respect to price 
elasticity of demand; 
Caves (4): There is, in short, noclea,r evidence about 
the aggregate demand elasticity for air transport at the 
present time. 
Barry (6): The fact is we know very little about the elas-
ticity of demand for air transport. We have had too little 
e~perience to j~dge from, and research is made difficuJ,.t by 
the continual changee in f1;:1.ctors other than price. It is 
not easy to isolate the effect of price changes. 
In the absence of exact data and precise knowledge, airline man-
agement must nevertheless make decisions with ~espect to pricing. 
Their prqclivity, past and present, h1;:1.s bee;n to~ as if the demand 
.for their product were inelai;;tic, as evidenced py their continued 
advocacy of price increases. This is especially true of trunk carrierso 
L9ca,l service carriers are forced by the competition of automobile 
travel and other surface transportation to behave as if they, at least, 
face a more elastic demand and so usually lead what efforts there are 
in the industry for more competitive price decreases. 
The CAB and Price Elasticity of Demand 
In June, 1965 the Civil Aeronautics Soard got a new chalrman, 
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Charles s. Murphy, In his first speech to airline managements, he 
dealt with the topic of price elasticity of demand for air transporta-
tion (17). I;n essence, he told the carpiers that reductions in passen-
ger fares and continued increases in carrier profits can take place 
concurrently. He pointed out that the record over the last two years 
showed: 
1.. A 10 per cent reduction in long ... haul first-class fares 
2. A 50 per cent cut in mil:i.tary fwlough faref:i 
3. A 33 per cent cut in family plan fares for a coach group 
of three 
4. An 80 per cent cut in excess baggage charges 
while net profits increased: 
1. In 1964 by 180 per cent over 1963 
2. In 1965 by 211 per cent over 1964. 
Mr, Murphy (17) further stated: 
I; will readily concede that these examples do not establish 
the proposition that any and all fare reductions re.sult in 
increased profits. On the other hand, I think you must 
concede they do establish the proposition that the two 
things can exist simultaneously ••• For the present, I will 
leave this with a simple statement that, in my judgment, 
reductions in vassenger fares are not necessarily synonymous 
with reduced profits. 
Later in the .same month of November, :J.965, Mr. Murphy delivered 
hi.s second .speech to a:i,rline officials, again setting forth p.is economic 
philosophy (18)~ While expressing his pleasure at the excellent earn-
ings of the industry, he neverthele.ss called their attention to the 
fact that about 45 per cent of the pa1;,senger seats offered by the indus-
try move empty. He remar~ed: 
We are forturi.ate indeed that American technology has pro-
duced the amazingly efficient jet. Otherwise, we could 
well be in deep trouble at thG moment. For I know of no 
other indUl;)tpy which could approach a profitable state 
operating at little more than half of its capacity. But 
even in you,r industry, it would be folly from the stand-
point of your private interests, the national economy 
and the public welfare to accept such a waste of potential 
ae just one more regrettable fact of life. 
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Mr. Murphy emphasized that even though air travel is indispensable 
to the time-poor businessman and that this market is highly dependable, 
the greatest potential market and one which must be reached is the 
money-poor domestic pleasure traveler. With ::t;'espect to tourism by air, 
he said (18): 
The task of developing tourism will inevitably call for p:rice 
reductions -- selective but substantial. For there is an-
other very real difference between personal and business 
travel which is well to keep in mind -- the net cost of the 
seat to each ••• The businessman's transportation is paid for 
with pre-tax dollars, persona.ltravel with afte;r--tc;lX dollars ••• 
It is small wonder that the pleasure traveler has his ear 
close to the ground when it comes to price. 
Chairman Murphy aJ,.so had some specific suggestions for the ca;rriers 
in the way of special-fare programs, though maintaining that the air-
lines themselves are the best ju,dge1;, of what promotional fare approaches 
are ;t"equired. Foreigners can travel anywhere in the United States at a 
flat charge on most local service carrier1;, and seve;t"al trupk lines, and 
Mr. Murphy suggested ttiat such a program for United State.s citizens be 
considered, either on a space-available basis to protect regular fares 
or only on off-peak f],ights having very low passenger load factors. As 
an additional means of penetrating the pleasure travel market, he fur-
ther proposed special excursion fares and, all-expense tours .• 
After the two speechs by Mr. Murphy, various industry spokesmen 
registered their disagreements with Murphy's.over-all pricing philoso-
ph,y, espec;i.ally with :t;"espect to excess capacity. They particularly 
feel it is an erroneous assumption that, because thEly fly so many empty 
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seats, fares should be lowered. On the contrary, most air carriers 
generally believe that rapid and increasing capital e~pansion is needed 
to make traffic grow, not fare reductions. Most of them feel, "It is 
the convenience of air service, the assurance that seats both there and 
back are readi],.y available and not the. price that has caused and will 
continue to cause airline businei;is to grow ••• " (19). 
Going into 1966, the CAB refused to permit the airlines to collect 
an erstwhile traditional surcharge whenever a piston flight was replaced 
wit4 a jet. The trunk airlines quickl1 told the CAB this action would 
cost them approximately $146 million in revenue per year. The carriers, 
fearful of a CAB imposed across-the~board fare reduction that they be-
lieve would reduce revenue per passenger without increasing passengers, 
have increased applications for special bargain fares for groups who 
normally do not fly. 
Selected Airline Pricing Decisions 
Mr. Murphy's suggestions to the industry, in particular the eleven 
trunklines, for.fare plani;i ti;, develop the pleasure ... travel market are 
not e~actly new; nor do all airlines take the viewpoint that fare re-
ductions can only prove unprofitable for the indui;itry. So .. called · 
"promotional fares" of one kind or another existed lqng before Mr. 
Murphy .took office. For instance, the Ex:ecutive Vice President for 
Bonanza Air Lines, a local service carrier, criticized the industry in 
1962 for its failure to properly define the. opjec1;ives of promotional 
fares, guide the development of the particular market sought, advertise 
the service and, in general; actively seek a wide public acceptance of 
the service. He pointed out then what all.airlines know -- that the 
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auto traveler ii;; by far the largest untapped potential and that only 
a fractional penetration of this pot!;!ntial wol,lld be worth a fortune to 
the ind~stry. In citing :SOnanza's own promotional fare program initi-
ated ;l.n April, 1961, he said (?O): 
We are not shrinking from the prospect that use of the fares 
might reduce yield. We firmly believe -- and the facts 
fully sustain us in tn!s ... '."" that the additional.traffic gen-
erated far more than offsets the reduction in fares and pro-
vides a very substantial gain in net revenue. Not only have 
we produced new excuraion traffic but we have also produced 
a growth in full fare ~ayi:ng traffic in the excursion mar-
kets that is four times the rate of gr9wth in the non-
excursion markets. 
In late 1961, Continental Airlines announced a "startling", revo-
lutionary decision with respect to pricing and the elasticity of 9-eniand 
in the. airline industry. .Airlines hav.e · for several years offered two 
basic types of service, first-class and coach, 'but in November, 1961, 
at a time when industry losses approached .i35 million, Col').tinental pro-
poeed a third industry-wide, "no frills" jet economy cl,ass with fi:U'es 
25 per cent below regular jet coach fares. '!'his was a period of slow 
growth and jet over-capacity.in the industry, ·and the CAB wae faced 
with determining whether the lower fare would increase new traffic 
sufficiently to increase ~irline profits or whether it would result in 
even heavier lqsse.s for the irtdust:ry. 
The president of Continental maintained that the 16 to 35 per cent 
increase in fares since the inid ... fifties l:iad seriously damaged the in-
duetry and that a pr;i.ce dec;,rease was necess~ry to re9t6re traffic 
growth. Continental's positio~ was stated to the Civil Aero!l/i:lutic's 
;Boarq as follows (2l): 
At .the p:resent time, over 75 per cent of our je"'1 revenue 
passenger miles are in Club Coach service. We know that 
a· porti.on of this traffi<;: is business traffic that has 
been qiverted from First ciass. We do not believe very 
much of this·business tr13,ffic will be diverted to the new 
''economy service," since it wi.;J.l be "Spartan" i:P. nature ••• 
In the Club Coach section olf' t:h~ aircraft, we wiJ.l be pro-
viding 42 seats at a: load factor of 50..,.55 per cent, or 
a,pproximately 40 per cent of the traffic we are now carry .. 
ipg in this section With capacity reduc;:ed 50 per cent •. In 
t}le economy section, we anticipate a load factor of 60 per 
cent, comprised of 25 to 30 passengers diverted from 
existing Club Coach service and 15 to 20 new passengers in 
the markets, attracted by new low fares. Thia IJ.ew traffic 
will consist of the following: 
l. Newly crei,ited traffic among the people now un-
willing or unable to spend the time required to 
travel by surface means and ~ble to afford 
air travel .at existing price levels. 
2. More frequent travel among present air travelers 
dµe to reduced prices. 
3. Tra,vel diverted from surface transportation. 
These load factors would result in a requirement for.Conti-
nental Airlines to develop approximately 550,000 additional 
revenue passenger miles per day.· Even assuming that no new 
travel is created,· tW,s :i:-epresents a diversio:p. from exist-
ing surface travel of only 2.4 per cent of the 22.5 million 
daily estirnated surface passenger miles in Continental' s 
market area. There is no question but t;hat this modest 
diversion from surface trB.1'1-sportation media will be realized 
with the planned reduction of fares. 
The industry'Ei most vocal dissenter was United AirUnes. United 
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maintained t;hat 11 ••• for longer-haul business travel, the distinguishing 
characteristics of air t;ransportation such as speed and comfort provide 
a value so great, price is not, in United's opinion, a serious 
consideration 11 (21 L 
Both ai.rline managements qi ted statistics, examples and other 
reasons to support their :i:-espective pos~tions concerning the importance 
of priqe is stimulating air transportation. Finally, the CAB voted to 
imspend Continental Is plan because, "· •• there is substantial question 
as to the economic val.idity of the propoe;ed fares if applied to the 
industry as a whole 11 ( 21) • 
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About a.year later, in Aµgust, 196:?, Continental submitted a re-
vised proposal to the C.A.B which would establish "economy" f~es in 
selected marl.5-ets. 20 per cent below conventional coach fares, instead of 
the originally proposed 25 per cent. In addition, the coach fares were 
to be raised 10 per cent, cutting what many felt to be an excessive 
spread between cqach and first-.class fa!'es that had caused considerable 
transfer of traffic to the lower-co9t class. The CAB approved the new 
plan on an experimental basis because it was " ••• uncertain what appeal 
the reduced fares would have to the public and we cannot, therefore, 
forecast accurately the impact of the proposal on the net revenue of the 
carriers" (21): 
Although other airlines had in the past experimented with reduced 
fares in special travel markets (in particular, commuter type city.:. 
pairs), Continental's experiment was generally acknowledged to be the 
most important up to that time in attempting to increase the sales of 
air transportation by fa;re reductions. It is a prime example of a 
decision made on the baSiis of price elasticity of demand considerations, 
but where the exact or eve:o. nearly exact elasticity coefficient was not 
known and where n experts" argued from oppos:i, te · positions. 
During the same yea;r that Conti,nental proposed an<;i subsequ,ently 
installed its third·level economy fare, the Assistant General Manager 
of Irish International Airlines wrote. an article commenting on the 
economic state of the industry and the cau,ses of the airlines' depres-
sion (2~). Research at his company .shows that the ~ublic is mainly 
concerned with two factors, safety andpripe, and t:q.at speed, comfort, 
and scheduling reliability, though important, have less powerful an 
impact. Speed, he grants, has been the predominant advantage of the 
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airpla,ne as a mode of travel, but the industry has been and i~ ob-
eessed with speed. Noting that the greatest amount of passenger travel 
.involves segm~nts shorter than 500 miles, he bemoans t4e fact that 
carrierfi rushed to buy long-hal)l expensive jets i:q.stead of demanding an 
· economic short~haul aircraft. He remarked (22) 
If we had been less amena'ble to theblandishments of' manu-
facturers and had given reduction of fares a higher prior-
ity than increased speed, would we not have served the 
public better and would we ourselves not be in a better 
financial position? ••• It is time that the economic 
relationships f;luoh as cost/price and demand/supply took 
precedence over technological allure. 
One of the most un.iqt.ie market "experiments'' in air travel history 
is being conducted under strong competitive pressures in the Los 
Angeles-San Francisco market, currently the largest air market in the 
world between two cities, In the last .three years since i962-63, the 
compounded annual growth rate. has been 25 per cent per year, A flight 
is 340 miles one way 1 and the current jet "commuter" fare of 3.97 cents 
pe;r- mile (a one .... way tariff of $13.50 plue ta)!:) is lower than ap.y other 
air fare in the United States· (23). 
'rhree. trunks (TWA, United, Western) and one intrastate carrier, 
Pacif;i.c $o~thwest Airlines (PS.A), compete in this market, PSA h,aving . · 
initially recognized and developed the p9t;ential. 4pp:roximately 
16,000 round trip seats per da.y are flown by the fc;,ur carriers, United 
ca:rrying 37.8 per cent of the traffic; PSA, 32.8 per cent; Western, 
18,9 per c.ent; and TWA, 10.5 per cent. ·Over its limited i~trasta.te 
route in 19$4, PS~ had a pre-tax margin of profit of 27.9 per cent, a 
record for the in~uetry. According to Anwrican Aviation (23), "It 
accompliahed this by charging lower fare~ to build up high.er traffic 
volumes. As on-time record of 94 per c~nt helped too." 
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Competition in this market has included equipme;nt, schequling 
frequencies, in-flight services, and the. matching Qf fare out with 
fare cut. The development of this low-fare, jet commuter service has 
cau~ed the industry to reconsider the effects of lower fares on market 
sales, especially when accompanied by improved aircraft. One .of the 
questions arising from this California experience is whether there will 
be similar high-capac;i.ty, one-class, low-fare commuter service between 
other high-traffic city-pairs. 
New Industr;y: Pramo,tional Fare Plans 
During 1965-66, air carriers ~eceived CAB approval to put into 
effect several additional promotionE:!1 fare plans. Th;i.s reflects the 
Board's policy of encoura!;!;ing domestie air carriers to provide." low-
fa.re, no-frill" service in markets where traffic demand is sufficient 
to support economical operations (24). · 
Tne use of third-level II economy" fares, along the lines originally 
proposed by Continental in 1962, which are set 15 to 20 per cent below 
coach fares, was expanded. 
The Farnil~ Fare discount wa~ liberal.ized bY, the trµnkline carriers 
' ( . 
by extending the period of applicabil;i.ty to coach passengers and to 
additional days of the week, The fares are availaQle to encourage 
. . . 
heads of families to take their wives and families with them on out-of-
town trips. The mall-of ... the.-house pays full jet coach fare, but gets 
one-third off for his wife and two-thirds off for each child under 22 
years of age. 'l;'WA, the o;t'!ginator of the plan, expects its family 
passenger milei:s · to increase. from 700 million a year to 1.3 billion, 
resulting in a $34 million iDcrease in revenue (25). 
Ro~d-Tri~ E;x:cursion fares are available involving a 25 per cent 
reduction from regular :f'ares •. They are dei;;igned primarily for those 
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who do not qr ca.nnot use the family plan. The traveler cannot return 
in the same oalendar week and must arrange his trip so that he does not 
travel on those hours of the week and days of the year when air traffic 
achieves abnormal peaks, 
Youth Fare plans were introduced in January, 1966, originally by 
American .A.irlines and Allegheny Airlines. Such plan1:;1 provide that any-
one between the ages of 12 and 22 y~ars CEUl purchase an airline identi-
fication card entitling him to fly at one~half coach fare on a 
space~available, no reservation basis. Youth fare plans are in effect 
year around except for heavy traffiq holiday periods. 
A &ard official ~ecently described th~ youth fare proposals and a 
1:ipecial standby fare proposal by Frontier Airline.a as "unique ventures" 
in rate making (26). The objective of youth fare plans is to gain an 
increase in short-run revenues by filling otherwise idle seats and to 
.enhance long-~un profits by exposing a coming generation of adults to 
air travei. Although there have been problems for the airlines with 
the youth fare, :Susiness Week :reported (27): "lhere is no doubt that .,.....,....... . 
the youth fare has generated a s~bstantial and desirable increase in 
business, up to 2i, per cent for aome linea. '' 
In general, the airlines are developing fare reductions aimed at 
stimulating domestic personal and vacation trav~l •. Feeling that rela-
tiveJ,y few people desire othe;r standard goods and services, they aeek 
to take into account the different needs o! customers a;nd qffer a range 
of products at vary-ing prices to rneet this d!vers:tty of ;needs. They 
are also reqognizing the importance of' price elastioity of demand in 
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pricing decisions. For example, fares for the summer of 1965 for the 
New England area were varied in an attempt to maximize profit for the 
carriers by seeking to alloci;i.te available capacity in an optimum 
fashion. On peak t+avel days, normally Friday and Sunday, a premium of 
10 per cent is charged above normal fares, Since the carriers are not 
able to accommodate all customers requesting service at normal rates, a 
premium is charged in an attempt to ration the facilities to those who 
are willing to pay for them. On days when demand is low and load-
factors are down, usually Tuesday, Wednesday, and Saturday, a discow1t 
of 10 per cent is given to induce new customers to travel by air and 
regular CUEitomers to postpone othevwise peak-day travel plans. Normal 
fares apply on Monday and Thur;sday (24). 
Price Discrimination 
In the air transportation industry, a fare or price is the sum of 
money a customer pays for being transported from one point to another. 
Thus, what the customer pays for and what the carrier offers as a prod-
uct is, in essence, an "arrival". But customers do not view night 
arrivals as equivalent to day arrivals or weekday arrivals the same as 
weekend arrivals, and sp forth. So, by increasing the number of fares 
and conditions-of-carriage available to customers, an airline can in-
crease the number of markets for its product and the amount of traffic 
carried. Not only will this increase the firm's revenue over that ob-
tained from a single tariff, but it will also increase the use of 
equipment and will likely decrease unit costs. 
Discriminqting mar~ets by prices is possible and profitabie if the 
price elasticities of demand at each price level differ among the 
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markets and the firm is able to keep the markets segmented. Price dis-
crimination occurs whenever a firm charges different prices to different 
segments of the market for the same product, or charges prices that are 
not proportional to the marginal costs of slightly differentiated 
products. 
The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 prohibits price discrimination 
between purchasers when such discrimination is not justified on the 
basis of cost differences and where the effect is likely to lessen 
competition. Regulatory agencies such as the CAB are charged with 
enforcing discrimination statutes contained in legislation pertaining 
particularly to the public utility type firms under their supervision. 
For example, the Civil Aeronautics Act requires that airlines maintain 
"just and reasonable" rates and that (4): 
No air carrier ••• shall make, give or cause any undue or 
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular 
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air 
tr'3!lsportation in any respect whatsoever, or subject any 
particular person, port, locality, or description of 
traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimina-
tion or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvan-
tage in any respect whatsoever. 
In general, it is difficult, first of all, to determine if prod-
ucts are in fact different products or simply different versions of the 
same thing and secondly, what the true ma,rginal costs a;r-e of producing 
each product. In particular the CAB must interpret what yonstitutes 
"unreasonable" and "unjust" price or other discrimination and what 
constitutes discrimination itself. 
Without attempting to establish the historical findings of the 
Board with respect 'to price discrimination investigations, it can 
safely be said that the Board's record shows variable interpretations 
and on+y occasionally l;lre they .founded in price-marginal cost analysis. 
At a.ny ra.te, the Board ha.sencouraged and permitted carriers to insti-
tute promqtional fa.repla.ns of the variety previously described without 
finding them unreasonable, unduly preferential, or u,njustly discrimina-
tory~ Whether or not the various ,product prices are in fact propor-
tional to tb,e marginal costs of produc.tion is yet to be determined; a 
priori one would suspect they a.re not. But, at any rate, the airlines 
have found that charging diffe~ent prices to different segments of the 
i:ur transportation market is a profitable policy. 
Cl;IAPTER IV 
CASE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS OF FRONTIER AIRLINES 
Introduction 
Chapters II and III dealt with important facets of the economicj 
political, and social environment of the airline industry and with man-
~ement thinking and practices that make basic theoretical economic 
concepts operational, especially in demand analysis. This chapter will 
more conclusively affirm, through case ptudies, the validity of the 
previously stated thesis and examine in detail the anatomy of economic 
decision-making. 
The analyses which follow are of four decision9 made by Frontier 
Airlines in 1966. In eaqh case, theoretical economic principles furnish 
the general framework within which the decision was formulated. The 
basic objective of case a;nalysis is to determine how the logic of theory 
is made applicable in practice; both when reasonable quantitative 
approximations to theoretical functions can 'be calculated and when they 
cannot. This will be accomplished by demonstr1;i.ting the mechanics of 
analytical procedures used by Frontier, identifying sources of input 
data, ppecifying underlying assumptions and noting environmental 
conditions. 
Decisions of Frl'.>ntier · selected for analysis incl.ude the following: 
1. 50 Per Cent Standby Fare Decision. Though acclaimed a 
57 
'' unique venture in rate ma.king", this decision did not 
occur in a vacuum; ample precedent existed, as did CAB 
encouragement. In this major pricing decision, price 
al:ld cross elasticity of demand consid.eration$ are 
paramount, yet quantification of relevant variables is 
not possible. The case analysis deals with the role 
of economic theory in inspiring the decision, environ-
mental factors bearing on the decision, the content of 
the fare proposal, Frontier's reasoning in making the 
decision, and the revenue results of si~ months opera-
tion in markets where the fare is ~pplicable. 
2. Las Vegas Route Decision. It is one thing to assert 
that a decision is pro;fitab].eif the resulting incre-
mental revenue exceeds incremental cost, and another 
thing to make reliable estimates of either. The case 
analysis disects this major roµte application decision 
into its many component parts in o:rder to ascertain 
just how Frontier makes such an evaluation. Particu-
lar attention is given to methods of cost and revenue 
analysis, data sources, and assumptions. Cost-output 
relationships are examined, and Frontier's use of 
marginal costing is noted and illuatrated. 
3. Douglas Route Decision. This new route application is 
considerably less important economically than tn.e 
Las Vegas proposal, but basically the same revenue and 
cost estimating procedures are utilized. In this deci-
sion, Frontier expli,citly uses an added cost approach 
to route costing. That is, Frontie:r's route cost fore-. 
c;;ast, in keeping w.tth economic theqry, .is based on the 
marginal cost of added servic::e, rather than and in con-
trast to the average, full1 allocated cost approach 
typically used by the CAB. 'On part of the new route, 
the 50 per cent standby fare will be made available. 
Thus, in its revenue forecasts, Frontier, while not 
computing· price and cross elasticity of demand ooeffi-
qients, does quantify the extent to which the price 
decrease $timulates additional sales 0:: ) , and the 
p 
effect of the price decrease on quantity sold of other 
service offered (Ec). The ca~e 1,Ulalys::l,s examine$ and. 
illustrates Frontier's reasoning underlying its incre-
mental revenue and .inc,:rem~ntal cost estimating 
procedures. 
· 4. T}ie Service to Jackson Decision. The question here ie;; 
whether a new flight between two exi1;;ting Frontier st,a-
tion~, Casper and Jackaon, is "paying its own ~ay''· 
Sinc.e no new stations or aircraft are required to pro..,. 
vide the service, the problem is obviously one of com-
paring incrememtal revenue attributable to .the added 
flight with incremental cost incurred. The case anal-
· ysis examines Frontier's evaluation base.s and methods, 
Aspectfi of the General Economic Environment of Frontier 
Organizational $:tructure 
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Data for the study were obtained from Frontier Airlines documents 
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and persqnal interviews, primarily with the Director of Economic Plan-
ning. Figure 2 ie an abbreviated organ!zation chart and shows the 
position of E;conomic Planning in the corporate structure. 
Route Cnaracteristics 
Frontier Airlines, owned by RKO-General and its parent, General 
Tire and Rubber Company, is a local service carrier based in Denver, 
Colorado. Frontier was formed in 1950 by merg:i,.ng three small feeder 
line~. Its present route system covers 30 per cent of the land area of 
the United States, a.n eleven state area which contains only 2 per cent 
of the nation•s population. Normally, about one-half of Frontier's 
traffic consists of passengers connecting to and from trunklines. 
Figure 3 is a map of Frontier's present route authority. 
Frontier serves 59 cities in the Rocky Mountain and High Plains 
regions, many of them quite small •. Though these cities produce a rela-
tively small volume of traffic, most of them ~ve an extraordinary need 
for air service because of tQ.e rugged mountain terrain, long distances 
and severe winter weather which makes surface transportation difficult 
and slow. Frontier also provides service over ma,p.y relatively short 
segments where there is a demonstrated need for air service. Due to 
these and other characteristics, a lar~e amount of Frontier's operations 
cannot pay for themselves without substantial ·subsidy assistance. In 
fact, Frontier receives over $6 million annually in subsidy payments. 
Like all local service carriers, Frontier competes with trunk car-
riers over parts of its system, while enjoying some "monopoly" power 
·over other parts. About 5,000 of Frontier's 6,500 route miles are not 
served by another airline~ Frontier's two main trunk competitors are 
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Figure 3. Frontier Airlines Present Route Authority 
United Airlines and Western Airlines, particularly on east-west routes. 
Figure 4 shows Frontier's preeent system and the competition it faces 
from other carriers serving the same points. 
S;ystem Operating Statistics 
. I , 
Since .the current president· of Frontier took over the posi ti.on in 
early 1962~ the firm has experienced rapid growth. In 1962, Frontier 
flew 91,597,000 revenue passenger miles; by contrast, in 1965, Frontier 
flew 2l8·,139,000 revenue passenger miles, an incr~ase in "output" of 
over 100 ~:r cent in four years. Selected statistical data on 
Fro~tier's 1965 system operations are given in Tables XXIII and XXIV in 
Appendix B. 
Traffic Promotion Plans 
The outstand:i,.ng growth of Frontier since 1962 is attributed to the 
. . 
dynamic leadership of its president and to the unprecedented growth in 
the entire air transportation industry. Considerable market stimula-
tion is accounted for by recent promotional fare plans of Frontier 
which include t~e following: 
1. Group Developer Plaµ. This is a group-travel plan.whereby 
the organizer receives a free ticket for every seven p~id 
tickets.. Frontier encourages employees to sell this busi-
ness by paying an incentive rate of 5 per cent on group 
sales. 
2, Commuter-Car Package. On its heavy-volume Kansas City--
Lincoln route, Frontier has put in a $25 commuter nonstop 
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Figure 4. Frontier Airlines Coropetiti~e ond MonopolY Routes 
fee :J;or 24 hour~ and 50 mil~s of d:riving. Car distance 
is 440 miles roundtrip and requires over four hours each 
way. '.Frontier is asking in its ads, "Can you drive you;r 
car 44o · miles fo:r;- $36?" 
;. Family Plan. Under this plan, the most lib~ral in the 
industry, the first member of the f~ily pays the full 
first-class fare, the second member p~ys one-half fare, 
and all other members up to age 22 pay only one-fourth 
fare. The plan permits travel on (,illy day of the week 
and on separate flights (within 24 hotq-s) if desired. 
4. Military Standby Fare. Members of the Armed forces, in 
uniform and on authorized leave, receive·50 per cent 
discounts. Once accommodated, they cannot be "bumped" 
at intermediate stops in favor of a ;reservation 
passenger. 
5, Vacationland Area Fares. This plan offers unlimited 
travel with confirmed reservations for 30 days anywhere 
on Front:i.~r's system for $100. The plan is available to 
all persons residing in states wholly east of the 
Mississippi River, plus the weet coast states, Hawaii, 
and Alaska. Tickets must be obtained at a point served 
by Frontier within 15 days after arrival by common 
c~rier. Private ca:r arrivees are ineligible. 
6. · Discover America Plans. Frontier offers low coi;;t, all 
expense p,;1ckage plans for trcivellers desiring to visit 
one or more of the ni.ne national park areas served by 
Front:J,.er. 
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7. ":;?1" Fare. Travelers between the ages of 12 and :22 
holding a Frontier "21" Fare Identific,a.tion .Card rna:y 
tl;'avel on any flight, anywhere on Frontier's system 
with confirmed reservations at a 40 per cent discount. 
(Many carriers offer a 50 per cent "student" standby 
fa,re.) 
Frontier believes that these and other promotional plans entice 
many people into flying who would. otherwise travel by other means or 
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not at all. An operating principle in the industry is that when people 
fly once, they come back. 
Frontier's 50 Per Cent Standby Fare Decision 
Introduct;ton · 
I. 
Anyone can learn a formula for the elasticity of demand. 
But the estimation of pric,e elasticities in actual mar-
kets requires a variety of skills; and, the application 
of the knowledge of such elasticities to decision-making 
p;r-o blems is far from simple ( 28) • · 
In economic theory, profit-maximizing pricing behavior by individ-
ual firm:$ :i,s set forth in abstraqt analytical form as illuf;ltrated in 
. . . 
Appendix A. It ifi assumed that individual firme;; know the shapes of 
their cost and revenue curves and, th'1lfi, kn.ow the price elasticity of 
demand at every potential price~quantity combination making up the 
firm's individual demand curve. Given revenue and coE;1t data, a firm, 
realizing various.maxim'lml quantities can be sold at various prices, 
.will adjust its price and quantity of'fereq. until the marginal revenue 
from the last un!t sold is just equa).. to the marginal cost of producing 
that unit. Hence, both cost of production and demand for the firm's 
product determine the p:rioe, and a firm will adju~t its price and 
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profit~maximizing level of output as demand and cost conditions change. 
In economic theory, the price-quantity decision made by the firm is one 
of maximizing short-run profits; no explicit attention is given to 
long-run repercussi,ons of short-run ac ti onE;i. 
It must be noted explicitly that in establishing the optimum price 
and quantity in the short-run, a firm will ignore.fixed costs and base 
its decision on marginal costs. If the firm is considering a price 
decrease, it will evaluate the marginal cost of each additional unit 
sold against the marginal revenue received from its sale. If marginal 
revenue exceeqs marginal cost, the pricing decision is "profitable" in 
the short-run even though price per unit may be less than average total 
cost~ As long as price exceeds average variable cost, fixed costs are 
irrelevant and have nothing to do with pricing in the short-run. 
Since many of the assumptions made in economic price theory are 
difficult to fulfill in actual bui:;iness practice, pricing decisions can 
seldom be made with the certainties portrayed in theory. Instead, 
according to Joel Dean, author of the first leading textbook in 
Managerial Economiqs, the most pervasive pricing method used in actual 
business practice is that of cost-plus or full .. cost pricing (29). Two 
of the chief reasons for using this method are: 
1. It offers a relatively simple, mechanical, expedient 
method of setting price. 
2. It provides a method for obtaining "adequate" profits 
where the exact shape of the demand curve is unknown 
or where firms eE;ichew price experimentation. 
In cost-plus pricing, firms generally take some measure of standard 
cost as their basic cost figure. l'his cost is determined by computing 
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unit coets of labor and materials and. by estimating uni.t overhead and 
se;I.,l:tng and administrative costs for operations at some arb:i,.trary per-
centage pf capacity, or II standard" output, irresp~ctive of tlle actual 
volume of operations. A. it fair" profit percentage is then added to cost 
to arrive at the selling price. For example: 
Direct Labor ~penses, plus 
Direct Material Ex:pense, plus 
Allocated Overhead Ex:penees, plus 
A.llocate~Sellill(li and A.drpinist:rative Ex:yzenses, equals 
Fully Allocated Standard Cost of Product, plus 
A l>ercznt~e MarkuP, on Full Cost, e9
1
ua.ls 
Product Selling P:rice. 
By its very oonst~uction, a cost-plus approach eliminates demand con-
d.itions from havi~g any significant influence on ind:i,.vidual prices, and 
.thereby fails to consider the possible effects of price changes on 
quantity sold. It mechc;lilically bases individual prices on accounting 
costs which include arb:ttra~ily allocated overhead, sel,l:i;ng and admin-
istrative expenses, and gives no con~dera.tion to the explicit costs 
often m<:>st relevant to short-run decisions, namely marginal or incre-
mental costs~ 
Basically, an iiir carrier's revenue potential on a g:i, ven route is 
determined by the amount of.traffic it oan generate at the fare the 
traveling publ;i.c is willing to pay.· The two, of course, are interre-
lated. In pra.Qtical terms, the u$er of air service is price motivated 
to use it or nQt by his subjective judgme:nt on the value of ~ir service 
rel~tive to its 001;,t, weighed a.g;ainst the value/cost relationships of 
available alternative modes o:( transportation. Th~ point to be made is 
t:n.at . the user of air service is buying transportation from one :Pla.ce · 
to anothe;t' like any other commodity on the basis of its.value to him 
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liUld without direct interest in the cost to the air carrier of providing 
th,e service. Any ai,r carrier, then, should be d~ms,nd oriented and price 
itls product within a range which will attract suf:f'ic;ient traffic to 
justify its services. Firms which do give specific attention to price 
elasticity estimates, either qu~titativ~ly or judgmentally, may be 
considered firms which eeek, at least to some degree, tp follow the 
precel>tl:\I of marginal:lsm rather than rel;}' exclusively on mechanical pro-
cedures such as cost-plus pricing. 
The 50 Per Cent Standb~ Fare 
I, I 
In December, 1965, Frontier Airlines officially filed with the 
Civil Aeronautics Board a ,50 per pent space-available ta.ri,ff' applicable 
between selected points on Frontier's system •. The objectives of the 
experime~tal tariff, as stated by the Vice-President of Sales and 
Service, are: 
1. To fill empty seats on lesfi desirable flig:nts. 
2. · .To develop facts as to the stim'Q.latd ve effect of' re-
duced fares in developing increased traffic. 
Frontier originally req"Q.ested.~hat the tariff be approved on an experi-
mental basis for an initial period of six months -- from Jan"Q.ary 24, 
1966 to July 31, 1966 -- during which time careful records and statis-
tics would.be mai~tained for the consideration of the Board ap.d 
Frontier's management in determining whether the fares ~hould be con-
tinued. Frontier e;iq,licitly stated it 11;:id no intention of continuing 
the fares after July 31, l.966, unless the traffic and revenl.le results 
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indicated that tl:i.e fares were "economical,"· 
Frontier considers that there is ample precedent for its standby 
fares. In l961, tri.e Bpard permitted the operE1,tion of comparable "no 
reservations fares!' by Allegheny Airlines in the Pittsburgh ... Philadelphia 
market. In the official investigation of tqat case, the Board permitted 
Allegheny to install no-reservation fares at a 42 per cent discount from 
.regular first-claes fares and eubsequently authorized Allegheny to con-
tinue .the service at a level 25 per oent below regular first-class f1p.res 
after investigation. 
Another supporting precedent is the Board's recent approval of 
half-fares for military standby pa~sengers travel:ing q;n leave, . These 
fares were approved by the Board on the.basis that the sh.ndby traffic 
constitu.tea added paasenge;rs on.services which wouJ.,d be operated in any 
event; and the reduced fares are thereby justified on an "added cost" 
bas:i,s. 
In both of the foregoing situations, the fares apply on all ser~ 
vices •. In contrast, Frontier p;i:-oposeq. th~t it~ fare1;1 would be appl,ica- · 
. ble only on flights which are less de1;1irable in terms of intermediate 
stops and elapsed time, For example, the standby fal'e between Rapid 
City, So~th Dakota and Penver, Colorado is applicable only on multi-
stop flights operated with DC-) eq~ipment; in this same ma~ket, Frontier 
a,lso operates two daily Convaj,r 580 non:..stop round trips arid Western 
Airltnes operates one DC~6B non-stop round trip. In the Salt Lake. City-
Denver mar~et, Frontier's fare app].iea to service which,must make a 
minimum of one stop, whereas United and Western operate ten daily non-
stop round trip schedules, inqluding eight with pu~e jet equipment. 
One minor e~ception to the above includes two city-pairs where 
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there is no slJ,perior service since Frontier is the only airH .. ne serving 
the cities.. Tiles~ are Chadron, Nebraska ... Denve~ and Alliance, Nel:>raska-. 
Denver. In these markets, the fares·were proposed as a means of measur-
ing the promotional effect of reduced standby fares :tn low-density 
markets. The existing revenues in. these markets are so small that no 
seriollS adverse effect in the form of competitive impact and serious 
revenue d:i,lution can be sustained WJ.der MY ci~curnstances. Load fac-
tor~ on the flights involved are very low and there is ample space for 
additional passengers. 
Frontier based its economic justification for proposed standby 
f;µ-es on the same principle under which the Board has pepmitted car-
riers to offer ::r;-educed night coach and other off-peak fares. These 
fares. are justified on the ground that the passenger will utilize space 
which will otherwise go unused and that the. service.can accordingly be 
treate(l on an adq.ed .. cost basiei. Frontier recognized the possibility 
that some of the passengers using .the reduced fares would be passengers 
who would otherwise use Frontier's regular reservation services, but 
anticipated that such diversion would not pe large because: 
1. A very large part of Frontier's traffic in these markets 
c;:onsists of connecting passene;ers who would normally 
insist upon a reservation: 
2. The services a,re suff:;tci~ntly slower in terms of 
elapsed time as to preculude the use of such services 
by the typic~l passenger. 
In.s"Ge~d, Frontier l;>elieves there is a s'Q.bstantial number of potential 
passengel;'s not now·using l'lir transportation who would ta,ke advanta,ge 
of such services at the lower rates. For instance, the service should 
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be particularly attractive to persons traveling on personal business 
for w~om the difference in fare is important and who are, thus, willing 
to ~ccept the wicer'l:;ainty of standby service and longer elapsed time. 
Frontier maintains that standby passengers ~hould be costed on an 
adde~-cost basis since they will not be carried unless there is space 
available on the aircraft after handling all regular-fare pa~sengers. 
Some of the specific rules and regulatio?1p pertaining to the one-
way standby fares are that: 
l. They apply for transportation in either direction on a 
standby basis qn any flight, other than non-stop, oper-
ated by Frontier, b(:}tween points niW!ed. 
2. They may not be used in combination with any othe~ 
tariff to construct through fares. 
,. They are not a~plicable to or from intermediate points, 
4. Standby passengers will be· enpl~ed on a flight subject 
to availability of space at departure time and only 
after all passengers having reservations for the flight 
have been enplaned. 
5. When a standby passenger has been accommodated on a 
flight, he will not be removed at an intermediate point 
to accommodate other revenue passengers. 
6. Stopovers at ::lntermediate points are not permitted on 
staxidby fare tickets. 
Table XXV in Appencax C summarizes the twenty ci ty .. pairs and the 
propqsed one-wa~ standby fares included in Frontier'~ proposai~ Column 
1 indicates the cities between which the standby fares are applicable, 
Column 2 indicates the one-way standby fare, and ColWl!n 3 tndicates the 
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routing number. 
Tabl~ XXVI in Appendix C explains and summarizes by routing numbers 
the routing of flights between the cities named and Table XXVII in 
Appendix C is a,n e~planation of abbreviations used. 
Frontier's fare proposal was immediately protested as "unlawful" 
by four competing airlines and the National Trailways Bus System (30). 
The protestants argues in general terms to the CAB that Frontier's pro-
posal was discriminatory in that it would offer reduced fares for a 
service "like and contemporaneous" with full-fare service and that it 
was economically unsound. The latter argµment contained the charge 
that Frontier's no-reservation restriction placed on the standby fare 
was meaningless becal,\Se of Frontier's low load factor. The result 
would therefore be significant diversion of traffic on Frontier's own 
flights, making ~t necessary for Frontier to generate more than two new 
passengers for every standby passenger and significant diversion of 
traffic from other carriers to Frontier. Western Airlines specifically 
charged that the proposed standby fares would break Frontier's fare 
structure a,t intermediate points since a passenger could buy a, standby 
fare between two points but get off at an intermediate point which was 
his real destination. For instance, a Frontier passenger could pay a 
$26 standby fare between Denver and Phoenix, but g~t off at Flagstaff~ 
and save $21 from the regular $47 Denver-Flagstaff reseryatioh fare. 
· Frontier generally took the view that only ciata based upon actual 
experience qould prove whose position was correct. 
The CAB voted 3 to 2 to permit frontier to install the standby 
fare proposal on an experimental basis, The Board said (31): 
While w~ will permit Frontier to pursue this experiment, we 
believ~ that the. complaints have raised questions as to the 
lawfulness of the proposed fares which ~e substantial 
enough to make it appropriate for us to order an inves-
tigation. This will enable the Board, to maintain a 
surveillance and to eva+uate the results of this tariff 
on the basis of actual experience to determine whether it . 
ha1;, the substantial beneficial effect,s to the tz,aveling 
public and the carrier anticip~ted by Frontier or, on the 
otner ha:p.d, has the untoward results.feared by complain-
. ants. In our view this experiment must be strictly con-
trolled and it should not be spread to any other markets 
of Frontier during the experimental period. 
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As previo-usly mentioned, Frontier originally filed for the experi-
mental standby fare·to extend from January 24, 1966 to July 31, 1966, 
but in June, 1966 requested that the experiment be extended to January 
24, 1967. In its tariff revision, Frontier amended the tariff to pro-
vide that a standby passenger who is not accommodated on a flight will 
be given a reservation on the next flight to the same destination if 
he dee:,;ires. such a reservation. This proposal bro.ught new complaints 
from Qompeting carriers,·but the. CAB dismissed them in favor of 
Frontier. 
Results of the Decision 
Frontier's experience with the standby fares during the period of 
their effectiveness has been most favorable~. Table XXVIII in Appendix C 
ip a summary of passengers and revenues in the standby fare markets for 
the six months period of February through June and September, 1,966 com-
pared with the same period in 1965. The months of July and August are 
omi,tted becau~e the major trunkline strike during t~ose months b.ad ~ 
significant dampening effect upon the growth of stMd'bytraffic. 
An analy~is of Frontier's experience for the ~ix months period 
shows that: 
1. Pa~senge:rs in the 20 standby fare markets increased 
83 per cent compared with a 34 per cent increase in all 
other Frontier markets. 
~. Revenues i;n the standby ll!arkets increased 70 per cent 
co;ntrasted with a .29 per cent increase in all other 
markets. 
3. The standby fare passengers totaled 32,201 and pro-. 
duced $576,525 in revenues. 
4. The increase in passengers in the stand~y fare mar-
kets, excluding standby fare passengers, was 35 per 
cent, which compares favorably with the 34 per cent 
gr9wth of traffic in all other markets duri:iig the 
same period. 
5. The average fare under the standby plan was $17.90 
per passenger, which is larger than the average 
local service carrier fare of $16~52 for the year 
1965 and compares W:,,th Frontier's average of $22.15 
per passenger for the year 1965. 
Dut'ing February and March, .1966, Frontier conducted a survey of 
·its standby passengers and analysis of the questionnaires reveals the 
following facts: 
l~ 19 per cent of all standby passengers completed the 
questionnai;r-e. 
¢!. 56 per cent of the stwi.dby passengeri;, were traveling 
on vacation or for pe:rson13.l reasons. 
3. 9 per cent were making their first journey by air. 
4. 15 per cent would not have made the trip but for the 
standby fa.re. 
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5. 43 per aent woul~ have made the trip by surface trans· 
portation (25 per cent by automobile; 10 per cent by 
train; 8 per cent by bus), 
6. 20 per cent would have used another airline. 
7. 22 per cen~ would have traveled via Frontier, 
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Frontier has had no sigI'l.ificant diffic:ultie1:1 with respect to pas-
senger handling, "no,-shows", or other .suggested problems raised in com-
plaints against the standby tariff at the time of the original filing. 
As for the guaranteed reservation provision of the fa.re for stan,dby 
passengers unable to board a flight, Frontier finds, as it e~pected, 
that this option has been used sparingly because only a small number of 
passengers are aci;uall;y unable to board the f:).ight of their choice. For 
example, during the months of September, October, and November, 236 
standby passen,gers were "unab],ed" (l.67 per cent of 14, 091 standby pas-
sengers). Of the 236 unabled passengers, 167 were confirmed on later 
flights <1.2 per cent of t~e standby passengers) •. This rule has pro-
vided a ~ignificant benefit for those few standby passengers who were 
una.bled on the flight of their choice. It has had no adverse effect on 
Frontier's revenues and has made the standby fares more attractive. 
. . ) . 
Frontier believes that the standby fares have been an unqualified 
sii.ccees in ::increasing traffic and reven.ue1:;1 and .in developing air trans-
portationover Frontier's system. In December, 1966~ Frontier requested 
that the CAB e:i<:tend the expiration qate of the Eitandby far~s ;crom 
January 24, 1967 to June 30, 1967. 
Analys1is of the Basi~, for the Decision 
Fronti~r's d~cision to provide standby service at a 50 per cent 
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fare reduqtion is directly related to two fundamental economic concepts, 
price.elasticity of demand, Ep, and eroas elasticity of demand, E0• 
These ela.E!ticity of demand concepts are employed below to organize 
relevant variables ;in the decision into a framewo:rlc for analysis. A 
:revi~w of actual reasonin~ used by Frontier is then presented to con. 
trast theory and practice. 
Price elasticity of demand(~) measurea the percentage change in 
quantity sold of a given product wh~ch results from a one per cent· 
change ~n price.· If demand is elas~ic, a price decrease results in an 
increase in total revenue. Cross e~asticity of demand (E0) measures 
the wrcentagE;'.l cha,nge in quantity sold of~ ~iven product which results 
from a one per cent change in the price o;.f a related product. If a 
decreaae in the price of o~e product causes a dE;1cre~se in demand for 
another product, the former ;i.s a subE;1ti.tute for the latter and the 
· greater the nume:i;-ical value of E0, the greater is the de~ree o:I;' 
substitution. 
For example, if product A is a normal ~ood, a dec~ease in its 
price will increaE;1e quantity demanded per time period, and the more 
elastic the demand, the greater will be the increase intne firm's 
total revenue. The additional units of product A wiJ,.l be sold to three 
olassee of customers: 
J.,. Customers who are already buying product A from this firm 
bµt who increase their purchases as prfoe decreases. 
2. Customers who are not purchasing product A from this or 
any other firm but who enter the market as its price 
decr~~$eS sufficiently to attract them. 
3. Custo.rners. who are purch1;1sing a similar product B, either 
from th;is or another firm, but who s1,ibsti tute the now 
relatively cheaper product A fo;r PJ:'.Oduct B •. 
. . 
In the ;latter instanc;:e, a decreaee li,n the price of A :results in a 
decrea,se in the dema,nd for ij; and quantity taken ·of product B decreases. 
Since the price of product B remains unchanged, there will be a de-
crei!Se in the total revenue f;r-om the sale of p;roduct B, and the greater 
the degree of substitution, the greater is the decrease in total 
revenue. 
If one firm is producing both A and B, the price decrease in prod-
uct ~ will be profitable ip the short-run, other things constant, only 
if the increase in total revenue from the additlona;t units sold of 
I I 
product A ~xceeds the decrease in total revenue reF1~lting from a de-
crease in Qemand for product Band the decrease in revenue on the orig-
inal quantity of product A sold at its original price. furthermore, 
the net incre~se in total.revenw~ must exceed the difference between 
the inc;reased cost of p;roduotng additional units of product A, minus 
the decreased cost of producing less units of product B. A firm making 
such a short~run pricin~ decision should ideally know the~ for prod-
uct A, the tc with respect to product B_(and, thus, the exact shapes 
and p9sitions of the demand curves for its products), and the exact 
cost functions pertinent to both •. 
Tb,e preceding hypothetical pricing decision generally poptrays 
frontier's situation with respect to the standby fare. However, dis~ 
cussions with Frontier official~ revealell that tp.ey know, quantita-
tively, none of t:ti.e above information. In tb.e first place, Frontier 
:had no quantitative estimates of eve;n e:x;pected CQnsurner response to its 
price change. Yet, officials felt 1 subjectively, that the dec;ision 
79 
would be economically sound. They ''expected" significant increases in 
standby traffic without serious d::tlutions from full-fare traffic, 
though some substitution was anticipated, One surpl'.'ise, however, is 
the net complementary effect that standby fares apparently have on 
demand for full-fare reservation traffic. In fact, as stated earlier, 
the growth of reservation traffic in markets where the standby fare is 
applicable has kept pa.r with, and even exceeded, that of other markets. 
This result was contrary to all expectations •. 
Though lacking quantitative measures, the president of Frontier 
nevertheless has a general pricing policy which is based on his subjec-
tive evaluation of price elasticity of demand for air t;r-ansportation. 
All of Frontier's special fares, and especially the standby fare, are 
based on his philosophy which in general terms is as follows: 
There are two basic types of passengers, business, and 
personal, and there are many differences between them in 
terms of flying habits and desires. One of the major dif-
ferences is actual cost or incidence of plane fares. 
Those who fly on business are ·spending pre-tax dollars, 
since the fares can be included as business costs. Thus, the 
government in a seni;;e "pays" about one-half the cost of air 
travel. Those who fly for personal reasons are spending 
after-tax dollars and bear the full cost of plane fares. 
Since business travelers are already going for "half-fare" 
and have more compelling reasons to travel by air, any 
special fare-reduction programs would not stimulate signif-
icant additional passenger-miles and carriers would lose 
revenue. 
To the personal tr1;1veler, price is of much grea,ter 
importance. Substitute means of travel tend to attract 
him due to significant cost savings, so he must be enticed 
to travel by air by reducing as far as possibie one of the 
biggest barriers -- high cost. Therefore, the carrier 
must make it attractive to personal travelers by offering 
cost savings similar to thoee actually experienced by 
business travelers. The personal traveler is sensitive 
to prices and will respond favorably to price decreases 
and other promotional fare plans. 
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In instituting a standby fare, the figure of 50 per cent-of-
regular-fare was chosen by the president, based on his general pricing 
philosophy and judgment that a price cut must be dramatic to bring 
results. Specifications and restrictions of the fare were for the pur-
poses of winning CAB acceptance and minimizing traffic transfers from 
Frontier's own regular-fare service. As for statistical estimates of 
relevant price elasticity e,nd cross elasticity of demand coefficients, 
there were none. Frontier has found it impassible to determine reli-
able demand coefficients, either beforl:;! a decision is mad.e or after 
data are received or>, decisions which have been in effect. 
Attempts to calculate a realistic value for price elasticity of 
demand on the basis of six months traffic and revenue data summarized 
in Table XXVIII in Appendix C proved fruitless. Several factors 
immediately confound any quantitative approach. 
1. In many respects, the sta,ndby fare is a new product and 
not a price reduction on an existing one. Since the 
conditions of carria~e are significantly changed and 
regular reservation fa.res are still in force, it is 
questionable to even consider measuring percentage 
changes :i,n price and quap.tity. 
2. The increase in traffic in the ~tandby fare markets 
:t:.s both a result of the fa:re decrease and normal 
growth over time. Thus, it is necessary to accu-
rately determine what amount of the total increase 
in traffic over the previous year is due to an in-
crease in quantity demanded in response to the price 
decrease and what amount is due to a change in demand 
in response to changes in income, p9pulation, travel 
hapits, advertising, and so forth. 
3. The total Frontier traffic carried at standby fares 
.consists of customers who. would not nave flown at all 
except for the re.duced fare, some who would have flown 
with Frontier anyway at a high,er fare, and others who 
would have flown with competitive carriers. Any analy-
sis of market price elasticity of demarid must isolate 
the effect of price decreaseson the former.group, 
since the latter two groups planned to travel by air in 
·any event. Even if such a difficult task could accu-
rately be accomplished, the perce~tage change in quantity 
in response to the price decrease.would be a questionable 
value since there actually is no meaningful original base 
from which to calculate the percentage change. 
In the standby fare decision, Frontier gave only cursory thought 
to the possibility of retaliation of competitive trunk lines. A 
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Frontier official emphasized that the trunks have little "stomach" for 
this type of pricingpl:1.ilosophy ...... or so Frontier believ~s! When asked 
about Frontier's reaction to possible future retaliation by competitors, 
he replied that Frontier would "look again" at its policy if others 
should. follow su:tt~ He commented that "so far, so good," but did admit 
that ahould competition retaliate, Frontier might see the day when it 
wished it had never hea;rd of standby fares! But, Frontier is not pres-
ently concerned about th~ possibility of such a development. 
Conclusion 
In summary, one can readily see that the existing promotional fare 
schemes of Frontier and other carriers plus the encouragement given by 
the CAB chairman to fill empty seats with new plea~mre travelers by 
"selective but substantiiµ" price redµctions make Frontier's 50 per 
... 
cent standl;>y fare less than totally original; its main uniquenesses are 
the size of the out and its application to any passenge::i;" willing to 
standby. 'l.'he seed was planted by others long before Frontier stepped 
forward to reap the harvest. 
By way of general env:i,ronmental condit:i~ns., it is significant to 
note that Frontier's over-all load factor prior to the decision was low, 
indicating subl3tantial amounts of idle capacity .a:Q.d fixed costs. Its 
relatively shorter hops and more·freqµent stops, constraints imposed by 
governmental regulations, place Frontier at a; disadvantage with respect 
to its trunk line competition. Lacking equipment superiority or ev~n 
. . . . 
parity, or any other competitive weapon to shift its demand curve, 
Frontier w'ai;; actually faced with only one realist:i,c alternative to in-
crease sales: a price redµction. Butknowing, or at leaet believing, 
the p~ice~insensitivity of business travelers relative to pleasure 
t;ravele;ros, Frontier was bas:J.cally forced to ~eek to attract the latter 
without. diluting it~ revenues from the former; :i,n other words, discrim-
inating between passengers by charg:i,ng different prices for essentially 
the sl;lJlle service-~ arrivals. Of course, significar+t differences exist 
between regular and standby passengers si~ce one has a reservation, the 
other does not; once enplaned, however, there ii? no difference. Thus, 
the es15ential elements of. the decision were more or less dictated by 
environmental conditions: within the confines of government regula-
tions, find a way to sell more pleasure trqvel to fill empty seats on 
competitively less desirable flights without seriously diluting busi-
ness travel and other ex:i,sting revenues so as to be more competitive 
with short..,haul ground transportation. Frontier's solution was market 
segmentation by price through the mechanism of the standby fare. 
In this clecision, Frontier definitely formulated its policy within 
t;he framework of theoretical economic concepts. Particularly germane 
to the decision WE)re considElrations of the a.mount of transfer passen-
gers from its existing traffic (cross elasticity of demand), the degree 
of potential new customer response to the price decreas~ (price elas-
ticity of demand), and the economics of price discrimination. But an 
exact,· formal application of theory requires quantifica.tio:µ of all 
:r;-elevant·variables, implying pe:rfect knowledge. Yet,.as already indi-
cated, Frontier had no such information, Officials, using subjective 
criteria, diq not "e:x:pect" significant transfers of traffio fl;'om regu-
lar to &tandby fares, II believed II potential pleasure travelers are Sig-
ni,ficantl,y motivated 'by price, and "felt" a price decrease must be 
dramatic to brin~ the kind of results desired, Nevertheless, 
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theoretical principles were employed as tools of logic and reasoning 
with which to Qrganize and qualitatively evaluate pertinent economic 
variables. Thus, theory was practically applied and the impossibility 
of deriving statistical revenue and cost functions did not negate its 
usefulness in formulating a major decision. 
frontie.r' s Las Vegas Route Decision 
Ii:J,troduction 
To provide deeper insight into the "anatomy" of economic decision-
making, it appears desirable and necessary to break an important deci-
sion down into its componentparts, Suc4 a detailed analysis ;i:-e:f'l,ects 
the numerous considerations necessary to ma~e reasonable quantitative 
approximations to theoretical functions as well as to establish a truer 
sense of the environmental conditions surrounding the decision. 
The following detailed analysis of Fr9ntier's ~as Vegas route 
decision will reveal source~ of input data,. assumptions underlying their 
use, and analytic~ procedures employed b;y Frontier in answering the 
main question of wpether or not the e~pected incremental revenue attrib-
utable to the service will exceed the expechd incremental cost. 
Specifically included are traffic forecasts and resulting revenue esti-
mates, ~ircra:f't operating statistics and resulting operating costs~ and 
traffic servicing e~penses. Initial paragraphs present ·aspects of the 
gene~al environment 'by discussing Frontier arguments before the CAB to 
justify the proposed ~ervice; tnus, gove+nmental constraints on manage-
ment actions ar~ depicted. 
As described in Appendix A, the traditional unit cost curves of 
economic theory, assuming a short-run production function of initially 
increasin~ and then decreasing ret'\lI'ns to the variable resource, have 
the familiar U-shape. This means that as output of a single product 
per time period increases, total cost per unit initially decreases, 
reaches a minimum and then increases due to decreasing efficiency of 
the added units of variable input. 
However, statistical cost studies in non-agriculture industries 
seemingly show average va,:riable and marginal costs to be constant, 
resulting in 1-.shaped average total cost curves. This means that as 
output increases, the added cost per unit of added output is constant 
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since added units of variable input have equal efficiency, but average 
total cost per unit continuously decreases slightly since the tota], 
fixed cost is spread ove:r a larger number of units. 
Controversy exists over the ''true" shape of the i;,hort-run cost 
function~ with both the traditional U-shaped and the L-shaped curves 
receiving support. A.i;, for the implications of this controversywith 
respect to m~agement decision-making, Hayr+es (28) says: 
Perhaps the greatest benefit to management is to create an 
awareri:ess that there are no firm generalizations about c;:ost 
behavior and that each firm and each industry must measure 
and predict its own cost patterns, One reasonable way for 
a manager to go about estimating the impact of a decision 
on cost is to llSe his own judgment and experience in deter-
mining how the different categories of cost will react to 
the decision. 
In analyzing this route decision of Frontier, the objectives 
specified earlier are amended to specifically include two objectives 
suggeste~ by Haynes: 
l. To determine as far as possible the shapes of relevant 
cost curves; that is, the way unit cost functions 
"behave" as ou,tput increases. 
2. To. specifically identify ~ frontier "estimates the 
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impact of a decision on costs." 
Summary of Las Vegas Route Pro~osal 
I I , 
In April, 1966, Frontier Airlines applied to the Civil Aeronautics 
Boarq fqr an amendment of its Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity to allow frontier to extend its service to Las Vegas, Nevada. 
Frontier currently serves Grand Junction, Colorado, and is specifically 
eieeking an extension of that route to Las Vegas. To date, the CAB has 
not issued a ruling on Frontier's Proposal. 
Figure 5 is a map of Frontier's present system and the proposed 
·. new route 9egment. 
To obtain. CAB approval, Frontier must convince the Board of the 
need for additional service to Las Vegas and of the ability of Frontier 
to provide it on an economic basis. ln arguments before the CAB to 
establish need, Frontier deals with three main points. 
First, Frontier charges that existing service between Las Vegas 
and Denver is seriously deficient, inconvenient and inadequate. Las 
Vegas is a natural aJ;l\i important vacation area for Penver and t4e large 
area beyond Denver se::rved by frontier, yet Denver hap only one daily 
jet non-stop frequency to Las Vega1$ and only two total frequencies~ 
including DC-6 propeller service via Grand Junction. The only carrier 
serving the Las Ve~as market from Denver via Gr1;llld Junction is United 
Airlines, although Western Airlines serves the city via Salt Lake City, 
and United's jet service is extrem~ly inconvenient since its departing 
flight leavel$ Denver at 10:20 P. M. and the return flight arrives in 
Denver from Las Vegas at 12:56 A. M. 




Figure 5.. Frontier Airlines Present System and Proposed 
Route to Las Vegae 
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is further evident from the fact that United flies only one round trip 
daily with DC-6 equipment. By comparison, service from Grand Junction 
to other important regional cities such as Denver, Salt Lake City, and 
El Paso varies from three to five daily round trips. 
Table III illustrates the inadequacy of service between Denver and 
Las Vegas by comparing the service from Denver and from Las Vegas to 
other nearby western cities. 
Secondly, Frontier maintains that there has been a serious lack of 
traffic development in the Denver-Las Vegas market. Table IV illus-
trates this by comparing the traffic between Las Vegas and major metro-
politan western cities with that between Phoenix and the same cities. 
As shown in Ti:l.ble IV, the Las Vegas-Denver traffic is much lower 
in relation tq Ph,oeni~ traffic than for any of the other cities. In 
Frontier's view, there is no apparent reason for this exce:pt for in-
adequate Las Vegas~Denver service. 
Thirdly, Fr9ntier contends that it will provide substantial ser-
vice improvements for other points on its system, in addition to the 
benefits provided in the local Denver-Grand Jl,ll),ction-Las Vegas marketso 
Frontier's proposed service will open up a large area of 24 smaller 
cities north, east, 1::1.nd south of Denver for first one-,carrier service 
to Las Vegas, with major reductions in travel times. In addition, 
important service improvements between Kansas City, Lincoln, Colorado 
Springs, and Las Vegas would include more desirable arrival times, 
reduced travel time, new one-carrier service, and new one-plane 
service. 
At the time of the proposal, Frontier had already planned to 
install Boeing 727 jet service between Denver and Grand Junction in the 
Fall of 1966.by replacing some e~isting Convair 580 flights with soon-
to-be-delivered new jet equipment. Of Frontier's planned two round-
trip schedules to Las Vegas, both using jet equipment, one will simply 
be an extension of existing schedules. For .this schedule, the only 
added jet service as a result of the Las Vegas decision will be that 
from Grand Junction to Las Vegas. 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF SERVICE FROM DENVER AND FROM LAS VEGAS 
TO OTHER NEARBY WESTERN CITIES 
No. of Round Trip Flts.~ 
(One-sto:e or less) · 
. I 
Total Jet Prop. 
Denver-Las Vee;as 2 l l 
Denver-Phoenix 5 2 3 
Denver-Albuquerque 7 7 
Las Vegas-Denver 2 1 1 
Las Vegas-Salt Lake ·c1ty 4 l 3 
LaE;> Vegas-Albuquerque 2 2 
Las Vegas-San Francisco 8 8 
Las Vegas-Los Angeles 27 l9 8 
~arcn, 1966. 















TRAFFIC COMPARISON: µAS VEGAS-DENVER VS PHOENIX-DENVER 
1964 Total Local No. of 
and Connecti~ Pas~engers Flts. 
Nonstop 
% Las and 1 .. stop Intercity 
Between Between Vegas of <2-64) Mile~e 
Las Vegas Phoenix Phoenix 
Base City And And Psgrs. LAS PHX LAS PHX 
Los Angeles 565,310 268,720 21o% 60 2B 228 356 
San FrMcisco 121,490 84,980 l.43 14 12 416 652 
Albuquerque 24,190 26,300 92 4 4 482 329 
Salt Lake City 29,300 38,860 75 8 4 362 504 
Mean 130 
Denver 36,910 63,260 58 4 10 605 586 
The other round trip w11i be a newly instailed jet flight replac-
ing a Convair 580 flight between. Denver and Grand Junction, and e~tend-
ed from.Grand Junction.to LasVega~. The entire schedule will represent 
added jet service attri"utable to Frontier's .decision, since the Convair 
580 flight between Denver and qrand Junction will not be replaced with 
jet equipment if' Frontier does not :reoei~e Las Vegas certificati,on. 
Also, if its proposal receives CAB approval, Frontier plan& to put on 
an additional daily roUlld trip Denver-Co],.orado Springs flight u.sing 
Convair 580 equipment to. provide direct on~lin~ connection to Las Vegas. 
Frontier's proposed one-plane added service to Las Vegas is illustrated 
in Figure 6. 
Las Vega . - -s -------0 -·::::. --::::::. -. - -- ---. - . --
Denver 
.• .. . . . 0.. Colorado . Springs 
Unooln 
Eaoh line represents a one-way flight. 
B7ff1ri-WH~~NnA~~rl-
- - -- - B 727 Jet - Additional Mileage With 
New Authority 
•• • • • • • •• Added Flights , OV -580 Equipment between 
Denver and Colorado Springs 
Figure 6. Frontier Airlines Proposed One-Plane Service to Las Vegas 
'° ..... 
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In order to "prove" tp itself and to the CAB that it can provide 
the needed service on an economic basis, Frontier was faced with the 
task of estimating the impact of the dedsion on total cost and total 
revenue, Frontier is specifically requesting that the route be awarded 
on a subsidy-ineligible basis, and estimates that the service, on a 
non-subsidy 'basi.s, will produce in the firl:)t year of operation a net 
operating profit of $624,800. As a further incentive to gain acceptance 
by the CAB, Frontier guarantees to apply this stated amount to a reduc-
tion in i4s annual subsidy requirement of $6.5 million. 
Frontier's estimates of the change in total revenue (incremental 
revenue) and the change in total cost (incremental cost) are strictly 
short-run, applying only to the single year, 1967. Table Vis a sum-
mary of estimatec;l financial results attributal:ile to the proposed serv-
ice to Las Vegas. The discussion which follows is a detailed analysis 
of~ Frontier made its economic evaluation, 
TABLE V 
SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL RESULTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO PROPOSED 
SERVICE TO LAS VEGAp, YEAR 1967 
Commercial. Reven~es: 
Passenger 
Mail and P~operty 
Total 
Operating Expenses:· 




Regional and Sy~tem 
Total Operating E;:xpenses 
Operating Profit 
Provision for Return on 
Investment and Taxes 
Reduction in Present System Subsidy Need 














Front;ter estimates it.hat its change i11 total revenue as a J:lesult of 
the decision to extend service to Las Vegas will be a total of 
$2t830,292 the first year, almost all of which will be in the form of 
passenger revenue, Frontier's first step in estimating incremental 
revenue was to estimate, by markets, the total number of local and 
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conneqting pa.ssengers expected to travel over its entire system to and 
from Las Vegas with other airlines and before Frontier service 
improvenie:g.t. 
~sed on a CAB sw;-vey of pi3,ssenger traffic iI). major markets for 
the years 1959 thrpugh 1965, Frontier made a forecast of the estimated 
1967 passengers by major market. The CAB requ:i,.res every carrier to 
report the origin and destination of every ticket sold whose number 
ends in zero. Since carriers must keep records of every ticket sold, 
it is a relatively simple matter for them to supply these data. The 
CAB then compiles passenger origi:ri-destination statistics from this lO 
per cent sample. Frontier simply toqk the CAB survey samples and e~-
p.µided them by a factor of 10 to estimate the total passengers who 
traveled between Las. Vegas and major ci:t:i,ee in, its system for the years . 
19.59 through 1965.. The 1967 estimate arrived at for each major market 
is average of constant r8ite and co~stan.t increment extrapolatio:ns of 
leaist sq~ree.lines on 19,59-1965 data. Reeults are summarized in Table 
XXIX in Appendix D. 
The estimahd, number of passenger1;3 in ea.ch market for. 1967 i1;1 
determined, a1;1 previously mentioned, by extrapolatio:Q. of ],.east sq1,1ares 
lines. This assumes, of col.lrse~ tl).at the past is a relit;1ble gµide to 
the future. But the years 1959-1962 a.re gene;ria.lly considered slump 
years for air carriers, af:! compared to 196,:3 .. 1965, when buf;liness was 
booming~ Thus, an. extrapolation of least sq1W-res lin~s to det~rmine 
expected 1967 p~ssenger traffic would tend to un~erstate the. real 
growth, assuming traffic continu~s to grow iiJ.S it did in 1963 .. 1965. 
Frontier agrees that this is undoubtedly true but that keeping 1959~ 
1962 <,iata in the projection desirably "'ljones down" the forecast. If 
o:nly the 1963-1965 da,ts were used, the forecast would ehow a bias of· 
very high growth rate, which may well 't;)e over-optimi,st;i.c, despUe the 
fact tha.t industry observers forecast continued prosperity!. Of the 
two extremes, Frontier prefers the. former since it is more cautious. 
Obviously, tl-1.e accuracy of Fronti,er's revenue estimate is directly 
related to the accuracy of this and other passenger forecasts. 
In addition to · major ~rkets, Frontier made estimates of 1,967 
local passenger traffic for two groups of smaller m~kets within its 
syste~, The results o~ the estimates are summarized in Table XXX in 
Appendi:x; D. 
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In Group I city-pairs, which mainly ~ncluded small cit~es north of 
Denver, CAB surveys of historic passenger traffic between. Ll;ls Vegas 
and the cities named ~e used to calculate a three-year (1962-1965) 
average for each market. Then a three-year average c;,f 2,370 passengers 
. . . . 
is c~lculated for all markets. The 1967 forec~st for each market is 
determined by multiplying the ttwee-year average by an expected growth 
factor of 58 per ce~t. 
To arrive at the factor of 58 per cent, Frontier fot.md the rela-
tions:tl,ip between the.three-year average of ail marll:ets in Group I 
. . . . . 
(2,370 passengers) and the composite market forecast (3,740 passengers) 
m~de by extrapolat;i.o:n of least square lines for "Other Frontie:v Points 
Beyond Denver-La1:1 Vegas" as shown in Table XXIX in .A.ppend.i;,c D. Thus, 
2,370 (],.00 + X):;:; 3,740 
... x = ~' ?40 ,.. 2,279 = .58 
2,370 
X = 58 per cent. 
Using 58 per cent asan expected growth factor, Frontier then estimates 
the expect~d passenger traffic in each city:pair l:tsted in G:roup I. 
Fo:r example, a three-year CAB survey of samp],e passengers in the 
Las Vegas-Casper market.shows an average of 740 passengers per year. 
Frontier expects this market to grow, in 1967, to 
740 X ~.58 = l,l70 passengers, 
The Group II city-pairs consist primarily of towns in west and 
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southwest Colorado near Grand Junction_ Expected traffic between Las. 
Vegas and these cities is q~ite small, Again employing the results of 
CAB surveys, Frontier ca,lculates the average nU111ber of passengers per 
year traveling between a given city and Las Vegas for the years 1963-
1965, then estimates a 50 per cent increase in traffic from these base 
figures for l967. ~e 50 per cent expected growth factor was arrived 
at by scaling c;iown from the growtll factoT.estimated for the Grand 
. . 
Junction~Las Vegas market shown in Table XXIX in Appendix D. The growth 
expected in this market from 1964 (2,110 passengers) to t967 (3,490 
paf:isenger s) is 6 5 per cent • Fron tj. er simply took a "rea1;1ona.ble guess " 
and figured the cities nam.ed in Group Il would generate a 50 per cent 
incre1;1se in traffic i:f Grand Junction gep.erated 65 per cen.t! 
Connecting triaffic j.s traffic which changes airlines during a trip. 
In Table XXIX in Appendix D, eetimates are given for connecting traffic 
between points in California. and two citi~s in Froni;;ie:r's system, Grand 
Junction and Lincoln; Colorado Springs-Denver connecting traffic is 
also shown. Table XXXI in Appei:idi:x D summarizee hietoric and forecast 
conr,i.eoting traffic for other major markets, adjusted to exclude con-
neet:ing traffic in mino~ markets. Frontier uses as its ineasurea of 
expected growth in. the number of connecting pa~sengers the same per 
cent factors used in the local traffic forecasts for the sanJe city-
pairs, ~s calculated in Table XXIX in Appendix D. 
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The local and connecting Las Vegas passenger traffic estimates for 
1967 for every city in Frontier's system, derived ~e described a;l;>ove, 
are subsequently ueed in.Table XXXI in Appendix D to fqrecast Frontier 
revenues attr:I,.butaole to the service. These traffic estimates are pro-
jections of historic traffic flows, asswning no change in qtial:i,ty .or 
quantity of service offered; that is, the estimate:;; do not include any: 
estimates of the effect on total passenger .traffic .that introductii;m of 
new service by Frontier might have •. But the new and improved service 
Frontier proposed certainJ,y is expected to stimulate the passenger 
traffic flows that :nave been devel,opecl l:Jy hi.storic services. ·The de-
gree of st:i,.mul~tion in any specific market :i,s determined by the type 
and degree of service improvement offered. Broad;j.y speaking, the amount 
of stimulation expected due to improved service is based on judgment; 
but Frontier uses statistical studies of stimulation afi guides in its 
traffic estimating procedures. 
Stimulation of' HistoricTraff:I,.c b;y; Frontier. 
Service Improvement 
Frontier's propc;,sed new services offer several types of service 
improvement, depending on the specific market. In its estimating proc-
ess, Frontier systematized its application of stimulation facto;rs by 
coding typee of improvement as follows; 
~ Type of' ~erv~c:e Im;proveme17t 
A. First one-.carrier one-plane service replac;tne; two .. carrier. 
B. First one-plane service replacing one.-c.ar:r:i,e:i;- direct 
on...,.line connecting service. 
C. First one-carrier direct on-line connecting service 
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Code _,.... ~~pe of Service Improv~ment 
replacing two-carrier. 
D. First one-ca,rrier service replacing twc;,-carrier. 
E. F;irst competitive one ... plane service. 
F. Additional service. 
The stimulation.factors used for codes A through D have been influenced 
by. two independent statistical studies cif the. effect of replacing two .. 
carrier service with single-carrier, single-plane service. Results of 
these studies are p9rtrayed graphically in Figure 7. 
The stati~tical relationship between the "St;i.mulation Factor" and 
t~e "Annual Local Passengers Before One Plane Service" shown in Figure 
7 was jointly developed by Frontier and a managemer.i.t consulting firm. 
The "C ll: A Date." shown is the result obtained by the consulting firm .in 
a similar analysis done for California Eastern A.5,.rlip.e (CEA.). 
A.s Figure 7 and discus1;1ion pursu~t to it point out,. the stimula-
tion factors shown a.re a statistical result of replacing two-carrier 
service with one-carr\er one-pl,ane service, the type of service improve-
ment designate~ code A. Service ;improvement ~Qde C is considered to 
have a. stimulati<:>n effect of 50 per cent of code A, and code D, 10 per 
cent pf code A. lt should be noted that the stimulation effects of 
codes C and Dare purely jud~emental, seasoned by experience. ln fact, 
Figure 7 represents a best-deqision-basis-available tec:17.nique and is 
not purported to be inviolable. The use of this specific estimating 
deviqe is unique to Frontier and ~ts forecasts a,;-~ seldom challenged 
on this partic~iar basis. When challenged, however, Frontie~ has been 
able to present sufficient examples over its system to justify, in 
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admits that th:ts procedl.U'e is open to quest;ion, but does believe that 
"good" a,nd "reasonably accurate" estimates can be made and the results 
used with confidence in decision ma.king. "Better" refiiults perhaps 
could be obtained with a more sophisticated technique, but the expected 
cost of developing such a technique, if, .in fact, one exists, is thought 
to outweigh the gain. 
The stimulation factors in markets where Frontier's service im-
provement results from new competition, c;ode E, are basically derived 
from a systemati~ed method of weighing service qua).ity before an.dafter 
the introduction of the new service •. A Service Quality Inde~ is con-
structed for the before and after periods based on assigned values per 
flight as follows: 




DC-6/DC .. 7 
CV-580 
F-27/CV-34o/440/M~4o4 
cv ... 240~-202 
DC .... 3 
Non-Stop 
One ... Stop 
Two-Stop 
Three-Stop 













These values represent minor Frontier revisions of values devel-
oped by the CAB Bureau of Operl;l.ting Rights from extensive statistical 
analyses of the effect of placing local service carriers in competi-
tion with trunklines. ~lthough the Bureau's statistical analyses were 
done for the purpose stated, Frontier feels that the principles 
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involved are basic for determining the'impact of competitive-service 
in any market. Primary determinants are service frequency, equipment 
quality and service quality measured inversely by intermediate stops. 
In brief, the so-called Service Quality Ind.ex resolvee;; to nothing.more 
than a systematic numeric method for evaluating these factors before 
and after introduction of competition. Figure 8 graphically portrays 
the relationship of competitive stimulation to improved service quality 
used as a guide by Frontier. For example, as assumed 100 per cent im-
provement in service quality should provide a stimulation approximating 
60 per cent. 
Frontier computes the Service Quality Index. (SQI) as follows: 
SQI = frequency of flights X stop value by flight 
X equipment value-by. flight. 
For example, if United offers four non":"stop flights daily between 
Colorado Springs and Phoenix using jet equipment, and there is no 
other carrier serving this city-pair, United's Service Quality Index is 
SQI (United)= 4(flights) X 8(stop value) X 
8(equiprnent value) = 256. 
Now asstll1le Front!er enters this rila.rket and adds two o~e-stop 
flights daily using Convair 580 _equipment. Frontier's addition to. the_ 
SQI for this market would be 
SQI(Frontier) = 2(flights) X 6(stop val-ue) X 
4(equipment valu~.) -= 48. 
The resuiting total market SQ! is then 
SQI(Total Market)~ 256 + 48 = 304. 
Frontier's service would rern1l t in a percentage increase in the Total 
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256 = 18.8 per cent. 
In Figure 8, an 18.8 per cent increase in the Service Quality 
Index would result in approximately a 22 per cent stimulat:i,on of 
traffic in the total market, after introduction of Frontier's competi-
tive service. Frontier would not necessarily carry all this newly 
create~ traffic, but would share in the total mar~et with United on the 
basis of Frontier's Service Quality Index as a percentage of the total 
market Service Quality Index. That is, 
Frontier SQI - 48 = 15.8 per cent, equals 
Total Market SQI - 304 
Frontier's participation in the total, Colorado Springs-Phoenix market. 
Estimated Added Frontier Passenger Traffic, 
·After Service Improvement 
Table XXXII in Appendix Dis a summary of Front:i.er's forecast of 
added passenger traffic and revenues attributable to the proposed servy 
ice to Las Vegas. The estimated total passengers, local and connecting, 
shown for 1967 are taken from Tablee XXIX, xxx, and XXXI.in Appendix D. 
. . 
In Table XXXII in Appendi~ D, each city tn Frontie~'s system is 
coded according to the type of service i~provement resulting from 
Frontier's entrance into the Las Vegas market, and the appropriate 
traffic stimulation factor is determined. ?he procedure.for estimating 
the number of passengers Frontier expects to c~ry is explained below 
by examining qifferent types of service improvement. 
For example, in the Kansas City-Las Vegas market,. the estimated 
total passengers for 1967, before Frontier service.improvement, is 
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13,160. Frontier identifiee the type of service .imprc;>vemen,t as c.ode E, 
the introduction of the first competitive one-plane service. Using the 
Service Quality Index (SQI) procedure previously discussed, Frontier 
.estimates a 20 per cen,t increase in total traffic in this market, after 
introduction of Frontier service improvement. Thus, the stimulation 
factor is 1.20, as shown. To find the, estimated 1967 total rr.iarket 
after Frontier service improvement, multiply the stimulation factor 
times the estimated 1967 passengers before Frontier service improvement. 
· Thus, 
13,160 x 1.20 = 15,792 passengers. 
To determine the number Qf passengers :frontier expects to carry out of 
the total- Kansas City-Las Vegas market, it is neoessary to estimate 
Frontier's per cent participation. For this particular market, 
Frontier expects a participation of 20 per cent. For each market, 
this p\:)rcentage is based on Fronti,r' s "beE1t judgment" -- nothing more. 
Thus, Frontier expects to carry 20 per cent of 1,5,792 forecast passen-
gers, or 3,158 pc;1ssengers. 
The Oma.ha~Las Vegas market has a service improvement .of code F, 
indicating "like additional" service. The traffic stimulation factor 
is 1.05, meaning Frontier expects to stimulate the total market by 5 
per cent~ The stimuiation factor for this type of service improveme~t 
is also based on the Service Quality Index procedure, 'put is, accorcling 
to Front!i,.e~, a "watered-down" version. 
The Grand Island/Hastings/Kearney~Las Vegas market has a service 
improvement o;f' code D, indicating the first one..;.carrier serv:tce replac-
i;ng two-carrier. The traffic stimulat:i,on factor is estimated to b~ 
1.30, and is determined by the use of Figure 7 .. The number of "ann~al 
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local passengers before one plane serviceri is estim~ted at 460 total. 
· Measuring along the hor;i.zontal axis 0f Figure 7 to 460 passengers, 
then up to curve, the stimu:i.ation factor of 2.9 can be read off the 
vertic~l axis. Thus, the code A stimulation factor so found is 
2.9 - 1.0 (since 1 = 0 stimulation) = 1.9. 
This means that if the service improvement in this market were code A, 
total traffic could be expected to increase by 190 per cent. But, 
since it :j.s, instead, code D, a code D service improvement is estimated 
to be only 10 per cent as stimulative as code A. Therefore, the 
expected percentage increase in traffic in this market due to code D 
service improvement is 
190 per cent X 10 per cent= 19 per cent 
and the resulting traffic stimulatio~ factor is 1.19, unadjusted. 
After making this initial calculat;i.on, Frontier frequently alters the 
factor to bring it closer into harmony with its own judgment as to the 
degree of "actual" stimulation expected from service improvement. Such 
is the case here. Although the calculated value of 19 per cent repre-
sents a starting point, Frontier feels that .the actual stimulation of 
this market from service improvement would be greater, somewhat in the 
order of 30 per cent. Thus, the adjusted value of the traffic stimula-
tion factor is 1.30. 
The percentage participation that Frontier expects in the total 
Grand Island/Hastings/Kearney-Las Vegas market after Frontier serv,'Lce 
improvement is designated by "S "· •• S" means "by-the-amount-of-
stimulation "· Fc,r example, the total estimated passengers for 1967 
before Frontier service improvement is 460. Frontier expects to 
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stimulate the market by 30 per cent, resulting in a total market after 
Frontier service improvement of 598 passengers, a net change of 138 
passengers. fhus, the meaning of "S" is that Frontier expects to carry 
138 passengers, the amount of the stimulation, rather than some per-
centage of the total market, as is the case in other markets. 
The procedure described above is used to estimate the number of 
passengers Frontier expects to carry between Las Vegas and each city on 
its system. By way of review, the process involves, for each market: 
1. Forecasting the total 1967 Las Vegas passenger traffic, 
before Frontier service improvement. 
2. Determining the estimated stimulation factor, and 
multiplying it times the traffic forecast to determine 
.the 1967 passenger traffic expected, after Frontier 
service improvement. 
3 •. Estimating Frontier's percentage participation and 
multiplying this percentage times the total passenger 
traffic, after Frontier service improvement, to deter-
mine the number of Las Vegas passengers Frontier 
expects to carry in 1967. 
Incremental Revenue Attributable to Las Vegas Serv;i.c.e 
' 
Total added passenger revenue expected to be generated by 
Frontier's Las Vegas service is found by multiplying the forecast num-
ber of Frontier passengers traveling between Las Vegas and the cities 
named, times the appropriate fares. The proposed fares are summarized 
in Table XXXII! in Appendix D. 
In establishing regular fares in specific markets~ Frontier's most 
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important considerations are the quantity and q~lity of available 
substitute means of transportation. This involves primarily a consid-
eration o! competititve airline service and surface transportation 
(mainly automobile, and secondly, bus; ra,il is of limited importance). 
For Frontier's system, geographical characteristics make surface trans-
portation generally inferior to air transportation. Furt~ermore, on 
many north-south routes, Frontier has little or no competition from 
other air carriers. 
On these routes, Frontie;r- charges fares, on a rate per mile basis, 
that are generally higher than those on more competitive routes. 
Frontier's stated objective is to maximize short-run total revenue by 
charging relatively higher fares where demand is more inelastic while 
still maintaining a long.run view of price effects on market growth. 
The "optimum" fare levels are based on judgment since no calculations 
are made t.o estimate price elasticity of demand in these markets. On 
east-west routes, Frontier faces stronger competition from other air 
carriers, and so charges fa.res that are competitive with, if not iden-
tical to, other ai,rlines. In these markets, Frontier is generally a 
price-fo~lower and not a price-leader. 
In arriving at the proposed fares between Las Vegas and Denver, 
Frontier took into account several factors. Only United Airlines 
serves Las Vegas directly from Denver" via Grand Junction. United 
offers one daily non-stop round trip between Denver and Las Vegas using 
jet equipment and one daily round trip, with a stop at Grand Junction, 
using propeller equipment. The United non ... stop jet service departs 
Denver a.t 10:20 P. M0 MST, and arrives in Las Vegas at 10:50 P. M., 
PST, for an elapsed time of l hour, 30 minutes. The jet first ohi.ss 
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one-way fare is $53,45, and jet coach is $47.20. The propeller flight 
leaves Denver about 11 o'clock in the morning MST, makes a stop at 
Grand Junction, and arrives in Las Vegas about 1:20 tn the afternoon, 
PST. The elapsed time is 3 hours, 20 minutes and the one~way fare is 
$39.65; all seats are coach. The only other existing Denver·Las Vegas 
service is that offered by Western Airlines via Salt Lake City. The 
Western flight leaves Denver at 12:10 P. M., MST, and arrives in Salt 
Lake City at 1:15 P. M., MST; after a change of planes, the flight then 
leaves Salt La,ke City at 2:10 P. M., MST, and arrives in Las Vegas at 
2:12 P. M., PST, for a total elapsed t.ime of 3 hours for the Boeing 
720 and DC-6 equipment used in the service. The first class one-way 
fare is $53.45, the same as that of United's non-stop flight. 
One of Frontier's two proposed jet flights from Denver would leave 
at 8:40 A. M., MST, stop in Grand Junction for 10 minutes, then_proceed 
to Las Vegas, arriving at 9:36 A. M., PST, for an elapsed time of 2 
hours. The second flight would leave Denver at 3:00 P. M., MST, and, 
after stopping in Grand Junction for 10 minutes, arrive in Las Vegas at 
3:56 P. M., PST, for an elapsed time also at 2 hours. 
The reason to state these comparative departure and arrival times 
is to point out the comparative "quality" of Frontier's proposed serv-
ice versus that of it competition, i~ terms of elapsed time of flight 
and time of day. frontier plans to use Boeing 727· jets on both flights, 
making Frontier's equipment "qualityV9 equal to United's relatively late 
night non-stop flight, and superior to United's noon propeller flight. 
However, on its jet flights between Denver and Las Vegas, Frontier does 
make one stop - Grand Junction. A flight with one-stop is generally 
considered inferior to a non-stop flight, other things equal. Frontier, 
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however, after consideriI).g othe.r things ll.21 equal, propose$ to offer 
its one-stop jet service at fares equal to Vni ted' s non-stop jet 
service - $53.45 first class and $42.70 coach, Frontier feels that its 
service is superior to United's and certainly to Western's, but reasons 
that establishing fares identical to theirs will in effect be a price 
decrease and, thus, serve to insure the economic so1,mdness of the 
decision. 
As shown in Table XXXIII in Appendix D, Frontier quotes two fares 
for jet flights, jet first class and jet coach. In order to estimate 
added total revenue from the proposed Las Vegas service, it is first 
necessary to estimate the total number of passengers Frontier expects 
to carry, and what percentages of the total would travel first class 
and coach. Making use of a 1964 CAB survey of traffic between Las Vegas 
and twenty-nine cities west of the Mississippi River, F~ontier calcu-
lated the percentages traveling first class and coach, took the mean, 
and arrived at a passenger-mix expected of 20 per cent first class and 
8o per cent coach. On the assumption that this 20/80 mix will like .. 
wise be its average experience, Frontier made appropriate calculations 
to determine total added revenue expected to be generated by each city 
on its system. For example, Frontier expects to carry 3,158 passen-
gers between Kansas City and Las Vegas. in 1967. If 20 per cent travel 
jet first class and 80 per cent jet coach, Frontier's expected added 
revenue in this market is 
3,158 pas$engers x 20% first class x $93.50"' $ 59,055 
3,158 passengers x 80% coa<;:h x $74.80 = 188,974 
$ 248.,022. 
Table XXXII in Appendix D summarizes by cities the expected ;passenger 
traffic and passenger revenue attributable to Frontier's service to 
Las Vegas. 
Although passenger revenue is by far the more important, added 
mail and property revenue is nevertheless significant, totaling 
$123,300. This value is determined by: 
1. Multiplying the number of passengers times the distance 
in miles between each city and Las Vegas to find the 
number of total revenue passenger miles (RPM= 39,154,000). 
2. Converting revenue passenger miles to revenue passenger 
ton miles on the basis that ,095 revenue passenger ton 
miles is equal to 1.000 revenue passenger mile (i.e., 
approximately ten revenue passengers are equal to one 
revenue passenger ton). Thus, 39,15L1-,000 RPM x .095 = 
3,720,000 revenue passenger ton miles. 
3. Converting revenue passenger ton miles to mail and 
property ton miles on the basis that th~ latter, based 
on Frontier's 1965 system experience, is 7.36 per cent 
of the former, after adjustment to account for the 
resort nature of the Las Vegas market. Thus, 3,720,000 
revenue passenger ton miles x 7.36% = 274,ooo added mail 
and property ton miles. 
4. Calculating the resulting added revenue from mail and 
property, based on Frontier's 1965 system experience of 
an average of $.45 per mail and property ton mile. 
Thus, 274,000 mail and property ton miles x $.45 -




The forecast change in total revenue attributable to Frontier's 
decision to add the Grand J~ction-Las Ve~as route to its system is 
Incremental Passenger Revenue 
Incremental Mail and Property Revenue 
Total Incremental Revenue 




Frontier estimates that total incremental operating expenses for 
the Las Vegas service, made up of aircraft operating expenses plus 
servicing expenses, will amount to $1,764,492 in 1967, In order to 
estimate incremental cost, it is first necessary to estimate relevc;3.Ilt 
aircraft operating data. 
Frontier's proposal specifies that one Denver-Grand Junctio1;1. sched-
ule currently flown with CV-580 equipment will be replaced with B-727 
jet equipment if Frontier receives certification, with the schedule 
extending to Las Vegas; the other schedule will simply be an extension 
to Las Vegas of an already planned jet schedule between Denver and 
Grand Junction. Also, an additional daily round-tr;ip flight between 
Colorado Springs and Denver will be scheduled to provide direct on:--line 
connection to Las Vegas. The added aircraft miles, hours, and depar-
tures attributable to the proposed service are calculated in Table XXXIV 
in Appendix D and summarized in Table VI, including relevant services 
and traffic data. 
Direct Costs: Aircraft Operating Expenses 
Frontier estimates the total net added aircraft operating expenses 
attributable to the proposed service to Las Vega$ to b.e $936,601. 
TABLE VI 
SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT OPER.ATING DATA AND SERVICE AND 
TRAFFIC DATA, LAS VEGA$ SERVICE 
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B-.727 CV-580 Net Total 
Aircraft Operating Data: 
Revenue Aircraft Miles Flown 
Revenue Aircraft Departures 
Performed 
Aircraft Stage Distance 
Revenue Aircraft Block Hours Flown 
Total Aircraft Block Hours 
Service and Traffic Data: 
Revenue Passengers 
Revenue Passenger Miles (000) 
Available Seat Miles (000) 
Average Passenger Load 






















Aircraft operating expenses consist of four major cost categories which, 
along with estimated dollar amounts, a.re summarized in Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
AIRCRAFT OPERATING EXPENSES,.LAS VllDAS SERVICE 
Flying Operations: B-727 CV-,?80 NE:r -
Crew Costs $180,105 $(17,262) $162,843 
Fuel, Oil, and Taxes 292,812 (12,880) 279,932 
Insurance 50,419 ( 2,167) 48,252 
Other Costs 2,2~2 ( gl2) 1,200 
Total Flying Operations $525,5 8 $(32, 1) $492,9~7 
Direct Maintenance-
Flight Equipment 188,2:20 (19,774) 168,446 
Applied Maintenance Burden-
Flight Equipment 95,393 ( 6,897). 88,496 
Depreciation-Flight Equipment · 193,310 <.6,578) 186,732 
I 
Total Aircraft Operating Expenses $1,002,491 $(65,890) $936,601 
The analysis which follows delves in spme detail into the mechanics 
of aircraft operating cost analysis by identifying specific experu;;ee 
incurred, sources of coetdata, aseumptions, and procedures used by 
Frontier to estimate the added Boe:i,ng 727 expensee summarized i:n 
'l'able VII. 
The decrease in Convair 580 aircraft operating expenses shown in 
Table VII are estimated by multiplying the appropriate unit cost, based 
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on Frontier's 1965 system CV 580 oost experience (App~ndix F), times 
the net decrease in total aircraft block hours flown resulting from the 
Las Vegas service. 'rhe elimination of one CV 580 schedule frqm Denver 
to Grand Junction, ~lus the addition of one from Colorado Springs to 
Denver results in a net decrease of 322 total aircraft block hours 
flown. Due to the mechanical nature of the ca],culations, no category.-
by-category estimate of CV 580 costs will be presented but they may 
readily be determined as indicated. 
Flying Operations. This function includes expenses incurred di-
rectly in the in-flight operation of aircraft and expenses incurred in 
the holding of aircraft and airc:raft operational personnel in readiness 
for assignment to an in-flight status. The fol.lI' sub-categories are: 
1. Crew Cost. The B-727 crew cost is estimated at $86.34 
per total aircraft block hour. Thus, the total added 
B-727 crew cost attributable to the proposed service is 
$86.34 x 2,086 total B-727 aircraft block hours= 
$180,105. The estimate for total added B-727 aircraft 
block hours is found in Table VI; the crew cost per air-
craft block hours is estimated a;s shown :in Table VIII. 
The relationship between crew costs and "output" is con-
sidered by Frontier to be linear, where output is meas-
ured in terms of total aircraft block hours. This 
line~ relationship is thought to hold true regardless 
of the level of total aircraft block hours flown, pro· 
vided there iEi little or no idle crew capacity employed. 
In the event that pilots, copilots and flight engineers 
are idle and could be used on additional flights, output 
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TABLE VIIJ;: 
ESTIMATED CREW COS'l' FOR BOEINq 7'27 
PER TOTAL AIRCaAFT BLOCK HOUR 
Crew Costs 
Pilots and Copilots 
Trainees and Instructors 







Plus 5% adjustment 
for inflat~on from 
1964 to 1967 















visions with pilots. 
At 2% of pilot salaries 
At 30% of pilot salaries, 
based on the 1964 B~727 
experience of the Big 
Four (AAL, EAL, TWA., UAL) 
Based on Frontier's 1964 
system unit coet plus 60% 
al~owance for extra crew 
member 
Frontier's 1964 relation-
ship to crew salaries 
Front:ier's 1964 relation-
ship to crew salaries 
could be increased without as large an increase in 
crew costs as would occur if new, additional crew 
were needed. This is due to the fact that members 
of the crew are paid a base salary plus a rate di-
rectly related to total aircraft block hours flown. 
If idle crew can be alloc:ated to added flights, there 
would be no increased cost of base .<;;alaries of col.U'se, 
but there would be increased costs due to increased 
flight pay. But in this proposal, Frontier figures it 
will need new, additional crews~ since :;i.t does not 
normally have sufficient idle crews to allocate to 
such a market. Therefore, the relevant relationship 
between crew cost and output may be depicted as 
follows: 
Crew cost 
per unit of 
output 




$86.34 AVC =MO 86.34 
0 21)86 Output .. 0 
Total aircraft 
block hours flown 
per year 
Total Cost Curve 
TO 






2. Fuel, Oil, and '.l;'axes, Boeing 727 cost of fuel, oil and 
taxes per total aircraft block hour is related to the 
average aircraft stage distance, the average distance 
flown between stops. The shorter this distance, the 
more costly are fuel and oil per total aircraft block 
hour due to the "voraciousness" of jets during take-off, 
climb, and acceleration toward cruising speed. This 
unit cost tends to decrease as the average aircraft 
stage distance increases since the aircraft can oper-
ate longer at its more efficient cruising speed. The 
Boeing Company made the cost analysis for Frontier, 
and estimates the cost per total aircraft block hour 
to be $140.37. The total added cost for B 727 fuel, 
oil, and taxes is 
2,086 total aircraft block l:+ours x $140,37= $292,812. 
3. Insurance. A complete Boeing 727 airpJ,.ane, including 
airframe, three engines, and electronic equipment, 
costs $4.5 mil],.ion. Frqntier has three B 727s in its 
fleet, making a total fleet cost equal to $13.5 million, 
excluding cost of spare equipment. Frontier ef;,timates 
total aircraft insurance cost at 2 per cent of the 
B 727 fleet cost or $270,000 per year. Frontier a~tic-
ipates that each jet will average 3,650 annual revenue 
block hours utilization, or 10,950 annual revenue block 
hours for the fleet. Non-revenue block hours are esti-
mated at 2 per cent of revenue block hours, making the 
total block h,ours for the fleet equal to 11,169. 
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Aircraft insurance cost per total aircraft l?lock hour 
is $270,00 total insurance cost per year~ 11,169 
total aircraft block hours= $24.17. Total B 727 
insurance cost allocated to the proposed service to 
Las Vegas is 
2,086 total aircraft block hours x $24.17 insurance 
cost per block hour= $50,419. 
4. Other Costs. This cost category includes such items · 
as supplies, professional and technical fees, injuries, 
loss, damage, and other miscellany. For .Boeing 727 
equipment, these accumulated costs are ee;;timated by 
Frontier to be $1.07 per total airoraft block hour. 
This figure.is based on the historical relatiollShiP of 
these "other costs" to all crew costs, as experienced 
by Frontier in 1964. Total added B 72711other costs" 
as a result of the decision is 
2,086 total aircraft block hours X $1.07 = $2,232. 
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Direct Maintenance--Fli5ht Eguipment. This oof\lt category includes 
necessary repairs, and overl).auls of the aircraft, including airframe,. 
engines, and other flight equipment. Unit co$t of this service on 
Boeing 727 equipment ::i,s estimated by Frontier·. to be $90.23 per total 
aircraft block hour, based primarily on the experience of four major 
trunklines as shown in Table IX. The change in total cost for direct 
maintenance on B 727 flight equipment is 
2,086 total aircraft block hours X $90.23 = $188,220. 
Applied Maintenance Burden--Flight Equipment. This function in-
cludes all overhead or general expenses used direotly in the activities 
119 
TABLE IX 
·ESTIMATED B 727 UNIT COST OF DIRECT MAINT~ANCE--FLIGHT 
















Total Direct Maintenance 
Plus 5% for i~lation 
















Bases for Estimate 
Simple average of Big Four 
costs for 4th quarter of 1964 
Eastern's 1964 4th quarter 
cost ~ince they alone reported 
a reserve provision· 
Average of American and 
Easter~ for 4th quarter 1964 
since the reporting by these 
carriers indicate use of out-
side engine overhaul 
Simple average of the Big Four 
costs for 4th quarter of 1964 
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involved in periodic flight equipment maintenance operations.· It in-
cludes expenses related to the 1;tdministration of maintenance stocks 
and stores, the keeping of pertinent maintenance operations records, 
and the scheduling, controlling, planning and supervieion of mainte-
nance operations. In Frontier's experience in 1965, the applied main-
tenance burden was costed at 159 per cent of direct maintenance labor. 
Frontier elected to use this same percentage in estimating the appro-
priate applied maintenance burden for Boeing 727 as well as Convair 580 
equipment. 
For Boeing 727 equipment the sum of direct maintenance labor for 
the total aircraft, including airframes ($14.75), engines ($8.57), and 
other flight equipment ($4.08), equals $27.39 per total aircraft block 
hour. The applied maintenance burden per tota], aircraft block hour is 
$27.39 X 159% + 4% for inflation::; $45.73. 
Thus, the total B 727 applied maintenance burden--flight equipment is 
eetimated to be 
2,086.total aircraft block hours X $45.?3::; $95,393. 
Depreciation--Flight Equipment. ·This cost category includes all 
charges to account for losses suffered through cµrrent exnaust::i,on of 
the serviceabi1i ty of flight equipment d,ue to wear and tear from use 
and the action of time and the elements, which are not replaced by cur-
rent repairs. For Frontier's new fleet of three Boeing 727 jets, the 
annual depreciation charge per aircraft is estimated on a time basis to 
be $345,000, calcu'.l,ated a13 shown in Table X. To put B 727 annual 
depreciation charges on a cost per total aircraft block hour basis, the 
following conversions are necessary: 
TABLE X 
ESTIMATED BOEING 727 FLIGHT EQVIPMENT 
INVESTMENT AND DEPRECIA?!ON 
Complete Airplane (OOO) 
Airframe 
Three engines 
at $239,000 each, 
Electronics 
Subtotal 
Spare Costs (OOO) 
Airframe Cat 11% of airframe cost) 
Engines Ca quantity of four) 
Engine parts and miscellany 
(at lo% of total engine costs) 
Electronics (at 23% of electronics) 
Total Fleet Cost (ooo) 
Residual Values (000) After 12 Years 
Airframes and spares at 15% 
Engines and spares at 15% 
Electronics and spares at 15% 
Built-in overhaul at $150,000 
per airframe 
at $25,000 per engine 
Total. Residual .Value of Tn.ree 
Aircraft Fleet 
Co$t . Total 001;3t of 3 



















Total Fleet A.rinual Depreciation (Stra,ight Line Basis)= 
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Total Fleet Cost .. T9tal Residual Value= $16,o4~tooo - $3,631,000 
Expected Life of Fleet·· · · 12 years 
= $1,035,000 
Annual Depreciation per aircraft= $l,o35;000 = $J45,000 3 . 
3,650 revenue block hours per aircraft x 3 aircraft 
+ 2% non-revenue hours of revenue block hotU"s 
= 11,169 total aircraft block hows for fleet 
Total fleet de;ereciation charge= $1,0,~lOOO 
Total !leet block }lours 11,1. 9 · 
= $92.67 depreciation cost per total aircraft block 
hour. 
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The total annual B ?27 flight equipment depreciation charge attributable 
to the proposed service to Las Vegas is 
2,086 total aircraft block hours x $92.67 = $193,310. 
As shown in Table X, depreciation cost per year is $345,000 per 
aircraft and is a function of time, not output, Therefore, the greater 
the Ol.\tput of the· aircraft in terms of tot.al aircraft block hours flown, 
the smaller tl).e depreciation cost per unit of output, Frontier esti-
mates it will fly each jet in revenue service· an average of ten hours 
per day,·365 days pe:r year, plu1:1 2 per cent.ri.on~revenueserv!ce, e;ivirig 
total aircraft block hours flown per year per i:i,ircraft of 3,723. The 
general,. relationship between un~t depreciation east a;nd aircraft output 
can be generalized as shown below, 
The diagram shows, of course, that for this decision, depreciation 
cost per unit of output wil], not vary as output varies. If Front!i,er's 
. . 
actual output experience :i,n the Las Ve~as seirvic~ il:l difte;ent than 
that forecast, the unit cost rate 6.f $92~67 will still apply-, given 
that Frontier does in fact achieve its expected system utilization of 
aircraft. The amount of total depreciation not·absorbed by the Las 
Vegas service would simply be allocated to the alternative which makes 
up th.e difference between the projected 3, 7'23 total aircraft block 
hours flown per year and the output actually experienced.in the 
Depreoiation 
oost per unit 
of output . 
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3723 Output= total airoraft block 
hours flown per air-
oraft per year in 
system servioe 
For the Las Vegas ser~ce, Frontier expects an output of 2,o66 total 
aircraft block hours flown; the dep~iation cost per unit of output 
can be illustrated as shown below. 
Depreciation 
cost per unit 
of output 
2086 ·. Output :: total,.· ~ircraf't olook 
hours flown Pl!lr year 
.. in Las Vegas servioe 
Las Vegas service. These same relationships·hold true for aircraft 
insurance since this cost is likewise fixed per aircraft per year. 
The total decrease in depreciaM,9n charges for Conv~ir 580 flight 
equipment is based on Frontier's system expeiience i;n t:he Third Quarter 
of 1965 when it had an average depreciation ~ast per total aircraft 
block hour of $20.03. During thiei quarter, Frontier had 10 aireraft in 
service with 9 committed to the schedule. In 1967, 17 Will be in serv-
ice with 15 in the schedule. Therefore, the ratio of total to sched-
uled will increase from 1.111 to 1.133, for a 2 per cent increase in 
cost. Frontier, thus, estimates depreciation cost per total aircraft 
block hour to be $20.43. The total decrease in CV 580 flight equipment 
depreciation charges is, then, 
(-)322 total aircraft block ho~r.s )( $20.43 = ( .. )$6,578, 
Indirect Cost§: Servicing Expenses 
. , t 
Indirect costs have been identified previously, using the func-
tional classification required by the CAB for carrier reporting. In 
order to cl~ify the meaning of a major porti~n of costs attributable 
to the Las Vegas service, each of these cost categories is briefly 
defined as follows (32): 
1. Direct Ground Eql.d.pm13nt Maintenance. This category 
includes the costs of. labor, mat~rials, and outi;d.de 
services consumed directly in pe~odic maintenance 
operations and repa:l.r of ground equipment.of.all. 
types. This is Frontier's smallest expense for a 
major category, averaging approximately 1.4 per cent 
of total indirect cost. 
2. · Applied Maintenan.ce Burden·~Ground iquipment. Like 
applied maintenance burden ... -flight equipmexit, this 
category inoludes all overheaQ pr g~neral expenses 
directly involved in periodic maintenance operations 
and repair of ground equipment. 
3. Ground Equipment Depreci~tion. 'l'h.ia category includes 
all charges to record losses suffered through.current 
exhaustion of the serviceabil:t, ty of ground equipment 
due to wear and tear which are not replaced py current 
repairs. 
4. Genera,l Services and Administration. When. applied air-
craft maintenance bur~en is included in direct cost 
instead of in indirect cost, approxirna.tdy 95 per cent 
of total indirect costs are included in the subcate ... 
gories comprising this major cost category. The $Ub~ 
categories are 
a. Passenger Service, whiqh includes all expenses 
chargeable directly to activities .contributing 
to the comfort, safety and convenie:q.ce ·. of 
passenge:ris wh;tle in flight and when flights 
are interrupted. Included are such·costs as 
stewardess expenses, food and beverage expenses, 
and hotel accommodations. This function accounts . . . . 
for approximately l:;? per cent o.f Frontier's tc;>tal 
indirect costs. 
b. Aircraft and.Traffic Servicing, whic;h includes 
(1) the compensation of g.round personnel and 
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other expenses incurred on the gl'9und 
incidental to the protection and con-
trol of'. the in-fl;tght movement of 
ai;reraft, 
(2) the expenses of' scheduling ~nd prepaX"ing 
aircraft operational crews for flight 
assign:meri:t, 
(3) the cost of handling and servicing of 
aircraft while in line operation, 
(4) the cost of enplaning and deplaning 
passengers, 
(5) the in·flight expenses of handling and 
protecting all nonpasse;nger traffic in-
cluding passenger baggage, ~d 
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(6) aircraft landing fees. 
This function conetitutes approximately.52 per cent 
of Frontier's total indirect cost. 
c. Pr9motion and Sales, which inclu4es expenses incurred 
in promoting <iind creating public preference for the 
· air c;arrien and its serV'ic~s, and in stimulating the 
generaL development of the air transport m~ket. It 
further includes: 
(l) compensation of personnel and other 
expenses inciden.tal t9 docum~nting 
f3a.],es, 
(2) expenses incidental to controlling 
and confirming aircraft space.for. 
traffic sold (reservations), 
(3) expenses incurred in direct sales 
solicitation and selling of aircraft 
space, ~d 
(4) expenses incurred in developing 
tariffs and schedules for pµbl:i,cation. 
For Frontier this fun9tion accounts for approx-
imately 18 per cent of total indirect cost. 
d. ·· General and Administrative, which includes expenses 
of a general corporate nature, and expenses incurred 
in performing activities which contribute to more 
than a single operating function such as general 
financial accoun,ting activities, purchasing activi-
. ties, lawyers' salariel3 and fees, management 
salaries, and so forth. The cost of this function 
· for Frontier averages approximately 13 per cent of 
total indirect cost. 
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In 1965, Frontier's indirect cost for all operations totalled a~proxi-
mately $9 million, 95 per cent of·which were accounted for by the sub-
categories comprising the General Services and Administration cost 
category described above. 
For purposes of decision making, Front.fer rearrange:;; the indirect 
co::;;t categories into three claseifications which it labels "Servicing. 
Expenses" as shown in Table V (page 93). These are: 
1, Stewardess Expense 
2. Regional and System Servicing Expense 
3. Local Station Servicing Expense. 
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Frontier attempts to allocate indirect costs to individual local sta-
tions on its system according to the degree to which each local station 
generates these costs or can be directly identified with specific 
costs. Those indirect costs which are not generally identifiable with 
any particular local station but are, instead, primarily inc.urred due 
to service provided to a region of local stations or to Frontier's 
entire system are all.ocated to the cost category of Regional and System 
Servicing Expense. Both of the servicing expense categories contain 
costs from each of the functions comprising total indirect cost. For 
example, some of Frontier's total system Promotion and Sales Expenses 
will be identified with specific local stations since advertising out-
lays in the Phoenix-Tucson area tend to benefit those local stations 
but not the Kansas City station. On the other hand, some advertising 
will benefit a given region and Frontier's system as a. whole and, 
therefore, will be allocated to regional and system e;icpenses. In 
Frontier's 1965 system experience, total Local Station Servicing 
Expense amounted to $4,297,000 and Regional and System Servicing Expense 
amounted to $4,585,000, for a total indirect cost, excluding Stewardess 
Expense.of $8,882,000. 
By the use of statistical analyses, Frontier has sought to specif-
ically relate Local, and Regional and System Servicing Expenses to 
measures of output in order to estimate changes in these costs ~s out-
put changes. Details of these procedures are analyzed and demonstrated 
below, as is the procedure by which Stewardess Expense attributable to 
the Las Vega$ service is estimated. 
Stewardess Expense. In 1,965 Frontier flew 24,128 total revenue 
aircraft block hours with Convair 580 equipment. Total stewardess 
129 
expenses amounted to $209,918, making the cost per stewardess per 
revenue block hour $8.70. To estimate the added stewardess expense for 
Boeing 727 equipment, Frontier uses the CV 580 experience of $8.70 per 
stewardess per revenue block hour, plus $.35 per stewardess per revenue 
block hour for extra compensation. The cost for three stewardesses, 
plus 4 per cent inflation, is 
$9.05 cost per stewardess per revenue block hour X 3 stewardesses 
X 1.04 = $28.24 per revenue aircrart block hour. 
Total added B 727 Stewardess Expense is 
2, 045 revenue aircraft block hours flown X $28. 24 = $57, 751. 
The total decrease in Stewardess Expense for Convair 580 equipment 
is determined similarly. A cost per stewardess per revenue aircraft 
block of $9.05 is calculated by adding an inflation cost of 4 per cent 
to the base figure of $8.?0. Thus, 
(-)316 revenue aircraft block hours x $9.05 = (-)$2,860. 
Regional and System Servicing Expense. Frontier computes its 
estimate of the added Regional and System Servicing Expense attributa-
ble to the proposed service to Las Vegas from a regression equation 
based on domestic trunk and local service industry experience for 1965. 
This regression equation was derived by relating Regional and System 
Servicing Expense per revenue ton mile to revenue ton miles per depar-
ture. These data and the resultant regression equation are shown in 
Figure 9. As is indicated, Regional and System Servicing Expense per 
revenue ton mile responds to changes in the revenue ton mile per depar-
ture index in that increases in the index result in decreases in 
regional and system unit costs. 
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system portion of expenses for local service carriers bases regional 
and system unit cost on each carrier's past long-term system added cost 
per added ton mile of traffic. In essence, this assumes no new route, 
no matter how different it may be in economic;: characteristics, can be 
operated at a more favorable unit cost than has been averaged in the 
past over a carrier's system. 
For the proposed service to Las Vegas, Frontier's revenue ton 
miles per departure for the added operation would be 1,838, compared 
with its 1965 system experience of 215 revenue ton miles per departure. 
Obviously, because of the nature of the proposed route and its differ-
ences from Frontier's present system, this is a situation which will 
result in a much more favorable regional and system unit cost. 
Table Xl summarizes relevant historic and forecast operating sta-
tistics used in computing addeq Regional and System Servicing Expense. 
TABLE XI 
SUMMARY OF OPERATING Sl'ATISTICS USED IN COMPUTING ADDED REGION 
AND SYSTEM SERVICING EXPENSE, LAS VEGAS SERVICE 
Present Added by 
System in Proposed Resultant 
1965 Service System 
Revenue Ton Miles (000) 22,027 3,994 26,021 
Aircraft Departures Performed 102,536 2,146 104,682 
Revenue Ton Miles per Departure 214.82 1837 .84 248.57 
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To determine the net increase in total Regional ap.d System (R a.nd S) 
Servicing Expense attributable to the P+opose~ Las Vegas servi~e, it 
is necessary to calculate F:r;-ontier's total system Rand S Servicing 
Expense before. and after introduction of the propo~ed service and, take 
the di:fferer,i.ce. 
Frontier's a9cotmting re9orda show total Regional and System 
Servicing E,x:pense for l965 to be $4,585,000. Rand S Servicing Expense 
per revenue ton mile (RTM) for Frontier's present 1965 system is, 
the~efore, equal to 
Total Rand S Servloin3 ExEense, Eresent system 
Total Re1venue Ton MileEi, prese:p,t system 
= $.2082 (actual). 
!4,585,000 
:;:: 22,027,000 
From Figure 9, a "computed" value for R and S Servic,in~ Expense per RTM 
for the present system is found by measuring a.long the horizontal axis 
to Frontier's 1965 av~rag~ system experience of 215 R'i'M per departure, 
tracing upward to the regression line, and reading the val~e of 
$ .2092 off the vertical axis.. The "actual" ~ and S Servicing ~xpense 
for the present system as .a percentage of the "computed" is 99. 52 
per cent. 
With t;he addition of the proposed service, Frontier's resultant 
system shows, in Table XI, an increase in RTM per departure from 215 
in 1965 ~o 249 in 1967. From Figure 22, the new "computed" Rand S 
Servicing l!;xpense per RTM for the result~nt system is found by again 
measuri~g along the horizontal. axis to Frontier's resultant system 
experi~nce of 249 RTM per departure, ql.Jld tracing upward to the regres-
sio:p. lin~. Front:t.er'Ei resultant system Rand$ Se~vi9ing E:lc;pense per 
RTM can be re~d off the verticitl axis to be $.1945, "computed''· Since 
the "i:a.ctual" as a percen,tage of the "computed" R and S Servicing 
Expense per RTM is 99.52 per cent,. the "actual" is calculated to be 
$.1936. The total Regional a~d System Se:i:tvicing Expense for the 
resultant syst~m .i~ then: 
26,021,00Q Reve;nue 'l'o:n Miles x $,1936 Rand S Servicing 
Expense pe~ RTM ~ $5,038,000. 
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The Regional and System Serv~cing Expense added by the proposed 
Las Vegas service is equal to the expense of the resultant system minus 
the present system, or $453,000, Dividing the added Rand S Servicing 
Expense by the added revenue ton m~les gives an Rand S Servicii;i.g 
Expense per RTM of $.1148 for the added output. 
~n the foregoing analysis, it was shown that an increase in total 
system output from.215 to 249.revenue ton miles per departure results 
in a decrease in total system Rand S Servicing Expense per R1M from 
$.2082 to $.1936. Thus, a 15,4 per cent increase i~ total system out-
put results in. a 7.2 per cent decrease in system cost per unit, i;ndicat-
ing a more efficient us~ of all facilities. More importantly, the unit 
added cost of t~e added service is calculated at $.1148 per added RTM, 
considerably below Frontier's present system as well as resultant sys-
tem unit costs, both of wh,ich are ;fully allocated ccist bases. But 
rather than use traditional fully c;tl.located cost, Frontier believes 
that the apprqj:,riate cost here is the unit incremental cost of $.1148 
per R'l'M qr an addedR and S Servicing ~pense pf $45},000 for 3,994,000 
added revenue ton ~ilee, A fully allocated cost approach would have 
employed Frqntie:r's ~istori,c regional and system unit cost experience 
of $.2082 per: r~venue ton mile, for a resulting addition to Rand S 
Servicing ~penije of'. $S30,ooo •. The two a:pproachee to route costing 
involve very subqtantial differences in, expected additic;mal coet and, 
there!ore, expected additional profit of the Las Vegas route decision. 
Local Stat,z!,on Servigine; ExI;>ense. Frontier computes its estimate 
of added Local Station aervicing E;xpense attributable to the proposed 
service to ~as Vegas.frQm an ee;'l:;imating equation based on domestic 
. . 
trunk and local service industry exp~rience for the year 1965. This 
estimat:t;ng equatioDi Wiill:I der.ived by relating Iiocal Station Servicing 
Expense per 100 departures to tons qriginated ~l' J,.00 departures. The 
resultant estimating equation and fitted regression line are shown in 
Fig~e 10. As is indicated, Local Station Servicing Expense per 100 
departures responds to changes in the tons originated per 100 depar= 
tures index in that increases in the index result in increases in 
Local servicing ~nit costs. 
Table XII summarizes.relevant historic and forecast operating 
statistics used in computing a,dded Local Station Servicing Expense. 
Adde~ tons originated by the proposed service (7,262) is cal9ulated by 
dividing; tata'.l, added revenue ton miles (3,994,ooo) 1:;>y the average 
passenger qaul (41.9). 
TABLE XJI 
SUMMARY OF OPERATING STATISTICS USED IN COMPUTING ADD:tmJ LOCAL 
STATION SJ:;RVICING EXPENSE, LAS VEGAS SERVICE · 
· Tqn Originated 
Aircraft Departures Performed 
Tons Ori~inated p~r 100 Pepartures 
Present· 
System 
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·To est:i,.mate Frontier's total Local Station Servic;ingE:icpense 
added by the proposed service, it is again necessary to find the re~ 
· sultant sistem expense and subtact the present system expense from it. 
Fron tier's accowiting records show Local Sta.tio.n Servicing Expense 
for 1965 to be $4,297,000. The "a.ct~1•1 Local Station Servicing 
Expense per 100 departures for the present system is equal to 
X 100 = 
From Figl.lre 10, a "computed" value for Local Station Servicing Expense 
per 100 departures for the presen~ system is found by measll.I'.i:ng along 
the hori;o:i;l.tal ~xis to Frontier's 1965.average system experience of 
72.21 tons origtnated per.100 departures,· tracing upward to the regres-
sion line, and reading t;be value of $3,175, off the vertical axis. 'rhe 
"actual.". Looal Stat:J.on Servicing Expense as a percentage of the 
"c;omputed" · is 132 .09 pe:,;, cent. 
Pue to the proposed service, Frontier's resultant system shows 9 
in 'l'able XU, a;n 1:n,crea.f;le in tons ori!;?jinated from 72.21 in 1965 ta 
77.68 in 1967. From Figure 10, the new"computed" iocal Station 
Servicing ~pense per 100 departures for 77.68 tons originated per 100 
d,epartu,;r-es is $3,34:;:>. Since the "actual" as a percentage of the 
"computed" is l,3?.09 p~r cent, the "actual" tocal Station Servicing 
Expense pep 100 departures for the resultant syst~m is calculated to 
be $4,414. The total' :J:,ocal Statio.n Servicing Expense for the resultant 
system is then 
l°{b&1Q Airpr1rft Departures perf,ormed >< $4, 414 ,, actual II Local 
.Statton Serv:i,cing Expense per 100 .d~partiires;:: $4,617,000. 
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The Lpcal, Station Servicing ~el'l.Se added by the proposed 
. . 
~as Veg~s service is equal to the e~ense of the resultant system minus 
the .preseni system or $320,000. Dividing total Local Station Servicing 
~pense addeli by the proposed service. by the added .departures (times 
100) givei;; a Local Station Servicing Expense per 100 departures of 
$1,492 :!!'or tb.e a.dded output, as compared to Frontier's 1965 system 
As in estimating Regional and System Servicing Expense, Frontier 
estimates Local Station Servicing Expense on an incremental cost basis~ 
rather than on a fully al,located cost basis. With 2,146 added depar-
tures, a fully allocated cost 1:ipproach would estimate the added Local 
Station $ervici;ng Expenae at $900,000, nearly'three times greater than 
Frontier's estimate using the added cost approach. 
Figure 9 shows that Regional,.and System Servicing ~pense per 
revenue ton mile substantially decreases at a decreasing rate, as out-
put, measured in revenue ton miles per departure, increases up to a 
. . 
level of approximately 2000-2500 revenue'ton miles per departure. 
Since the lOcal carriers have m1J.c;h shorter hops and lower load factors 
than the trunk lines, this unit cost is typicaJ,.ly much greater than 
that of the tr\lP.ks. Greater e:f'ficienc;:ies in the use of' regional and 
system facilities, coupled with the sheer force that greater distances 
have on Mit cost per some measure of distap.ce, generally explain the 
d:i,ffe:ren~es in tllis unit qost between.locals and,. trunks. But in 
Figure lO, unit cost is shpwn to increas~ as output increases. Local 
Station Servicing Expense per 100 departuree increases at a rapidly 
increasin,g r~te as output, measured in tons originated per 100 depar-
.tures, inqrea,ses.· For instance, United Airlines has an output of 305 
tons originated per 100 departures, and a resulting Loe.al Station Serv-
icing ~ens~ per 100 departures of $23,908. By contrast, Frontier's 
1965 experience was 72.21 tons originated per .100 departures and a 
Local atatton Servicing Expense per 100 departures of $4,194. United's 
output wa~ 4 .• 3?. times greater than Frontier's, but its unit cost was 
5.78 times greater. 
At first glance, these relative local station co~t-output values 
would seem paradoxical. One might thi;nk a priori that the greater 
traffic volumes handled per flight per local station would give the 
trunklines advantages in cost effioiencies which would reduce their 
Local,. Statiori Service Expense per 100 departures below that of mol;'!t 
. . . 
local carriers ~ince the locals must maintro,.n and provide ground serv-
ices at many re;l.atively smalleI' stations produc:i,ng comparatively little 
traffic (tonsoriginated) in relation to the fixed costs required. But 
apparet1,tly such .is not the cas~. Th.e indirect cost of promoting, 
selling, and servicing traffic.identifiable with a specific local sta-
tion differs significantly between classes of carriers.· Compared to 
the trunklines, local service.carriers generally seek to operate local 
statiori.s on a ],east-cost,-possible bas;ts. With lower average fares per 
pasE1enger, higher .lj_ne-in,aul costs. and pressure to hold down subsidy 
needs, they mwst keep all controllable servicing and overhead costs at 
practic?]. m:i.nimwns; in-flight.passenger services aremodest, local sta .... 
tion facilities ar$ minimal, ·and so forth. In contrast, the trunks, 
with mu.ch hi~her a.verage fares per passenger, can aff<;>rd to provide a 
higher level, of local station service p~r passenger and competition 
adds to tbe pressure to do so. Comparatively elaborate station facili-
ties, e:xpensive downtown sales offices, complete meali:. and other 
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passenger amenities, and substantial ad.vertising all contribute to the 
trunks r~l~tively hi~her Local Station Servicing Expe~se per 100 
departures_ 
Return on Investment. and Subsid~ Reduction 
I I 
A summatton of total added Aircraft Operating Expenses and total 
added Servici~g Expen~es results in a change 1~ Frontier's total Opera-
ting ~penses attributable to the proposed service to Las Vegas of 
$1,764,492. Thus, the increase in Operating Profit of Frontier (lue to 
the decision is: 
Incre~ental Commercial Revenue 
'minus Inc:i;-emental Operating.Cost c; (-)J.,764 2492 
Total Incremental Operating Profit= $ i,065,800~ 
In the original proposal, Frontier encourages CAB approval by 
requesting the route extension ona non-sµbsidy basis. In fact, 
fri:;,ntier furtheJl' strengthens its case by offering to apply $624,800 of 
··. the revep.ue earned toward reduction of its present yearly subsidy pay-
ment. This is a significant pa.rt of the over-all decision because the 
CAB, 1r it approv~s the route application, w:U.l :;tn fact reduce Fron-
tie:r 's $Ubsidy by the stated.amoun.t, regardless of Frontier's actual 
revellue,-co:st exper:;tenoe in operating the Las Vegas route. 
The provision for net additional return on inve1;1tment and taxes 
ip oalcul.ated tobe $441,opo •. The procedures used and the bases for 
deteI'l!lin.i:rig this value are specified and discussed in Table XXXV in 
Appendix D. Given a. tota.l foreca13t a.dded operatin.g ;Profit of $1,065,ooo<j 
this perm;l~s Frontier to earn a ''fair" return while at the same time 
reducing its p!lesent su'l;lsidy need by $624,800. 
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Conclusion 
If the fully allocated cost method had been employed in Frontier's 
estimates qf added Local Station $ervicing Expense and added Regional 
and System Servicing Expense, Frontier's total expected added cost of 
the proposed service would have been almost $1 m;tllion greater than 
that calculated using the added cost approach. Such an added cost 
value would turn the expected net profit in Table V into a loss of 
almost $0.5 mil.lion, considering the need for return on investment and 
taxes. Instead of reducing subsidy, it would be necessary to increase 
it if Frontier is to receive a "just" return for its service. Thus, 
the importance of employing relevant cost ooncepts can readily be seen 
in this decision. 
Frontier's attempt to determine the added total cost and revenue 
of the Las Vegas service relies heavily on projectio:p.s of historic 
data, judgments, a:p.d formulas. Given Frontier's accounting system and 
size of operation, thii;;.approach, though undoubtedly subject to im-
provement, provides~ "satistaetory" basis for decision making. Fron-. 
tier admits it may not be the best basis, but a "best" way, assuming 
there ~s one, might well cost more than is justifiable. Frontier offi-
cials do have confidenoe :i,n these procedu:i;-es ,;3.nd if the over-all esti-
mate is within 5 to ).0 per cent of actual experience, they will be 
quite satisfied.· 
Frontier's Douglas, Arizona Route Decision 
Introduction to :Incremental Analysis 
In h:i,a book, Ene;ineering Economy, Professor Thuesen (33) says: 
Where incremental costs are to be.considered, the question 
is: Will it be profitable to add a certain activity or 
s1,1btract a certain activity from the total activities now 
in progress? · 
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In a recent issue of Business;~, an article dealing with decision.-
making state1:1 (34): 
. Getting lflanagement to accept and apply the marginal concept 
probably is the chief contribution a.µy economistci:ill make 
to his ~onipany. Put most simply, margina).ists maintain 
than a company shoi.ild undertake any activity that adds more 
to :revenues than it does to costs~-and not limit itself tQ 
those activities wb,ose returns equal average or "fully ' 
allocated'' costs. · 
Haynes (28), in his managerial economics text, defines the m&rginal 
(o:r increment1;:1.l) concept in a relevant and practical form as follows: 
a decision is sound if it increases revenue more than costs or reduces 
costs more than revenue. He further states that application of the 
incremental concept, " ••• involves estimating the impact of decision 
alternatives on costs and revenues, stressing the chan5es in total cost 
and total revenue that result ••• " 
· These quotations succinctly p:l;'esent one of the most fundamental 
and important concepts of economic theo:ry. Theory states that if, when 
output increases, the resultingmarginal revenue exeeeds marginal cost, 
the action is profitable in the short-rl).n. Short ... ru.n analysis does not 
take into account fixed costs associated with production, as they are 
irrelevant for the decision. 
. . .. . .. 
Insufficient studies have been conducted to ascertain if a.nd how 
firms ul;le the marginal (or incremental) concept; in decision-making. 
One of the objectives of analyiz:.irig this an9, the following decision of 
Frontier is to document the degree to which, and how, actual decisions 
made empioy ;lncremental reasoning. By way of fwther introd1,1ction, 
incremental pract;i.ces of Continental Airlines are discussed to establish 
some of the decision areas where application of the concept has proven 
profitable. 
Cqntinental Airlines is a recognized leader in the air transporta-
tion industry in new innovationi:;. In product differentiation, 
Continental was the first airline to seek to establish a distinct 
corporate image by color-coding its flight equipment, ground personnel 
and traffic-handling equipment. It has on several occasions startled 
the industry with rate decreases in passenger fares, insisting that the 
action was justified on pure elasticity of demand considerations. Only 
recently, in August, 1966, Continental "broke the ice" for truriklines 
on adult st(llldby fares, setting them one-third below economy fares on 
late night flights. 
Continental has likewise led the industry in application of the 
marginal concept to improve net corporate profit. In fa.ct, when this 
writElr firet contacted Frontier Airlines for permission to analyze its 
use of certain economic concepts, he was encouraged to, instead, "talk 
to Continental" because of Continental' s advanced II stage" as an imple .. 
menter of such concepts. Subsequent correspondence with the Vice 
President for Corpor~te Planning of Continental Airlines reve'9.led that 
certain practic~s to improve profits, whi.ch are disqussed below, are 
continuing to be used by Continental. He replied, "In reviewing your 
information reques-bs, I do not.find too much that could be added ••• 
other than some additional (comparable) illustrations ••• '' He was 
· referring to Cop.tinentaL I s use of marginal analysis in flight 
scheduling (34). 
The bulk of Contine:nta1 1s flights are scheduleq. on a ful],y allo-
. cated co.st basis since the firm cannot, of course, make a profit unless 
average total costs are cover.ed. But for any S: ven flighi;, Continental 
maintain1;1 that fully allocated' cost should not be the basis for 
· deoision,-miildrm, since such reasoning would distor~ the II real" cost of 
the flight and result in foregone opportunities to add to corporate net 
profit. SQ, once the basic sched1,1.le has been determined, Continental 
puts on extra flights if the additional revenue exceeds the additional 
cost, where the latter is estimated on,.as Continental calls it, an 
''out-of-poclcet '' basis. Out-of-pocket costs mean the actual dollars 
that must be paid out to run• flight and include no costs that do not 
vary directly with the flight. A proposed schedule is circulated to 
every operating department concerned which then in turn estimates the 
addi tionaJ. cost it incurs in handling the flight. · For ex~ple, if a 
plane can be serviced by a ground c:r;'ew already on: duty, the flight is 
not allocated any of .theiri salary expense, sinc,e :p.o addiM,onal dollar,-
outli;cy is incurred. 
TJ::i.e Ejame marginal analysis is likewise a.p:plied to individual 
flights with poor records to. determine if they should be discontinued. 
Again,. if revenues fromdroppihg the flight dectease more than out-of-
pockat costs decrease, the fligrt.is kept on since there is a positive 
contribution to corporate net profit. 
Continent~'s practice has been to run these marginal flights at 
off-peak periods such as late at night, or early in the morning. Its 
adult standby fare, for example, is appl.icable only during such times 
of usually low lo~d-factor. 
Closely connected with marginal cost analysis is the concept of 
opportunity cost--the net revenue foregone by choosing one alternative 
over another. 'i'he "best'' .al terna ti ve is that which results in least 
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opportunity cost. For inst.ance, i:r;i a decision made by Continental to 
add a flight to· Kansas City on a marginal b~sis, Continental found . 
that, coincidentally, two planes would.be arriving a.t the same t:i,me, 
requiring service simultaneously. Tb.is would reql.dre addit5,.onal serv-
ioe faciU.ties costing $1800 per month •. Continental was fa,ced with the 
. altern~:t;ives of having tW'o planes on the grotW.d in Kansas City at the 
same time or rescheduling its flights departing from other cities to 
avoid the double landing. The latter alternative entailed selecting 
less desirable hqurs, with the result that customer£;; would switch to 
competitive flights leaving at more popular hours. Continental esti-
mated that loss of this traffic would reduce revenues by $10,000 per . . 
month. In this instance, the opportunity cost of choosing one alter-
native over another .was quite clear, once the relevant "cost'' eetimates 
were made. 
A similar example of Continent.,:1 1 s use.of the marginal and oppor-
tunity cost concepts inv<;>lved a late evening flight froin Colorado 
Springs to Denver and an early morning return flight; the aircraft had 
to be in Colorado Springs later on in the morning each day for sched-
uled flights originating there. Nevertheless; Continental returned tht;t 
aircraft ta Denver each n!lght, often empty except for some cargo, be-
cause the net cost of the·round trip flight was less than the.rent for 
· overnight hanger space in Colorado Springs. · 
This kind of rea,soniµg has resulted in enviable profit records for 
Continental,; even though certS.,.n measure,;; of performanc~ i:Q.volving 
"averages", such as loa.d factorq, appear inferior. 
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Summary of Douglas Route Proposal 
I . 
In January, 1966, F:rontier submitted a proposal to the CAB for new 
certification to serve Douglas, 4:ri~ona, with six daily flights using 
Frontier's fleet of 52 passenger, jet ... powered Convair 580 equipment. 
Figure 111$ a map of Frontier's present system and proposed route to 
Douglas. Air travelers to and from Douglas will be benefited by Fron-
tier's promotional fare programs such as its Fa,mi:j..y Pian, Youth Fare, 
Military Standby Fare, Clergy Fare, Vacationland Area Fare, and Visit 
U.S.A. Fare. Frontier further proposes to offer the El Paso-Tucson/ 
Phoeni:x; passengers its new 50 per cent Standby Fare. 
The proposed service to Douglas has a strong integration with 
Frontier's existing system and requires the addition of only one sta-
tion, Douf!;+as. Frontier service can be provided by, the extension of 
present flights now operating into El Paso and Tucson, thereby requiring 
no additional aircraft. 
A summary of first...;year (1966) estimated financial results attrib ... 
utable to the proposed service to Douglas is shown in Table XIII. Of 
particular interest is Frontier's rou,te costing method used in the 
deci$ion. Frontier uses what it calls an added (or incremental) cost 
approach in determining expected profit or loss, in contrast to the CAB 
allocated cost method. The procedu,re used by Frontier in estimating 
tot?]. c1J.ange in revenue attributable to.the Douglas deci.sion is similar 
to that used in the Las Vegas route proposal. An abbreviated ana,J.ysis 
of th:l,s proce<;l.ure ie madl;l to illustrate how the revem,1e-basis for the 
Dougla9 decieion·was determined. Then, F:t>ontie:r's ad.ded cost method is 
.analyzed and the results contrasted with those of the CAB allocated 
cost met;hod. 
Figure 11. Frontier Airlines Present System and Proposed 
Route to Douglas, Arizona 
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TABLE XIII 
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED FINANCIAL RESULTS ATTRIBUTABLE 
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~ncrementat Revenue Attri~utable to Do~las ~ervice 
A summary of the estimated service and traffic resµlts of Fron~ 
tier's proposed service to Douglas is given in four parts in Table XIV. 
Th~ forecasts were made u~ing basicaily the same procedures analyzed in 
the Las Vegas decision. 
Part I. N§!w Doy.e;:t.as Markets. In Pa.rt I, Frontier estimates the 
I 
total loca;J. and connecting passengers E:xpected to travel between 
Douglas and 17 area cities in Frontier's system south of Denver, such 
as Grand Junction, Pueb;Lo, Santa Fe, Tµcson, and eo forth. These esti-
mates are calculated by trucing CA~ traffic surveys made in 1961, 1962, 
and 1963, and projecting them to i966 to obtain the size of the total 
market expected before Frontier service improvements. 
' . . 
In these 17 new Douglas markets, Frontier's 1:;1ervice improvements 
consist primarily of code A and code B. Cade A iei a service improve-
ment where a local service carrier replaces a trunk carrier and code B 
is a service improvement where there is first one-carrier, one-plane 
service replacing two-carrier service. In either type, there is a 
resulting tra:t'f'ic stimulation, and the degree of si;imu,lation is related 
to the extent to which the local carrier has increased service frequency 
over that.provided by the tr\l.Ilkline, A. servic~ !mprovement factor is 
estimated for each market by use of Figure 7 ~iscussed in the Las Vegas 
proposal. F~ontier then,estimates the total passenger market after 
Frontier service improvements. The forecasting p~ocedure is summarized 
as follows: 
Take the CAB historic passenger surveys f9:r:each market in-
volved, and project these to determine traffic for the fore-
cast year before Frantie~ service improvements. Multiply 
the forecast traffic times the appropriate t~~ffic stimula-
tion factor for Frontier service i~provements to determine 
TABLE XIV 
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED SERVICE AND TRAFFIC RESULTS, DOUGLAS SERVICE 
P!RU PART II PART III PART IV 
New Other Total Effect on Effect.of 
Douglas New New Through Standby Net 
Markets Mark~ts Markets Traffic Fare Total 
Revenue -passengers 12,004 4,621 16,625 (1,623) 1,296 · 16,298 
Revenue passenger miles {OOO) 2,937 .8 1,826.3 4,764-..1 (753.4) 466.7 4,47?.4 
Revenue ton miles: 
Passenger bl 452,590 (71,573) 44,336 425,353 
Mail and property L£ 57,026 27,026 
Total 509,616 (71,573) 44,336 482,379 
Airer-aft departures performed 2,760 
Rev,mue miles per departure 174.78 
Commercial Revenues {Net) 
Passenger 207,700 114,874 $322,.574 $(41,,09) $14,549 $295,414 
Mail and Property I.£ 25,320 25,320 
Total $347,894 $(41,709) $14,549 $320,73~ 
!.f! At .095 tons per passenger ... 
l2 At l:?06% uf passenger ton miles per Frontier system experience in 1965. It is estimated that the 
addition of Douglas to existing flights would not adversely affect the existing mail and property load. 
It is estimated that the standby fare would not affect the mail and property load. 




the total market after Frontier service improvements. Esti-
mate Frontier's p~tage participation in the resulting 
total market to determine the number of passengers in each 
market Frontier expects to carry ;i.n the forecast year. 
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Once the number of passengers Frontier expects to carry in each market 
has been estimated, it is a relatively simple matter to determine ex-
pected revenue and other important statistics. 
Since Frontier offers many types of fa~e discounts, the published 
one-way, first class fare does not always apply to all passengers 
carried in~ given market. On the basis of past experience, Frontier 
estimates the applicable average system discount according to inter-
station distance, and uses the average discount to adjust forecasted 
gross revenues for each new market, For example, consider the Douglas-. 
Tucson market. Frontier expects to ct;J..rry 665 passengers :in 1966 
between these two cities which are 92 miles a.part. The first class, 
one-way fare is $9.00, .resulting in an expected gross revenue of $5,9850 
But, based on past experience, Frontier elcitimates that for city,-pairs 
with an inte:rstation distance of 125 miles or less, there will be an 
8 per cent average discount that is applicable as passengers take 
advantage of various special fare plans offered by Frontier. Thus, the 
expected net revenue is $5,506. 
An operating statistic of primary importance is revenue passenge:i;' 
miles (RPM). It is found by mul,tiplying the number of passengers 
traveling between two cities times the interstation mileage. For 
example, 665 passengers q.re expected to travel between Douglas anq 
Tucson, a distance of 92 miles. Thus, the revenue passenger miles are 
equal to 665 pa13senge:t:'s times 92 m:pes, or 61,200 RPM. The total mun-
ber of adciitional Frontier--passE,ingers traveling between Douglas and l? 
area cities ts estimated to be 12,004 in 1966, for a total of 
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29,378,000 a.dd~d RPM; one-half the total IU'e .considered to originate at 
Douglas. 
Part II. Other New Markets. The fo;reoast made in Part .I is of' 
expected passengers whose origin or destination is Douglas. In Part II, 
the forecast is of expected passengers traveling between Phoenix/Tucson 
. ' 
and El Paso/Alamogordo, via Douglas.· Again, to determin.e the expected 
number of additional passengers Frontier will carry in the forecast 
year and the resulting. net added passenger revenue, the same procedure 
outlined about is used •. The total number of Frontier passengers 
traveling poth directions i~ llother new markets" in 1966 is estimated 
to be 4,6:?l, for a total .of 18,263,000 added RPM. 
Summing the revenue passengers forecast in Part land Part II for 
l966 results in total additional· Fr.on tier revenue J>l1).ssengers expected 
in "new mar}tets'' of 16,625 as s.hown in Table XIV. 
Part III~ Through Traffic l\ffected
1
by Douglas Sto~. Passengers 
. . .. , .. . . . 
travel:Xing between Phoenix/'.t'uceon and· SilveI; City, Albuquerque and. 
beyond are expected tc;, be adve:rsely affected .. by the II detoUI' 11 through 
Douglas, as ill~strated.below. 
erque · 
' ·1 
, /lH lllil~ 
.. ' 
92.llliles ·, I 
' I 
' '() .. · LEGEND: · 
Proposed :Route 
152 
Service to Douglas will delay the arrival time of these pasEiengers by 
requiring an additiona~ stop .and over~all greater mileage. Frontier 
estimates that due to the inconvenience for so~e passengers, 10 pe~ cent 
· to 40 per cent, depending on origin and destinatioq, will transfer to 
other flights, resulting in a net loss of present Frontier passengers 
of 1,6~3 for the forecast year. 
Part IV. Ef!ect of Standby Fare. Since. Frontier will offer the 
I '. I · j- . • 
50 per cent Sta:ndby. Fa.re to El Paso-Tucson/Phoenix passengers, it is 
desirable to forecast separately the expected effect of the standby 
fare on traffic and revenues. In the following analysis, it is evident 
that the economic concepts of price and cross ela.~ticity of.demand 
underlie Frontier's reasoning. 
In Part II, Other New Ma,rkets, Frontier estimates the total market 
after Frontier service improveme~t to be: 
Pµoenix-El Paso: iB,242 total passengers. 
7,685 total passengers. Tucson-El Paso: 
Frontier estimates that it will have a 6 per cent partiq:tpation in the 
Phoenix-El. Paso ma,rket,· and a 9 per cent partic;:ipation in the Tucson-
El Paao market. The forecast added local Frontier passengers at regu ... 
lar :(ares would, thus, be ;I..,095 ,;md 692, respectively, in the two 
markets. 
As a result of the 50 per cent standby fare, Frontier estimates an 
additional 5 per cent stim1,1lation of the total market, all of which 
wouid b~ added Frontier pas~engers, Thus, the added new Frontier 
passengers will be 
Phoeni:x-El Paso: 
Tucson-El J(aso: 
18,242 total passengers x 5% stimulation= 912 
7,685 total passengers x 5% stimulation= 384. 
Frontier a~so e:xpects that 20 per qent of the forecast Frontier 
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passengers will transfer from exieting Frontier fares to the standby 
fare. Thus, diverted Frontier pas1;1engers will be 
Phoenix-El Paso: 1,095 forecast Frontier passengers X 20% 
diversion - 219 
Tucson.-Ei Paso: 692 forecast front;i..er passengers X 20% 
diversion ::,:,: 138. 
The total number of Frontier standby passengers is equal to the number 
of new passengers attracted into the market by the standby fare, plus 
the number of existing]i'rontier customers diverted from regular fares. 
Thus, the total standby p~ssengers estimated is 
Phoenix-El Paso: 
Tucson-El Paso: 
912 added Frontier passengers+ 219 
diverted Fron ti er passengers ... 1 ~ 131 
384 ad~ed Frontier passengers+ 138 
diverted Frontier passengers= 522. 
~he computation of net added revenµe attri~utable to the standby fare 
as a result of Douglas service is summarized in Tabl~ XV. 
Table XVI is a summary of the estimated airGraft operating data 
and service a.nd traffic data attri1Qutable to the proposed service to 
Douglas. Each statistic is estimated by using the exact proqedure 
analyzed in the Las Vegas dectsion~ The totals are given due to their 
importqnce in estimating operating expenses. 
Incremental Cos~ Attributable to Douslas Service 
For each cost category, Frontier's 1965 Conva:ir 580 system unit 
co;:;t experience sv.inmarized in Appendix Fis used to estimate total 
added operating cost of Pouglas serviqe. In the foilowing analysis, 
Frontier's "added cost" method, which employs increme:ntal reasoning, is 
contrasted with the CAE' s II allocated cost" method, which employs the 
fully alloc:ated accounting cost approac:b.. For some cost categorie9, 
however, the results are equivalent. 
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T.Al3LE XV 
SUMMARY OF NED APDED REVEN~ ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE STANPBY FARE 
AS A RESULT OF DOUGLAS SERVICE 
Inter-
station RPM 
Passengers F?t'e Revenue Mileage (000) 
Phoenix-El Paso 
Total Standby 1,131 $14.40 $16,286. 
Diverted fro~ 
Existing Fares (219) 22.71 f.! (4,973) 
Net 9l2 1i,313 393 358.4 
Tucso:q.-El Pt:1-so 
Tottl Standby 522. $10.65 $ 5,559 
Diverted from 
. Existing Fax,es (138) 16.83 a (2,;23) 
Net ~ 2,226 282 108.2 
Total Added 1,296 ·$14,549 466.7 
l.f!:. Fron,t:i,er's ex:perienc;:e show1:1 that all passengers do not pay full 
fare; but instead, si;>rne .take advantage of various special fares avail-
able to tll.em. · In col'rjpet;t ti ve city-pair markets with an inte;r-station 
distance between 250 and 500 miles, Frontier's aver,;;i.ge discount has 
been 21 per cent. The ta.res shown above refleqt this average reduction. 
. TABLE xv;r 
SUMMARY OF. AlRCRAFT Ol?ERATlNG DATA AN.p S~VICE AND 
TRAFFIC DATA, IX>UGLA$ SERVICE 
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Number .or Amount 
Aircraft 02erating Data 
I I . · 
Revenue Aircraft Miles Flown 
Rev~nue Aircraft Depar~ures Performed 
Revenue Aircraft Block HoUTa Flown 
Total Aircraft Block Hours 
Reve:p.ue Passengers 
Revenue Passenger Miles (OOO) 
Available Seat Miles (OOO) · 
Revenue Ton Miles 
Average Passenger Load 
Passenger ;Load Factor(%) 













Flying QOperationso This cost category includes crew costs~ fuel 
costs~ insurance costs, and "other costs 0\ and is estimated to be 
$100034 per total aircraft block hour. Total added cost of flying aper-
ations for Douglas service is: 
1397 added total aircraft block hours X $100 .31+ = 1tl 40 9 17.5. 
'l'he estimate using Frontier's added cost method is the same as that using 
the CAB's allocated cost method since total cost of flying operations 
vti.ry directly wHh changes in output. 
D:5 .. rect Maintenance-Fli_ght Equipment. This cost category includes 
all labor, materials, and outside repairs necessary to maintain the air-
frame, engines, and other flight equipment. The estimated cost per 
total aircraft block hour is $60.70, resulting in a total change in 
cost o:f $8L1-, 798 for Douglas service, using either costing approach. 
Applied Maintenance Burden-Flight Equipment. This cost category 
includes all overhead expenses incurred due to periodic flight equip-
ment maintenance operations. In Frontier's 1965 Convair 580 average 
system experience, this expense amounted to 159 per cent of Direct 
Labor cost of Direct Maintenance-Flight Equipment, or $21.04 per total 
aircraft block hour. On this basis, the CAB allocated cost method 
estimates the change in total maintenance burden expense to be: 
1397 added total aircraft block hours X $21.04 = $29,393. 
Frontier contends that only a portion of the applied maintenance 
burden may be considered variable with small changes in the vo1urne of 
operations, the rest remaining fixed and, thus, not applicable to the 
decision. The sub=accounts of this major cost category considered 
variable with small changes in volume of operations, as in the Douglas 
service~ include those shown in Table XXXVI in Appendix E. In 1965, 
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these items accounted for 51.4 per cent of Frontier 1 s total applied 
maintenance burden of $12004 per total aircraft block hour. On this 
basis Frontier estimates the added maintenance burden-flight equipment 
attributable to Douglas service to be: 
$21.04 per total aircraft block hour X 51.L~% = $10.81 applicable 
unit cost 
1397 added total aircraft block hours x $10.81 = $15,1020 
Depreciation and Obsolescence-Flight Equipment. In the third 
quarter of 1965, Frontier's total depreciation and obsolescence expense 
for its Convair 580 fleet was $186,120 for 9,292 total aircraft block 
hours flown. The resulting allocated cost per total aircraft block 
hour was $20.030 The Convair 580 fleet size was then 10 aircraft in 
service with 9 committed to the schedule; in 1966, Frontier will have 
16 i:r1 service with 14 in the schedule. Therefore, the ratio of total 
to scheduled will increase from 1.11 to 1.14~ for a 3% increase in 
cost to $20.57 per total aircraft block hour. The CAB allocated cost 
method applies this average unit cost to the added total aircraft 
block hours expected and calculates an increase in total cost of 
Frontier1 using the added cost method, assumes !!..<2. added flight 
equipment depreciation and obsolescence expense because the proposed 
services will be operated with existing aircraft. 
Stewardess Expense. Frontier uses its 1965 experience to esti-
mate stewardess expense at $8.87 per total aircraft block hourj or a 
total added cost of $12~152 for the proposed service. An estimate of 
zer~ is shown under the CAB method in Table XIII because the Board 
includes this cost category in Regional and System Servicing Expense~ 
rather than estimating it separately. 
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!£cal Station Servicing Expense. To estimate total added Local 
Station Servicing Expense for Douglas=origin traffic Frontier again 
uses past average system experience. Computations of this cost cate= 
gory were made for all intermediate stations in Frontier's system with 
between 3~000 and 10~000 passengers originated in 1965; a total of 18 
stations had this characteristic. For 18 stations 1 the average 
servicing cost per station was $49')356~ the average number of passen-
gers originated was 6,114, and the average number of employees per 
station was 4.9. 
Since stations other than Douglas are affected, Frontier also made 
an estimate of added Local Station Servicing Expense per added passen-
ger generated as a result of the new Douglas service, but who did not 
originate at Douglas. The estimated added cost per added passenger is 
based on historic cost experience; the reasoning and data used are 
summarized in Table XVII. 
Using the 1965 average servicing cost per station of $49~356 and 
the hi.storic average added station expense per added passenger of 
$2.70 9 Frontier estimates total added Local Station Servicing Expense 
attributable to Douglas service to be $82,890. Cost estimating bases 
and computations are summarized in Table XVIII. 
Regional and System Serv~cing ExEense. Frontier 1 s computational 
procedure for estimating Regional and System Servicing Expense attrib-
utable to the proposed service to Douglas is again identical to that 
described in the Las Vegas analysis. A summary of the computed results 
is shown in Table XXXVII in Appendix E. As one can readily see'l the 
Rand S Servicing Expense per RTM added by the proposed service') 
excluding the standby factor portion ($.2511 per RTM)~ is considerably 
TABLE XVII 
COMPUTATION OF SYSTEM ADDED LOCAL STATION SERVICING 
EXPENSE PER ADDED PASSENGER 
For the Year 
126z 1222 122.~ ~ 
FRONTIER SYSTEM~ 
Local Servicing 
Expense $3j375~141 $3~589~303 $4')108~292 $4~297')262 
Passengers 
Originated 359,406 491~130 624~826 698,464 
Expense per 
Passenger 
Originated $9.39 $7.31 $6.58 $6.15 
Added Expense $214,162 $51811919 $188j970 
Added Passengers 131,724 133,696 73,638 





Added Passenger $1.63 $3.88 $2.57 $2.70 
-
TABLE XVIII 
COMPUTATION OF LOCAL STATION SERVICING EXPENSES 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO PROPOSED SERVICE TO DOUGLAS 
I. Douglas Station: 
Passengers originated ll];, 
Local station personnel 
Estimated local station expenses: 
A. Basic cost per station, 1965 
average on 18 stations 
B. Extra costs: 
Salaryj one additional agent 
Employee welfare and payroll 
taxes at 706% 
Split shift travel expenses, 
2 per day 
Total 
Total Douglas 
II. All Other Frontier Stations: 
Added passengers on existing fares .l!?, 
Estimated expenses at $2.70 per 
added passenger 
Passengers added by proposed standby fares 
Estimated expenses at $1.35 per added 
passenger!.£ 













~ At i the number estimated in both directions in Part Ij New 
Douglas Markets, Ta'ble XIV. 
LE. Includes, from Table XIV: Part I--6,002 passengers whose 
destination is Douglas, plus Part II--4,621 passengers from "other new 
markets'\ less Part III--1.,623 through-passengers affected by Douglas 
stop. 
L£ Estimated that the standby passengers can be served at one-half 
the historic added cost of $2.70 per added passenger because they will 
be carried on flights that already will be operating and, therefore, 
will be a small addition to the basic passenger volume for which costs 
have been provided. 
higher than Frontier 1 s present system experience ($.2082 per RTM). 
This is due to the fact that the Service and Traffic Index (STI) for 
the present system (214.82) is much more favorable than that of the 
added service (158.70). The relatively greater number of added depar-
tures with respect to added RTM flown accounts for the relatively 
higher cost. The Rand S Servicing Expense of $5,000 for the standby 
fare traffic is actually only a nominal charge since few added costs 
will be incurred because of this traffic. 
The CAB allocated cost method is based on local service air 
carrier's Rand S unit costs for 1965 of $.2371 per revenue ton mile, 
as compiled by the CAB. The CAB estimated increase in Rand S Servicing 
Expense of the Douglas service is calculated to be: 
482,379 added RTM x $.2371 = $114,372. 
This value compares to Frontier's added cost estimate of $115i000~ but 
includes a charge for stewardess expense not included by Frontier. 
Re~n Elemen:.!:• Frontier's added cost method estimates total 
incremental operating cost attributable to Douglas service at $450~117~ 
compared to the CAB 9s allocated cost estimate of $480,364. With esti-
mated incremental revenue of $320,734, Frontier shows an operating 
breakeven need of $129,383, as compared to the CAB 1s $1.59,630, to 
cover the cost of the service, excluding a provision for return on 
investment and taxes. 
Frontier estimates a~ return requirement on investment on the 
basis that there is no added return needed since the proposed services 
will be operated with existing aircraft. The CAB allocated cost 
method') however') charges a full share of calculated return requirement 
to the proposed ser·1Tice. Computations for full return on in-vestment 
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and tax allowance are summarized in Table XX.XVIII in Appendix E. 
Subsidy Requirements. If awarded the Douglas route~ Frontier will 
be eligible for additional subsidy payments at a specified rate per 
standard available seat mile flown. For the proposed service 1 this 
will amount to additional subsidy payments by the CAB of $131~170 9 
calculated as shown in Table XXXIX in Appendix E. 
Increm~~tal Profit Attributable to Douglas Service 
A summary of the two conflicting forecasts of financial results 
attributed to the Douglas service are reproduced below from Table XIII. 
















Front:ier 0 s added cost method results in an estimated incremental 
profit~ after subsidy~ of $1~787~ compared to a forecast operating loss 
of $111~325~ af'ter subsidy, using the CA.B's allocated cost approach. 
His clear that the expected financial result of the decision is 
greatly dependent not only on the accuracy of necessary traffic and 
service forecasts, but also on the costing procedure used. If Frontier 
had employed the allocated cost method 9 it may very well have rejected 
the possibility of providing service to Douglas on. the basis that it 
would lose nearly a quarter-million dollars the first year. Instead~ 
Frontieris dec:ision 9 using incremental cost concepts 9 will add nearly 
1~2 9 000 to the firm 8s net profit in the forecast year. 
To date~ no official CAB decision on Frontier's proposal has been 
given. 
Conclusion 
The primary conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis is 
that Frontier did in fact make reasonable quantitative approximations 
to theoretical functions. 
In Part IV of the incremental revenue analysis, the effect of the 
50 per cent standby fare on El Paso-Tucson/Phoenix traffic was evaluated. 
Two variables had to 'be quantified; namely, the response of new traffic 
to the 00 price decrease" (price elasticity of demand), and the transfer 
of existing Frontier traffic to the lower fare service (cross elasticity 
of demand). The discussion in this section (see Table XV) presented 
the assumptions and procedures used by Frontier in quantifying the 
variables necessary to make a practical application of theoretical 
economic principles. 
In estimating the incremental cost attributable to the Douglas 
service~ Frontier 9 in keeping with economic theory, includes only those 
costs which vary directly with "output 11 • Thus, only the portion of 
maintenance burden=flight equipment expense variable with small changes 
in total aircraft block hours is included; no additional depreciation 
and obsolescence expense for flight equipment is included since no 
additional aircraft are re'quired. 
Of particular interest is Frontier's estimate of the added Local 
Station Servicing Expense of each additional passenger generated as a 
result of the new Douglas service, but who did not originate at Douglas 
(see Tables XVII and XVIII).. Frontier's system experience shows 
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average local station cost per passenger to be in excess of $6. But 
Frontier is concerned with the ~rginal, not average cost. Thus~ for 
9~000 added reservation passengersj Frontier estimated an added cost 
per passenger of $2.70~ less than one-half the fully allocatedj average 
system cost. For 1. 9 296 standby passengers, the estimated cost per 
added passenger is even less ($1.35) since they will be carried in 
otherwise empty seats on flights for which most costs have already been 
incurred. Frontier's reasoning here manifests marginalistic practices 
prescribed by traditional economic theory. 
Frontier 9 s estimate of added Regional and System Servicing Expense 
also shows evidence of marginal cost reasoning. Instead of using the 
present system average cost of $.2082 per RTM, Frontier calculated a 
marginal cost applicable to this added output of $.2511 per RTM. This 
relatively higher unit cost reflects the fact that the average ST! for 
the present system is better than that of the added service due to the 
relatively greater number of added departures with respect to added RTM 
flown. 
This case analysis, as in the Las Vegas case, has focused generally 
on the reasoning~ assumptions, and analytical procedures employed by 
Fron·tier in making an incremental cost and revenue analysiso Though 
both are new route decisions') the relationship of some costs to output 
changes were significantly different. In the Douglas decision, addi-
tional output incurred only 49 per cent of the usual unit cost of 
maintenance burden-flight equipment, and no additional expense of 
depreciation and obsolescence-flight equipment or additional return on 
investmento But in the Las Vegas decision~ each of these categories 
was considered variable with output and substantial dollar amounts for 
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each were computed. Hence, cos~s that are variable for one decision 
may not be variable for another. One cannot break down all operating 
costs into predetermined fixed/variable classifications; the classifi-
cation depends on the conditions peculiar to the decision. 
Frontier 1 s Service to Jackson, Wyoming Decision 
Introduction 
In 1965, city officials of Jackosn, Wyoming, besought Frontier to 
serve their city with flights originating in Denver. The purpose was 
to develop the Jackson Hole skiing area by attracting Denver area 
skiing enthusiasts. Jackson representatives finally persuaded Fron-
tier1 s management; to give the route a chance and Frontier sought and 
won the CAB 1 s approval to serve the city. 
The winter months of late 1965 and early 1966 did not produce 
particularly surprising results for Frontier, in that traffic was light 
and the economic return questionable. Nevertheless, Frontier stayed 
with the route throughout these months on a 11 wait and see 11 basis, 
giving the route time to develop. By the beginning of April, 1966, 
however, the president of Frontier was greatly concerned over the route 
because traffic, though nEnrer very heavy, had greatly fallen off in 
Marcho In facti he wanted to cancel service to the cityo Others in 
the organization did not want to drop the route without looking into 
its economic performance in more statistical detail. The president 
agreed and Frontier 1 s department of Economic Planning prepared relevant 
cost and revenue data pertinent to the decision facing Frontier. The 
following analysis presents facts and figures used in arriving at the 
decision finally reached by Frontier 1 s management. 
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Flight Scheduling Characteristics 
Jackson was serv.ed by simply extending Frontier's existing route 
from Denver to Casperi Wyoming, on to Jackson~ Wyoming. Originally, 
aircraft used to service the existing Casper route would come into 
Denver from other service and remain idle for a few hours, waiting to 
depart on a round trip to Casper. After making the Casper run~ the 
aircraft would then remain idle at Denver, awaiting departure time for 
another city in Frontier~s system. Since there was no alternative way 
to effectively utilize the idle aircraft, Frontier was amenable to 
servicing Jackson, provided, of course, it could be done on an economic 
basis. So, the flight schedule to Casper was modified to permit service 
to Jackson and reduce otherwise idle aircraft time. The original and 
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Figure 12. Frontier Service to Jackson via Casperj 
Original and Modified Schedules 
167 
In the modified schedule, the flight for Casper left earlier, made 
its run to Jackson and returned to Denver via Casper and Cheyenne. The 
flight left Denver about 1:15 p.m. and after stopping in Cheyenne, 
arrived in Casper about 2:45 p.m. After a very brief stop in Casper, 
it continued to Jackson, arriving at 3:40 p.m. The elapsed time from 
Casper to Jackson was 54 minutes. After a 20 minute stop in Jackson, 
the aircraft, a Convair 580, began its return flight at 4:00 p.m., 
arriving in Casper at 4·: 48 p.m., for an elasped time of 48 minutes for 
the 220 mile hop. The flight then continued on to Denver via Cheyenne, 
arriving in Denver about 6:00 p.m. The flight was originally scheduled 
to be non-stop between Casper and Jackson and was so listed in flight 
schedules. However, it did, on an unscheduled and irregular basis, 
stop at RiV1.erton to enplane and deplane passengers. 
Somej but not all, of the idle time incurred with the original 
Casper schedule was eliminated, as shown in Figure 12. Even though 
equipment and crew utilization increased, the president of Frontier was 
concerned that the additional service to Jackson might not be 00 pa.yi.ng 
its own way 0v. 
Operating Characteristic~ 
In order to assess the 00 profitabilityn of the Jackson service, 
appropriate service, traffic, revenue, and cost data were estimated for 
the 35 days 'between March l and April 4, 1966. Actually only 30 days 
operating results were used since service was not provided on 5 days of 
that period. 
Frontier was concerned, of course, with only the incremental 
revenue and cost attributable to the extended service from Casper to 
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Jacksono In its incremental revenue estimate Frontier counted all 
added traffic between Denver, Cheyenne, Casper, Riverton, and Jackson 
whose origin or destination was Jackson since none of this traffic 
would have been carried without the new service. But in its incremental 
cost estimate, the added operating expense was calculated only on the 
basis of the Casper-Jackson segment since the aircraft would be making 
the Denver-Casper round trip anyway. Table XIX is a summary of calcu-
lated service and traffic data attributable to the Casper-Jackson 
service during March 1-!pril 4, 1966. 
Incremental Revenue, Jackson Service 
Table XX is a summary of added passenger traffic and added reve-
nues~ both passenger and mail and property, attributable to the Casper-
Jackson service. 
Incremental Cost, Jackson Service 
The estimated additional cost of the Casper-Jackson service was 
based on Frontier's system unit cost experience for Convair 580 equip-
ment during 1965. Table XXI is a summary of added operating costs 
attributable to the Casper-Jackson service. 
Incremental Profit, Jackson Servic~ 
In its incremental cost and revenue estimates, Frontier was mainly 
concerned over whether or not the added revenue from the Casper~Jackson 
service covered the added cost of providing it. Though not used, esti-
mates were made for added Local Station and System and Regional 







SUMMARY OF SERVICE AND TRAFFIC DATA ATTRIBUTABLE TO CASPER-JACKSON 
SERVICE DURING MARCH 1-APRIL 4'J 1966 













Mail and Property 





TOTAL 372 134,089 12, 738 13'JB97 1,159 
Added Revenue Aircraft Miles Flown (Miles between Casper and Jackson x No. trips/day X No. days X 
Mileage Completion Factor): 
220 miles X 2 trips/day X 30 days X 97% mileage completion= 12 2764 
Added Aircraft Departures Performed L2, (No. scheduled per flight X No. days): 
2 departures X 30 days= 60 
Added Revenue Aircraft Block Hours flown (Scheduled Time per flight x No. Flights per day X No. days) 
54 minutes/flight per day Casper to Jackson+ 48 minutes/flight per day Jackson to Casper X 
30 days= 21 
~ Mail and Property Revenue Ton Miles was estimated'J as shown, at 9.1% of Passenger Revenue Ton Miles, 
based on Frontier's average experience on the Jackson route for the months preceding March-April. Frontier's 
over-all system experience for 1965 was a ratio of Mail and Property RTM to Passenger RTM of 12.6%~ but the 
resort-nature of the Jackson service results in less-than-average mail and property carried. 
~ The departures between Denver and Casper do not apply, of course. The only added departures are 




SUMMARY OF ADDED PASSENGER TRAFFIC AND REVENUES ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
CASPER-JACKSON SERVICE DURING MARCH l=APRIL 49 1966 
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% Discount Net Added 
Published No. of Full from Full Passenger 
City Pair Full Fare Pa1;,sengers Revenue Revenue Revenue 
Jackson-Riverton $14 37 $ 518 16% 
=Casper 21 85 1,785 16 ~ $3~448 
-Cheyenne 34 53 1,802 16 
-Denver 4o 197 z,880 2206 LB. 6,099 
TOTAL 372 $11,985 $9,547 
Added Mail and Propert~ (Mand P) Revenue 
Added Mail and Property RTM attributable to the Casper-Jackson 
service were estimated to be 1,159 as shown in Table XIX. On 
the basis of Frontier's experience in 1965~ the revenue from 
this traffic was estimated at $.45 per RTM. Thus, the total 
added Mand P revenue resulting from the service was estimated 
to be 
1 9 159 M and P RTM X $.45 per RTM -· $522. 
~ This average discount from full-reve~ue is based on Frontier 0 s 
system experience for 1965. The availability of various promotional 
fare schemes on Frontier's system permit many passengers, including 
whole families~ to tra1.rel at significant fare reductions. 




SUMMARY OF ADDED OPERATING COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO CASPER-JACKSON 
SERVICE DURING MARCH 1-APRI.L 4, 1966 
Estimated No. 
1965 CV 580 of Added Block 
Unit Cost per hours~ Casper-
Expense Category Block Hour Jackson Service 
L AIRCRAFT OPERATING EXPENSES 
1. Flying Operations $101.94 L2:. 51 
2. Direct Maintenance--
Flight equipment 50.75 L£ 51 
3. Applied Maintenance 
Burden--Variable 11.36 !.£. 51 
Total AOE--Excluding Depreciation 
II. STEWARDESS EXPENSE 8.70 51 
Total AOE a.nd S·tewardess Expense 










L£ Frontier 0 s actual experience with CV 580 1 s was limited during 
1965 and Frontier commonly used a unit cost of $60.15 in Us cost; esti-
mates. This figure was a simple average of the 1964 experience of 
three other carriers using similar equipment. As Frontier gained 
experience, it found that the highest unit cost experienced was $57.00 
and the lowest $53.00. The estimate used here of $50.75 is now con-
sidered to be too low. At the time of the study, however, it was 
thought to be realistic. 
!.£ The 1965 total unit cost of applied maintenance burden was 
$21.54. Frontier considers that small changes in the volume of opera-
tions affects only 51.4% of this unit cost. The specific cost sub-
categories were previously identified in the Douglas analysis. 
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approach described in the Las Vegas analysis. These expenses totaled 
approximately $5300. 
It should be emphasized that Frontier was not altogether sure that 
additional servicing expenses of $5300 were in fact incurred, or that 
they were !!.2!~ At any rate, the decision to continue or discontinue 
the Casper-Jackson service was made on the basis of the added revenue 
versus the added direct cost ,shown in Table XXI; the indirect cost as 
well .as the customary return element were excluded as irrelevant for 
the decision. Table XXII summarizes the incremental revenue-incremental 
cost data ultimately used. 
TABLE XXII 
SUMMARY OF INCREMENTAL REVENUE-INCREMENTAL COST 
DATA USED IN CASPER-JACKSON DECISION 
ADDED REVENUE 
Passenger 
Mail and Property 
Total 
ADDED DIRECT EXPENSES 
Aircraft Operating 
Stewardess 









On the basis of the calculated "contribution 10 of approximately 
173 
$1,000 made by the Casper-Jackson service during the 30 day operating 
period between March 1-April 4, 1966, the president of Frontier decided 
to retain the service rather than cancel it. The director of Economic 
Planning helped jell this decision by pointing out that although traffic 
had indeed sharply fallen off due to the decline of the skiing season, 
it would likely sharply pick up again in May due to increasing travel 
and preparation for the coming summer tourist season. 
Conclusion 
Although the service from Denver to Jackson via Casper was new, 
the Jackson station was already in existence and operating. Frontier 
serves Jackson from the south via Salt Lake City and from the north via 
Billings. Therefore, the question of "Does the new service pay its own 
way?i9 would appear simple indeed to answer since no new stations or 
additional aircraft are needed; basically an existing flight just 
leaves earlier and flys, round trip, 440 miles further. And, the esti-
mate of incremental revenue is rather straightforwardo But the esti-
mate of incremental cos·t is far more difficult and uncertain. F:r.on-
tier9 s approach to the problem is based on historic cost experience and 
operating data, and assumes these statistics are applicable to the 
present situation. It is also significant ·to observe that one-half the 
cost of Flying Operations ( see Table XXI) is for II crew expenses", which 
one might think would not be added cost since the crew appears other-
wise idle; the same is true of Stewardess Expense. But Frontier does 
not view it this way. It assumes that due to tight scheduling, any 
allocation of crew and stewardesses to an added flight will always 
result in removing them from some other existing service, thus 
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requiring additional personnel. Existence of idle time for the air-
craft in Denver does not mean idle (that is, cost free) time for 
personnel. Still, as demonstrated in the case discussion, Frontier 
does employ incremental analysis, reflecting its general propensity to 
a.dhere to marginalist precepts in decision-making 1 when applicable, to 
the extent possible. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter I it was asserted that literature in managerial eco-
nomics, while well developed in its theoretical and admonitory content, 
is incomplete by way of description of managerial decisions analyzing 
wherein, how, and the environment in which traditional economic theory 
of the firm has been made operational in practice in a given industry 
and firm. To further narrow the void between theory and practice, 
this study proposed to demonstrate that economic theory is applied in 
the airline industry in general and by Frontier Airlines in particular 
not only when all that is possible is reasonable quantitative approxi-
mations of theoretical functions, but also when it is impossible to 
quantify any salient variables. It was further proposed that in the 
process of validating the thesis, a more realistic picture of economic 
theory in action would be presented by describing important environ-
mental factors, necessary modifications of theory, sources of input 
data, assumptions, and analytical procedures relevant to decision= 
making and, where possible, actual results of decisions. 
It was assumed that if the logic of fundamental concepts com-
prising the theory of the firm is applied by management in decision-
making, then analysis of economic decisions would yield incisive 
evidence and information. Thus, decisions of the airline industry and 
Frontier Airlines were chosen as objects of study by which to verify 
175 
176 
the thesis~ and the theoretical concepts summarized in Appendix A1 
which include demand, revenue, price and cost analysis~ were taken as 
benchmarks around which the basic study was conducted. In order to 
accomplish the objective of the study, a two=phase analysis of airline 
management decisions was made. 
First, a search of recent literature was conducted in order to; 
1. Develop a portrait depicting important aspects of the 
political., economic, and social environment of the 
domestic air transportation industry and of Frontier 
Airlines as it functions generally in that industry. 
2. Discover evidence of the prevalence of managerial 
application of economic theory, both subjectively 
and quantitatively., in decision-making ·throughout 
the industry. 
This initial phase was subsequently pursued in Chapters II and III. 
Chapter II discusses industry environmental characteristics such 
as economic aspects of governmental regulations which circumscribe the 
areas for corporate economic actions, important distinctions between 
classes of commerical air carriers which have significant bearings on 
competitive conditions andj thus, greatly influence the economic deci-
sions of individual firms., and product~ marketing and operating cost 
characteristics which further identify major constraints within which 
individual firms must operate. 
Chapter III delves into economic facts of demand analysis in air 
transportation and the kind and amount of attention given by the in-
dustry to determinants of demand~ price elasticity of demand and 
pricing practices. It was found that industry demand for air service 
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is growing rapidly and is exceedingly difficult to forecast. In addi-
tion to reaping the benefits of rapid industry growth, individual 
carriers actively seek to increase their sales by product differentia-
tion (including reduced flight tim~s, increased frequencies, equipment 
superiority~ and special in-flight amenities)<j and extensive product 
\ 
advertising to create a distinctive corporate image and to build custom-
er loyalty. Price decreases are generally eschewed, either because 
firms are denied or prefer to avoid the use of this competitive means 
of increasing quantity sold. In the latter case, airlines generally 
believe demand to be price inelastic 1 although some firms have sought 
price reductions on the basis of expected increases in total profits. 
Recently, the new chairman of the CAB strongly encouraged airlines to 
epxeriment with fare reductions aimed especially at pleasure travelers 
due to their alleged sensitivity to fare levels. Thus, during 1965-66, 
the industry introduced and expanded its promotional fare plans, based 
largely on price elasticity of demand considerations. The chapter 
demonstrated that firms in search of added profits formulate policies 
within the :framework of economic theory and, thus, make theory practical 
and useful though lacking statistical measurements of important 
variables. 
The second phase of the study, contained in Chapter IV, consists 
of detailed case analyses of selected economic decisions made by 
Fron-tier Airlines in 1966. The basic objective of case analysis is to 
determine how the logic of economic theory is made applicable in prac-
tice 9 both when reasonable quantitative approximations of theoretical 
functions can be calculated and when they cannot. This objective is 
accomplished by demonstrating the mechanics of analytical procedures 
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used by Frontier, identifying sources of input data, specifying under= 
lyin.g assumptions, and noting environmental conditions. Theoretical 
economic concepts providing the rational foundations for the decisions 
include price elasticity of demand, cross elasticity of demand, price 
discrimination9 marginal (incremental) cost, and marginal (incremental) 
revenue. 
Four decisions of Frontier selected for analysis are reviewed 
below. 
50 Per Cent Standby Fare Decision. The case analysis dealt with 
the role of economic theory in inspiring the decision, environmental 
factors bearing on the decision, the content of the fare proposal, 
Frontier's reasoning in making the decision, and the revenue results 
of six months operation in markets where the fare is applicable. 
Though acclaimed a 01 unique venture in rate making 0\ this decision 
did not occur in a vacuum; ample precedent existed, as did CAB 
encouragement. Furthermore, lack of acceptable alternatives to gener-
ate significant increases in traffic and revenue more or less dictated 
this particular action. In this decision, Frontier definitely formu-
lated its policy within the framework of theoretical economic concepts. 
Particularly germane were considerations of the amount of transfer 
passengers from its existing traffic (cross elasticity of demand), the 
degree of potential new customer response to the price decrease (price 
elasticity of demand)~ and the economics of price discrimination. But 
an exact, formal application of theory requires quantification of all 
releYant Yariables., implying perfect knowledge. Yet Frontier had no 
such information. Officials, using subjective criteria, did not 
uuexpect 00 significant transfers of traffic from regular to standby 
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fares~ 01 believed 00 potential pleasure travelers are significantly 
motivated by price, and ''felt 0v a price decrease must be dramatic to 
bring the kind of results desired. Nevertheless, theoretical principles 
were employed as tools (of logic and reasoning) with which to organize 
and qualitatively evaluate pertinent economic variables. Th.us~ theory 
was practically applied and the impossibility of deriving statistical 
rei.renue and cost functions did not negate its usefulness in formulating 
a major decision, 
Las _¥~as Route Decision. It is one thing to assert that a deci-
sion is profitable if the resulting incremental revenue exceeds incre-
mental cost and another thing to make accurate estimates of either. 
The case analysis disected this major route application decision into 
Us many component parts in order to ascertain just how Frontier makes 
such an evaluationo Particular attention is given to methods of cost 
and revenue analysis 9 data sources and assumptions. Cost-output rela-
tionships are examined and Frontier's use of marginal costing is also 
noted and illustrated. 
In this decision Frontier is faced with the task of establishing 
a need for additional service in the general Denver-Las Vegas market 
and prov'ing the ability of Frontier to provide it on an economic 
bas:1'..so 
In revenue estimates~ the need for adequate input data is readily 
apparent ,since the accuracy of the forecast substantially depends on 
ito Frontier used as its major source of traffic data historical 
t-itudies of individual markets made by the CAB~ and then projected 
calc:ulated trend lines to estimate the total size of city-pair markets 
affected by the decision~ before Frontier service improvements~ in the 
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forecast yearo The use of statistically and judgmentally determined 
market stimulation factors arising from certain types of service 
improvements was analyzed in order to demonstrate how Frontier esti-
mates the total market traffic expected in the forecast year after 
Frontier serv~ce improvements. Frontier's percentage participation in 
a market is determined solely on the bases of experience, judgment, and 
speculation. Once the market participation factor is established and 
the bjreakdown in Frontier traffic between first class and coach is 
estimated~ the calculation of incremental revenue is routine, since 
appropriate fares are equival.ent to existing fares of competitors, or 
are already in force in Frontier's system. 
The procedures for making incremental cost estimates were explained 
an.d illustrated. Aircraft operating data on number of flights sched-
uled~ distance flown~ elaspsed flight time, and number of aircraft 
departures were calculated and converted into measures of output~ in-
cluding the principal one of total aircraft block hours flown.. Wi·th 
the use of adjusted historical aircraft operating costs and stewardess 
expense pe:.:" 'block hour flown, estimates were made of added aircraft 
operating an.d stewardess expenses attributable to the proposed service. 
A.ddt;;d Regioual and System Servicing Expense and Local Station Servicing 
Expense were calculated from estimating equations based on domestic 
trunk and local service industry experience for 1965. For each cate.:.. 
gory~ Frontier calculates only the added or incremental cost of these 
indirect; expense categories and avoids the error of including an aver-
age9 prorated share of company fixed costs not arising as a result of 
the decision. In cost estimates~ Frontierj in compatibility with 
economic theory~ uses marginal costs rather than average costs; 
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frequently~ however, the relationship between unit costs and output is 
linear and the results are identical. Cost estimating bases were 
historical experiences of Frontier and other carriers and the assumption 
is clear that Frontier expects its future cost experience to follow 
past company and industry patterns. 
Douglas Route Decision. This new route application is considerably 
less important economically than the Las Vegas proposal, but basically 
the same revenue and cost estimating procedures are utilized. In this 
decision, Frontier explicitly uses an added cost approach to route 
costing. That is, Frontier 9 s route cost forecast, in keeping with 
economic theory, is based on the marginal cost of added service, 
rather than and in contrast to the average, fully-allocated cost ap-
preach typically used by the CAB. On part of the new route, the 50 
per cent standby fare will be made available. Thus, in its revenue 
forecasts, Frontier, while not computing price and cross elasticity of 
demand coefficients, does quantify the extent to which the price 
decrease stimulates additional sales (E) and·the effect of the price 
p 
decrease on quantity sold of other service offered (E0 ). Some cate-
gories of cost variable with output in the Las Vegas case were esti-
mated to be fixed in this casei emphasizing that fixed/variable 
classifications depend on conditions peculiar to a given decision 
situation. 
Service to Jackson Decision. The question here is whether a new 
flight between two existing Frontier stations, Casper and Jacksonj is 
"paying its own way 91 • Since no new stations or aircraft are required 
to provide the service~ the problem is obviously one of comparing in= 
cremental revenue attributable to the added flight with incremental 
cost incurred. The estimate of incremental re·venue is rather straight-
forward but the estimate of incremental cost is far more difficult and 
u11certaino Frontier's approach to the problem is based on historic 
cc"':it experience and operating data, and assumes these statistics are 
applicable to the present situation. Still, as demonstrated in the 
case discussion~ Frontier does employ incremental analysi.s~ reflecting 
its general propensity to adhere to marginalist precepts in decision= 
making 9 when applicable~ to the extent possible. The calculated con-
tribution to overhead and profit served as the deciding factor in the 
decision to maintain the service in the short run. 
In summary~ the study did establish the fact that firms in the 
airline industry and Frontier Airlines in particular do indeed make 
usfJ of basic economic concepts in decision-making~ notably price and 
cr0oss elasticity of demand, product differentiation'j price discrimina-
tion~ and appropriate revenue and cost analysis. Environmental condi-
t;ions surrounding important decisions were established'j and sources of 
input data and assumptions underlying their use were identified. And'j 
perhaps most significantly, actual methods and procedures used to make 
the economic analyses pertinent to the decisions were examined and 
:Ulustrated. It was also shown that, unlike theoretical price~ cost~ 
and revenue analysis~ economic analysis for decision-making, despite 
detailed traffic forecasts and elaborate cost estimating procedures~ is 
in fact fraught wit.h uncertainty and highly dependent on experience and 
judgment. For instance~ in the standby fare decision~ elasticity of 
demand coef'f:icients could not be quentified; in. other decisions rea-
sonable quantitati1re approximations to theoretical fu...'lctions were made 
and used with confidenceo Thue;, economic theory was shown to play a 
major role in the reasoning used in the decisions analyzed; but pure 
theory was tempered by the realities of uncertainty, lack of errorless 
data~ and the mechanics of making concepts operationalo 
CHAPTER VI 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
The analyses in preceding chapters automatically suggest studies 
into simi.lar decision areas of other carriers to provide further in-
sight into the anatomy of decisions and to compare procedures and 
reasoning used by different a,irlines. During the course of this study, 
SE,veral topics came up for discussion which suggest areas for meaning-
ful investigation within Frontier Airlines itself. 
Added Cost Standby Fare Passengers 
At the ·time of this study, cost statistics relevant to Frontier 0 s 
50 pe,r cent standby :fare traffic were not; available. Given that the 
p1&.ne is going anyway~ the eost of handling standby passengers is less 
than that of reservation passengers due to the elimination of reserva-
tion services for standbys; but other costs of enplaning, of inflight 
se:c,,d .. t~es,; and of deplaning are likely to be the same for standby as for 
reservat.:ton passengers. There may also be other costs peculiar to 
standby traffic that would make actual cost per passenger handled 
equivalent to that of reservation traffico Thus~ an important area. for 
:fu:.:cther study would be that of determining the over=all profitability 
of Frontierrrs 50 per cent standby fare by determining the extent to 
w:td .. ch Fron ti.er 9 s total costs have increased due to standby traffic o 
Since Frontier does not put on extra flights due to standby traffic~ 
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the only added costs expected would be indirect servicing costs~ those 
pursuant to handling passengers on the ground. Further analysis would 
also determine~ Frontier estimates the amount of these added costs. 
Pricing Practices in Competitive Versus 
Non-Competitive Markets 
Frontier serves 59 cities in a system containing approximately 
6500 route mil.es~ 5000 of which are not served by competing airlines. 
On competitive routes~ Frontier usually matches the fares of its 
competition. But on a few routes where Frontier is not a truly effec-
tive eompetitor with the trunklines, it charges a slightly higher fare 
than its competition. The president of Frontier believes that Frontier 
is not losing customers to competition on these routes due to higher 
fares~ nor would Frontier gain a significant amount of additional 
passengers if its fares were competitive. Thus, in an attempt to 
maximize revenues from the traffic carried, Frontier charges higher 
fa.res since passengers have not apparently been sensitive to the fare 
differentials. 
On routes where Frontier has no competition from other airlines~ 
Frontier 10 tends 11 to charge higher fares than on c:ompeti.tive routes. No 
formal study has been made to prove this conclusively·; and., therefore, 
the degree of price differential is not known. 
Further study into Frontier 0s pricing practices would further 
establish the degree to which Frontier considers price elasticity of 
demand in decision.-mak.ing9, and the extent to which the presence or 
absence of cornpet:ition influences pricing decisions. Such a study 
would also reveal whether or not Frontier is practicing price 
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discrimination in its monopoly routes by analyzing price differentials 
and cost differentials with respect to competitive routes. 
Scheduling Practices 
Scheduling aircraft over its system is a continuous task for an 
airline management. In scheduling the fleet, the problem may be simply 
stated as that of allocating the right aircraft to the right routes, 
with the right frequencies at the right time so as to secure maximum 
economic advantage. Bu·t providing an optimum solution to the problem 
requires the simultaneous consideration of many variables, including: 
1. For the whole route structure 
a. The total number, sizes, and types of aircraft 
in the fleet. 
b. Seating configurations. 
c. Maintenance schedules. 
d. Needs for standby aircraft. 
2. From. route~-to·-route 
a. Demand for passenger seats and space for freight. 
b. Demand for various classes of travel. 
c. Demand for a certain frequency of service. 
d. Demand for certain arrival and departure times. 
e. Amount and type of competition from other 
carriers. 
f. Tariffs and rates. 
g. Operating costs. 
h. Available crews. 
i. Capacities of traffic handling facilities. 
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The operational problems of reconciling all variables so as to 
optimize fleet scheduling are undoubtedly legion. For example, demand 
may be heavy at the same time of day on a number of routes, but the 
airline's fleet is inadequate to handle all the traffic. Or, alloca-
tion of aircraft to a certain route in the short-run may render them 
tm.available for seemingly more profitable business, but the long-run 
potential of the route must be considered and the decision facing man-
agement is one of balancing short-run profit against long-run potential 
profit. 
Once a basic schedule is determined and operated, management must 
continually consider the effects on cost and revenue stemming from 
possible changes that might be made in the schedule. Further study 
into the way carriers calculate these revenue and cost changes and the 
reasoning behind their procedures would shed light on airline manage-
ment° s use of important economic concepts, including applications of 
marginal analysis, considerations of opportunity cost and recognition 
of the relevant time periods. To illustrate the kinds of scheduling 
dec:isions into which further study could well be made, the following 
examples are presented. 
In the latter part of 1966, Frontier bought three new Boeing 727 
,jet;s at $4.5 million each. One immediate problem wa.s to phase them 
into Frontier 0 s existing system so as to insure the maximum economic 
benefit from their use. At least two philosophies exist within the 
compan.y as to how this objective might be accomplished~ often resulting 
in conflicting schedules. 
lo Replace older aircraft with the new jets on existing 
Frontier schedules which are currently the most 
profitable. This tends to optimize the chances of 
economic success. 
2. Schedule the jets on routes where the total traffic 
per flight is greatest. In certain city-pairs where 
Frontier.faces strong competition., (for example, 
Demrer··Salt Lake City where United and Western :fly 
non-stop on coast-to-coast routes) there often exists 
a disparity between total traffic and existing serv-
ices of the major carriers. That is, the amount of 
traffic per flight, the load factor, is great. 
Therefore, Frontier, in an attempt to break into 
these markets~ should schedule its jets where the 
traffic is heaviest. 
The immediate question is which philosophy, if either1 results in 
c,ptimum use of' the equipmento Further study would identify relevant 
variables and methods of evaluation. 
29.;.hed.ul.i:r~g___to_Keep Out Co,m.I?etition 
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In the Lincoln-Kansas City market, Frontier is a monopolist; no 
other airlines are currently certified to serve the market. Frontier 
flys 14 flights daily between this city-pair with an approximate aver-
age load factor o:f' 35 per cent. This is 5 per cent below its average 
system load factor of 40 per cent. 
In the short=run~ Frontier could sign.ificantly increase its load 
factor~ reduce its operating costs and probably increase its net profit 
over this route by reducing its frequency of flights. But~ looking to 
the long=run~ Front;ier is very anxious to provide more than enough 
service to keep the public happy. This prevents potential competition 
from claiming and successfully proving to the CAB that Frontier is not 
providing adequate service. Thus, Frontier hopes to maintain its 
monopoly position and keep competition out. The short-run gain in 
over=all profits from reduced frequency would 1 in Frontier's estimation, 
be far lower than the long-run loss due to sharing the market with a 
competitor. However~ excessive allocation of equipment and crews to 
this market prevents the5.r use in alternative markets~ resulting in 
opportunity costs to Frontier. 
Additional research into scheduling practices such as this would 
bring out how management uses flight scheduling as a competitive tool, 
and how management maintains the 00 right 00 balance between short-run and 
long-ru.r.t object:ives. 
Sq,hEiduling and Market Forecasti~ 
Iri 1962 9 Ur.ited Airlines decided to cancel one of its two daily 
non-stop flights between Denver and Lincoln'! Nebraska because the 
:.f.'1.ight was :rwt profita.ble and United had a better alternative use for 
the aircraft. Front:i.er, though certified to sen·e this market non-stop, 
had never used its certific:ati.on. However, when United dropped a 
fli.ght~ Fron-tier decided to put one on to see what it would do. 
According to one of Frontier 0 s vice=presidents~ it ou ••• looked like a 
hole. 19 Irdtially~ the non-stop f'light did not even cO'lrer direct cost, 
but did show signs of' agonizingly slow growth. (He emphasized that. the 
growth was so slow as to be almost imperc:eptiblell but i.t did grow!) 
The president of Frontier decided to 11 stay with it" in spite of the 
apparent fruitlessness of the decision. While others were convinced 
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of the impracticality of keeping the flight on, he was n1ed on by the 
spark of life that grew ever so faintly brighter. uo Today, Frontier has 
put on two daily non-stop flights between Denver and Lincoln due to the 
increasing traffic and profitability of the route, and will put on a 
flight using Boeing 727 jet equipment as soon as possible. 
Frontier 01 nursed" this market along with good service, and watched 
it grow. The 01 appropriate economic analysis" which accompanied the 
heuristic decision-making of the president was little more than the 
playing out of a hunch and a "feel" for the market. A Frontier offi-
cial said that this route, which was at the time "small potatoes" for 
United, is now 90 big potatoesu for Frontier. 
In making this scheduling decision, Frontier did, as the results 
now testify, make the 11 right" long-run forecast. By suffering short-
run losses, Frontier maximized long-run profit by allocating aircraft 
to a market which eventually proved highly profitable. Even though 
in the short-run Frontier incurred not only revenue losses below 
direct costs, but also opportunity cost from failure to use the air-
craft elsewhere~ its decision was a good one. Further analysis of this 
kind of decision would identify factors relevant to the process of 
decision-making in an environment of uncertainty. Of equal signifi-
cance would be the identification of procedures used by management in 
weighing expected profits from a given allocation of resources versus 
the expected profits from alternative allocations, taking into account 
the relevant time periodso 
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Scheduling and Operations Research 
In scheduling., the number of variables is 1arge and the amount of 
uncertainty is greato For example 1 when Frontier introduced Convair 
580 jet-powered equipment on routes in Nebraska and Missouri, traffic 
increased threefold. When the same type of service was introduced in 
Montana~ there was no appreciable increase in traffic. Frontier is 
unable to account for the difference in customer response. Given the 
complexities of scheduling, an interesting and important question 
arises as to the possible usefulness of Operations Research in sched-
uling decisions. When this possibility was proposed to a vice-
president of Frontier, he stated that a representative of one of the 
nation's largest consulting firms had just recently contacted him to 
00 sell 00 him on O .R. approach to scheduling. After talking with the 
representative? he concluded that the areas of uncertainty which plague 
a scheduler using Frontier's present approach are just those factors 
which greatly affect the successfulness of a scheduleo But~ since 
there is no way to quantify and integrate these into a scheduling 
procedure~ there is no way for a computer program to help Frontier do 
a;.1y better. The ' 0known 99 factors and data available can just as readily 
be assim:i.lated 'by conventional techniques as by a computer model; the 
unknowns remain unknown and judgment based on experience serves as 
well. as a more sophisticated computer-model approach and without the 
added high cost of outside 91 expertise 11 ? 
A study made to establish the procedures used by Frontier in 
scheduling and to ascertain the success of Operations ;Research ap= 
proaches used by other carriers would be quite beneficial to students 
of management and potentially profitable to smaller airlines. 
Aircraft Maintenance 
The need for aircraft maintenance is twofold, preventive and 
remedial. Management's main objective is to control maintenance in 
such a way that it has the least adverse effect on the productive 
capacity of equipment. 
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Formerly, maintenance scheduling took priority over commercial 
needs. The maintenance function was organized first and flying hours 
were a residual activity. Increasingly, maintenance is becoming the 
residual activity as managements adopt the philosophy that maintenance 
should be done in the hours left over after aircraft have flown the 
best commercial hours. Since most passengers prefer to fly by day, 
this normally means maintenance should be performed more expensively 
at night~ during the off-peak hours. Even if the concentration of 
maintenanc:e in off-peak hours gives rise to increased costs due to? 
say, poorer production flow, but at the same time gives rise to in-
creased revenue because more capacity is available at the "right" time, 
the relative position may be better. A maintenance schedule which 
minimizes the over-all cost of maintenance may not be the best alter-
native open to the firm. The technical optimum for maintenance must 
give way to the marketing optimum due to opportunity costs incurred. 
Continental Airlines keeps its jets in the air more hours per day, 
on the average, than any other carrier (35). One reason is its flight 
scheduling policy? previously discussed, of putting on flights when-
ever the additional revenue exceeds the additional cost. Another rea-
son is its maintenance policy, which it calls vu continuous maintenance. n 
Other airlines periodically take their jets out of service for over-
hauls requiring five days. Continental, on the other had, has each jet 
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inspected and worn parts replaced with spares during a thirteen-hour 
check made every fifth day. This permits using the plane in scheduled 
service while repairs are being made in the maintenance shops. Being 
able to replace worn parts with spares means that large inventories of 
parts must be maintained, with the result that costs higher than those 
of conventional maintenance scheduling are incurred. But on the basis 
of comparatiye costs~ Continental estimates the profit lost from fail-
ing to adopt continuous maintenance is greater than the additional 
cost incurred from using this approach. So~ on the basis of opportuni-
ty cost reasoning~ Continental has selected the maintenance alternative 
resulting in~ opportunity cost. 
As part of its "new look", Braniff International has recently 
increased its aircraft utilization from an average of eight hours per 
day to over ten hours per day (14). This is in part attributed to a 
new maintenance philosophy. Like many carriers, Braniff regularly 
t.ook its planes out of service for several days for complete maintente-
nance checks. This practice has been abandoned for a system whereby 
each aircraft is checked over section-by-section between each scheduled 
fli.ghto The maintenance costs are higher but the additional revenue 
earned from increased aircraft utilization more than makes up the 
difference. 
A study into the maintenance policy of Frontier would indicate how 
comparative cost and reyenue estimates are made and whether or not 
profit mi.ght be increased with the adoption of. an alternative mainte-
nance pol.icy o 
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Equipment Replacement and Investment 
The depreciation policy of an airline, like any other firm, is an 
attempt to spread the acquisition cost of an asset over the number of 
years the asset is to be used. During this time period, the firm 
expects to accumulate sufficient revenue to equal the original or ex-
pected replacement cost. This number of years is usually based on what 
is regarded as the "normal life" of an asset, which is a function of 
wear and tear. 
The number of years an airline can continue to use a particular 
type of aircraft profitably, however, is not likely to be determined 
simply by the time it takes to wear out, since aircraft do not wear 
out~ Due to rigid maintenance schedules, their efficiency is not 
allowed to diminish. More importantly, aircraft are rendered 
00 uneconomic 00 by a new invention or other improvement'l rather than (or 
before) the completion of the normal life period. Thus, due to obso-
lescence~ an airline 1 s rate of depreciation for a given aircraft may 
suddenly and abruptly be invalidated by the introduction to service of 
a new competitive aircraft. Though the given aircraft is still 
perfectly usable in the physical sense, it can become non=usable in 
the economic sense for a particular airline. 
Broadly speaking, an aircraft becomes obsolete as soon as it 
becomes less profitable to fly than the aircraft that could be bought 
as its replacemento For instance~ an aircraft may become comparatively 
unprofitable by a decline in earning powers because traffic is attracted 
to alternative aircraft. Once obsolescence occurs~ of course~ the 
remedy of disposing of aircraft does not involve considerations of 
initial acquis:it:j.on cost or depreciation. The only relevant cost for 
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the decision facing management is opportunity cost. Of course, it is 
not always immediately apparent that one aircraft type has become less 
profitable than aother 0 Making the appropriate economic analysis is 
as much an art as a science due to the uncertainties and assumptions 
involved. 
As previously mentioned, one rule-of-thumb in the airline industry 
is that traffic tends to vary directly with the frequency of flights. 
The importance of available capacity was emphasized by the president of 
the Air Transport Association in a recent speech, when he was quoted 
as saying (36): 
Capacity provided an improvement in quality of the service 
reflect the business judgments of vigorous competitors on 
the market opportunities available. Given large additions 
to capacity, airlines mount massive efforts to sell addi-
tional seats. The ready availability"' o·f-""Ca.pacity results 
in a convenient service. Thus, plenty of capacity is in 
itself a creative force resulting in faster traffic growth, 
better ser,rice to the public and higher profits. A restric-
tive attitude· toward capacity is the most effective means of 
depressing· both growth and profits. 
But 00 plenty of capacity 01 means purchasing additional aircraft which 
are quite expensive, even though the airline industry is not one with 
particularly high capital cost. For example, as shown in Appendix F, 
Frontier had a total system aircraft operating cost on its Convair 
580°s in 1965 of over $5 million, but its depreciation and obsolescence 
expense was not quite 10 per cent of the total. 
Given the competitive impact of equipment superiority and the 
market impact of increased frequency of service~ management decisions 
to replace and/or increase fleet size with upgraded equipment greatly 
influence the profitability of the firm. In the past, decisions to 
purchase a specific number of given types of aircraft seemingly depended 
on fewj if any, precise calculationso Decisions on the amount of 
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equipment to order has rested with top management men who are prone to 
operate on an intuitive basis. By way of illustration 9 the story is 
told of an airline president who~ when asked why the airline had 
ordered seven planes of a certain type~ thundered, vv I knew we needed 
seven. That. 0 s why Pm president!" Of course, one of the many prob-
lems confronting management is the exceeding difficulty of forecasting 
future demand for its particular service in an environment in which 
even industry demand cannot confidently be forecast. Nevertheless, 
iuvestment decisions must be and are made. 
As was brought out in the Las Vegas analysis~ Frontier has bought 
three Boeing 727 jets at a cost of $4.5 million per aircraft, excluding 
spare parts. But, as far as Frontier is concerned, it is not ready for 
jets on its system at this time. Still, these new jets 01 had'° to be 
purchased for competitive reasons. Since Frontier competes with trunk-
lines over several important east-west routes~ Frontier believes it 
mus·t offer comparable quality service to keep its share of the market 
or to improve it~ and to pro;ject the image of a prog:re8sive airline. 
From a short=run. viewpoint, Frontier lowers its profit ·by buying expen .. 
sive jete:.J it really neither needs nor wants. But in these situations, 
short-run profit maximizing behavior by Frontier must'! to some extent, 
be subjuga:ted to long-run considerations. 
The whole realm of investment deci.sion-rnaking would be a fruitful 
area for detailed econom:i.c analysis. Such a study would delve into 
the reasoning be,hind decisions to 'buy specific quantities of additi.onal 
aircraft? how the competitive and market economic impacts are evaluated 1 
and how management gives proper consideration to long-run versus short-
run effects of its decisions. 
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ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE FIRM 
A conventional presentation of the traditional economic theory of 
the firm can be found in any managerial economics or intermediate price 
theory text. The following partial treatment is taken largely from 
Leftwich (1). 
Demand 
There are two basic reasons why demand analysis is important to 
decision making: 
1. It provides the basis for analyzing and subsequently 
adjusting to external market influences on the firm's 
sales. 
2. It provides guidance for internal attempts to manipu-
late demand. 
Demand for a product is defined as the various maximum quantities 
of it which consumers will take off the market at all possible alterna-
tive prices during a given time period, other things constant. Besides 
price, the most important determinants of quantity taken are: 
1. Consumers' tastes and preferences. 
2. Consumers' income. 
3. The prices of rela'l"~ed goods. 
4. The number of consumers in the market. 
A demand function identifies the relationship between possible 
alternative prices and the resulting quantities taken during some 
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moment in time, assuming the other determinants of quantity taken 
remain unchanged. The "law of demand 11 states that as price decreases, 
quantity demanded by consumers will increase. This inverse relation-




Quantity per Unit of Time 
Figure 13. Demand Curves 
A movement along a given demand curve, such as from A to Bon d1 
in Figure 13~ is a change if1 ~uantitl demanded resulting from a change 
in price, assuming all other conditions affecting quantity taken remain. 
unchanged. A change in demand, such as a shift in the demand curve 
from d1 to da~ results when the conditions held constant in defining a 
given state of demand change. 
203 
Revenue 
From the firm's viewpoint, demand indicates revenue per unit of 
sales and is the firm's average revenue curve. Total revenue for each 
level of sales is determined by multiplying the price times the corre-
sponding quantity demanded. The demand curve for an imperfectly com-
petitive firm slopes downward and to the right, indicating that the 
firm must accept a lower price to achieve a larger volume of sales. 
But, whenever a firm is considering lowering its price to increase its 
sales~ it will be concerned with how its total revenue will change as a 
result of the decision. 
Marginal revenue is the addition to total revenue which results 
from the sale of one additional unit of output. In an imperfectly 
competitive firm~ marginal revenue decreases faster than does price 
(average revenue) because when the firm decreases price to increase its 
volume of sales, the lower price will apply not only to the extra unit 
sold but also to all other units of output which otherwise could have 
been sold at a higher price. 
The general relationships between total revenue, average revenue, 
and marginal revenue of an imperfectly competitive firm are illustrated 





Quantity per Unit 
of Time 
Figure 14. Revenue Curves of an Imperfectly Competitive Firm 
Pr~ce Elasticity of Demand 
2o4 
The "law of demand" states that consumers will respond to a price 
decrease by buying more of a product. Price elasticity .2!. demand 
refers to the responsiveness of the quantity of a product which con-
surners are willing to take to changes in its price, given the demand 
curve for the product. The degree of consumer response is measured by 
the price elasticity of demand coefficient, which is the ratio of the 
percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage chance 
in price, when the price change is small. The simplest expression for 
price elasticity of demand (Ep) is 
Ep Eercentage change in quantity demanded 
·~ percentage change in price 
205 
when P1 /Qi represent original price and quantity, and P2 /Qa~ final 
price and quantity. 
Demand is elastic if a given percentage change in price results in 
a larger percentage change in quantity demanded. The absolute value of 
Ep is greater than 1 and a price decrease will result in an increase in 
the firm's total revenue. If a given percentage change in price is 
accompanied by a relatively smaller change in the quantity demanded, 
demand i.s inelastic. The absolute value of Ep is less than 1 and a 
price decrease will result in a decrease in the firm's total revenue. 
Figure 15 summarizes the relationship between revenue curves and price 






Figure 1.5. Relationships Between Revenue Curves and Price 
Elastici·ty of Demand 
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Two major factors influencing price elasticity of demand are~ 
1. The availability of good substitutes for the product. 
2. The price of the product. relative to consumers' incomes 
and whether or not the product is regarded as a luxu:ry 
item (and~ therefore~ dispensable) or as a necessity. 
Cross Elasticity of Demand 
When the quantity of sales of one product is directly affected by 
a change in the price of another product, there is an interrelationship 
between the products. The nature and extent of this demand relation-
ship is measured by the ~ el.asticit_;'l of 9:..ema.E_9:. 
For example, for two products, A and B, the cross elasticity of 
demand of A with respect to B equals the percentage change in the 
quantity of A taken divided by the percentage change in the price of B. 




"' .E.§:rcentage cha£_ge in g'Ll;anti ty taken of...! 
pE:ircentage change in price of B 
Two produc:ts are ~ut~ for each other 9 if'~ when the price of' 
one decreases 5 the quantity ta.ken of the other decreases. This is 
illustrated in Figure 16~ where a decrease in the price of B results in 
a. decrease in demand and, thus, quantity taken of A.. 
Two products are CQ!llPlementary to each other~ if 9 when the price 
of one decreases~ the quantity taken of the other also increases. This 
is illustrated in Figure 17~ where a decrease in the price of B results 
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·. ~l ~2 Q/U.T. 
Figure 17. Cross Elasticity of Demand: Complementary Products 
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Production Function 
The principles of production provide the foundation for analysis 
of costs of production and supplies of particular productso The term 
production function is applied to the physical relationship between a 
firmvs inputs of resources and its output of products per unit of timeo 
The simplest production function relates one output to two inputso If 
q represents the quantity of the output, and x1 and X2 the quantities 
of the inputs, q i. s a function of x1 and x2 ; that is, 
q = f (x1 , X2) o 
This function assumes that a giv·en quantity of :x1 and x:2 produces a 
single quantity of output, which is the maximum qua~tity possible from 
those amounts of inputs. 
The output which a firm can produce depends of course upon the 
quantities of resources used. The firm can vary its output by varying 
the quantities of all resources used or by varying the quantities of 
one resource while holding the quantities of the other resource fixed. 
The way in which output varies as the firm varies the quantities of 
resources used depends upon the period of time under consideration. In 
production and subsequent cost. analysis, a distinction is made between 
the time period called t;he short-run and that cal.led the ;tong-run. The 
short-run is a time period so short that the firm is unable to vary 
the quantities of some resources used, such as capital~ but long enough 
to allow variation in the quantities of resources such as labor. In 
the long-run, the firm can vary the quantities of' the variable resource 
with the fixed resource. 
The~~£! diminishi:p.e: returns describes the general direction 
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and the general rate of change which the firm's output takes when the 
input of one resource only is varied. It states that if the input of 
one resource is increased by equal amounts per unit of time while the 
inputs of other resources are held constant, total output will increase, 
but beyond some point the resulting output increases will become 
smaller an.d smaller. If input increases of the variable resource are 
carried far enough, total product will reach a maximum and may then 
decrease. Figure 18 illustrates a production function of initially 
increasing returns to the variable resource up to some level of re-










Product Variable Input 
per u. T. 
Figure 18. Production Function of Increasing, Then Dimi.nishing Returns 
The !!l™inal ;e,_hysical Erodu.ct of a resource is defined as the 
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increase in total product resulting from a one-unit increase in the 
quantity of variable resource used per unit of time. The average 
product for any given quantity of variable input is found by dividing 
total output produced by the quantity of variable input used. 
Total Costs 
The costs of production incurred by a firm are the explicit expen-
ditures which the firm must make for the resources used to produce its 
output. In addition to explicit costs, economic theory also includes 
implicit costs of production such as market value payments for self-
owned, self-employed resources to determine total economic costs of 
prc;,duction. 
Total cost at each output level depends upon: 
1. The amount the firm must pay for resources. 
2. The efficiency with which the firm uses resources. 
Si.nee resources are classified in the short-run as II fixed" and 
09 ·qar·iable 00 ~ their costs are likewise classified as 00 fixed costs 09 and 
09 variable costs 90 • Three concepts of total cost are important for 
short-run price and output analysis. These are: 
1. Total~~· This includes the expense incurred 
by the firm for fixed resources. Since the firm in the 
short-run does not have time to vary the quantities of 
fixed resources used, total fixed cost does not change 
as output varies. 
2. Total variable cost. This expense must necessarily in-
crease as the firm's output increases (and vice-versa) 
since larger outputs acquire larger quantities of 
211 
variable resources. 
3. Total~· This expense is the sum of total fixed and 
total variable cost for any given level of output. 
The shape of the total variable cost curve results directly from 
increasing and diminishing returns of the variable resource and, there-
fore~ reflects the nature of the firm's production function. Initially, 
increasing the quantities of the variable resource to produce more out-
put increases the efficiency with which it is used in combin.ation with 
fixed resources. Thus, for output increases in the range of increasing 
returns, the total variable cost curve will be concave to the origin. 
As larger quantities of the variable resource are used with the fixed 
resources to produce still more output, the law of diminishing returns 
sets in, meaning there is a decrease in the efficiency of the variable 
resource. For output ip.creases in the range of diminishing returns, 
the total variable cost curve will be convex to the origin. The level 
of maximum output in the short-run is ultimately determined by the 
quantities of fixed resources and when this maximum capacity is reached, 
the total variable cost curve will become vertical. Figure 19 illus-
trates the total cost curves, assuming a production function of in-
ca,reasing and then diminishing returns to the variable resource. 
Total Cost 7otal cost 
' 
~Total variable cost 
1:-----------· _______ Output/U. T. 
Figure 19. Total Cost Curves 
Unit Costs 
Although they essentially present the same kind of information, 
per unit cost curves are normally used for price and output analysis 
instead of total cost curves. The per unit cost curves are: 
l. Average fixed~, obtained by dividing total fixed 
cost by any given quantity of output. 
2. Average variable~, obtained by dividing total 
variable cost for a given quantity of output by that 
quantity o:f' output. 
3. Average total~, obtained by adding average fixed 
cost to average variable cost for a given quantity of 
output. 
4. Marginal cost, obtained by calculating the change in 
total cost resulting from a one unit change in output. 
Marginal cost varies with output and, therefore, is in 
no way dependent upon fixed cost in the short-run. 






Average total cost 
verage variable cost 
~ 
-----..Average fixed cost 
Output per Unit of Time 
Figure 20. Unit Cost Curves 
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Figure 21 depicts the general relationships between the f:i.rm 's 
short-run produ9tion function and the resulting cost curves., assuming 

















Total variable cost 
Output/U.T. 
ginal cost 
Average total cost 
Output/U.T. 
Figure 21. General Relationships Between a Short-Run Production 
Function and Cost Curves 
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Price and Output Analysis 
In the short-run the firm, given a fixed scale of plant, will 
attempt to maximize its profits or minimize its losses by adjusting 
output through changes in the amounts of variable resource employed. 
Faced with a downsloping demand curve, the firm must simultaneously 
select price and output. The output and corresponding price which the 
firm chooses will be that combination where the resulting difference 
between total revenue and total costs is the greatest, as illustrated 





Q Output U,T, 
Figure 22. Profit Maximization: Total Revenue 
and Total Cost Curves 
An alternative method for determining the amount which the firm 
will produce to maximize profits is for the firm to compare the amount 
that each additional unit of output will add both to total revenue and 
to total cost. That is, the firm should compare the marginal revenue 
and the marginal cost of each successive ur1i·t of output. Any unit 
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whose marginal revenue exceeds its marginal cost should be produced, 
because on each such unit the firm is gaining more in revenue from its 
sale than it adds to cost in producing that unit. Similarly, if the 
marginal cost of a unit of output exceeds its marginal revenue, the 
firm should not produce it since it will add more to total cost than to 
total revenue. Thus, the firm will maximize profits or minimize 
losses by producing at that level of output where marginal revenue is 
equal to marginal cost and by charging the price which consumers are 
willing to pay for that output. Unit cost and revenue analysis is 






verage variable cost 
Quantity per U.T. 
Figure 23. Profit Maximization: Unit Revenue and Unit Cost Curves 
In the short-run, the firm will always produce if there is any 
level of output which can be sold at a price which exceeds average 
variable cost, even though average total costs are not covered. To 
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minimize losses in this situation, the firm will still produce at that 
level of output where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. 
If~ at a given level of output, the firm finds that the marginal 
revenue from the last unit sold exceeds the marginal cost of producing 
it, the firm will, to maximize profit, decrease price and increase out-
put until the optimum combination of price and quantity is established. 
Haynes (28) cites several studies of cost functions which suggest 
tha.t another pattern of costs is common in industry. 
''Since the time of (Joel) Dean's work, the preponderance 
of statistical studies has supported the conclusion that 
total costs are linear and marginal costs are constant 
in the short-run." 
The unit revenue and cost curves would then appear as shown in Figure 
23. The firm would still employ the same.;marginal reasoning to deter-




~Average total cost 
~~~~~--~~~~~ Average variable= 
marginal cost 
Average revenue 
Q Quantity per U.T. 
argin~l revenue 
Figure 24. Unit Cost Curves With Constant Marginal Costs 
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Price Discrimination 
Sometimes a firm may find it possible and profitable to diyide the 
total market for its product into two or more segmented markets. The 
firm will then charge a different price for its product in each of the 
markets. In economic theory, price discrimination is defined as: 
1. The practice of charging different prices to different 
segments of the market for the same product, or 
2. The practice of charging prices that are not pro-
portional to the marginal costs of slightly differ-
entiated products. 
Two conditions ar necessary for price discrimination to be profitable: 
1. The firm must be able to keep the markets segmented 
and 
?.. The price elasticities of demand at each price level 
must differ among the m~rket segments. 
To present the analysis of price discrimination, it is desirable 
to assume a homogenous product to be sold in two segmented markets, 
with all units produced at a constant marginal cost. The initial objec-
tive is to determine the way in which the firm should allocate its total 
sales between the two markets. For any given volume of total sales, the 
firm should always sell in the market in which an additional unit of 
sales adds the most to total revenue. Total revenue will be maximized 
when the firm has allocated its total sales among the markets in such a 
way that marginal revenue from the last unit sold in one market is equal 
to marginal revenue from the last unit sold in the other market. 
Figure 24 illustrates the concept. 
Market II 




Quantity per U.T. 
Figure 25, Price Discrimination With Two Market Segments 
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If the volume of total sales is below q0 , the firm should sell the 
entire amount in Market I, since the added revenue from sales in that 
market .will exceed any added revenue made from selling in Market IIo 
If the total volume of sales equals q1 plus q2 , the. firm should sell 
q1 in Market I and q2 in Market II so that marginal revenue from the 
last unit of sales in Market I equals marginal revenue from the last 
unit of sales in Market II. The level of marginal revenue will be r in 
each market, with the price in Market II equal to P2 and the price in 
Market I equal to P1 • P1 exceeds P2 for the same product and the last 
units sold in both markets are produced for the same marginal cost. 
Product Differentiation 
A firm may actively influence the quantity sold of its product in 
two fundamental ways: 
1. Decrease the price of the product to increase quantity 
demanded, and/or 
2. Differentiate its product in an attempt to increase 
demand. 
Liebhafsky (37) states: "The term product differentiation is defined 
as the existence of a preference, real or fancied, in the mind of the 
buyer for the produc·t of a given seller. 11 
An oligopolistic-type firm is usually reluctant to engage in 
price competition in an effort to increase individual firm sales, but 
prefers instead to use other means. Since price decreases are the 
easiest forms of competitive action to duplicate, product differentia-
tion by an individual firm offers a more subtle and a much safer method 
of accomplishing approximately the same results. 
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Attempts at product differentiation take two major forms: 
1. Advertising. 
2. Variation in design and quality of product. 
The primary purpose of both is to shift to the right the demand curve 
faced by an individual firm and to make it less elastic. Thi.s will 
enable the firm to sell a larger volume at the same or perhaps a higher 
price without the danger of starting a price war. Thus, each firm 
tries to enroach upon the markets of others through product differentia-
tion instead of through price decreases. 
Product differentiation in either form is expected, of course, to 
add more to the firm's total revenue than to its total cost. However, 
it is to be expected that beyond some point, additional expenditures 
add successively smaller amounts to total revenue. To maximize profits 
with respect to product differentiation, the firm should spend funds on 
advertising and/or product variations up to the point at which the 
added profit attributable to the expenditure is equal to the amount of 
the expenditureo 
Value of Marginal .Product 
When a firm employs additional units of a variable resource in or-
der to produce additional output, the resulting additions to total 
revenue are called the ~ 2f ~arginal product of the resour•ce. Each 
additional unit of the variable resource used adds some amount of.prod-
uct to the firm's total output which can then be sold at its market 
price. Thus, the additional output multiplied by its market price per 
unit is the value of the marginal product of a unit of variable 
resource. 
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A profit maximizing firm will seek to allocate any given resource 
among alternative uses in such a way as to obtain greatest economic 
efficiency. Units of a resource are most efficiently allocated among 
alternative uses when the value of marginal product of the last unit 
allocated to one alternative is equal to the value of marginal product 
of the last unit allocated to all other alternatives. 
APPENDIX B 
FEONTIER AIRLINES 1965 SYSTEM FINANCIAL, OPERATING, 
AND TRAFF]C STATISTICS (SELECTED) 
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TABlE mII 
FRONTIER AIRLIN!ilS 1965 SYSTEM OPERATING AND 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS (SE!ECTED) 
Operating and Traffic Statistics 
Revenue Plane Miles 
Originating Passengers 
Revenue Passenger Miles 
Available Seat Miles 
Originating Passenger Journey 
Average Passenger Load 
Average Available Seats 
Passenger Load Factor (1,) 
Scheduled Miles · 
Completion Factor (1,) 
Revenue Hours 
Daily Aircraft Utilization 
Number of Departures 
Average Hop Length (Miles) 
Average Hop Duration (Minutes) 
Revenue Ton Miles (Total) 
Passenger 
u. S. Mail 
Freight, Express and Excess Baggage 
Available Ton Miles 
Over...All Load Factor (1,) 
Average Number of Employees 
Number of Aircraft ( Total) 
Douglas DC -3 
Convair 440 
Convair 580 
Number of Stations Operated 
Number or Amount 
13,223,146 
737,375 



























FRONTIIDR AIRLINES 1965 SYSTEM 
FINANCIAL DATE (SELECTED) 
Financial Data Dollar Amount 
Total Current Assets 













Total Operating Revenue 
Operating Expenses: 
Flying Operations 





Aircraft and Traffic Servicing 
Promotion and Salas · 
General and Administrative 
Depreciation,..-Ground Equipment · 
Total Indirect 
Total Operating Expenses 
Operating Profit 


















ll, 513 ,403 
$ 6,663,235 









DATA APPLICABLE TO FRONTIER'S 50 PER CENT 
STANDBY FARE DECISION 
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TABIE ·xxv 
ONE WAY STANDBY FARES 
City-Pairs 
Albuquerque, N. M. 














Denver, Colo . 
Great Falls , Mont. 
Kansas City, Mo. 
Kansas City, Mo. 
Phoenix, Ariz. 




Denver, C olo . 
Great Falls, Mont. 
Denver, Colo. 
Denver, Colo. 
Great Falls, Mont. 
Kansas _City , Mo. 
Lincoln, Neb. 
Omaha, Neb. 
Phoenix , Ariz. 
Phoenix, Ariz. 
Rapid City, S. D. 
· Salt Lake City, Utah 
Tucson, Ariz. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Lincoln, Neb. 
Omaha, Neb. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Tucson, Ariz. 















































TABIE XXVI · 
STANDBY FARE ROUTIKJS 
Applioation of Routings 
1. Routings are applio~ble only. to fares whioh make specif io 
referenoe to them. 
2. Locate in the routing the'point of origin and the point 
of destination between whioh the fare applies. Apply only 
the portion of the routing which connects the origin and 
destination points by a line or a series of oity codes 
and dashes, always·'reading continuously in the same gener-
al direotion. The applioable portion of the routing may 
be traveled via the cities named between the origin and 
destination points in the. order named. 
3. Where a routing includes more than one option applicable 
between the origin and destination or b.etween any two . 
intermediate points , · any one of the options may be used. 
4. The oities shown at the head of the fare columns and the 
cities at the side of the fare columns, between which the 
fares are published,.are referred to as the headline and 
sideline points, respectively. The routings via which 
the fares apply are shown from the point named at the 
head of each. group of tares to the point named within such 
group. When passage is in the opposite direotion, the 











TABIE XXVI (Continued) 
Explanation of Routing Numbers 
Read Odd Numbers from Left to Right--
Even Numbers from Right to Left 
/000'\ 




/ / \ 




DEN-COS- PUB-A IB- DRO-FMN-GUP- ABQ-GUP- !NW-FIG- PH.lt-TUS 
/SVC TUS" 
ABQ-GUP-FMN-GUP-INW-FIG-PH.lt 
DEN-OYS-1.AR-CPR.,. RIW-RKS-VEL-S ID "" . / GUO-MTJ-GJT-CNY 
/SAF~ 
DEN-COS-PUB-A IB- DRO .. FMN-GUP-ABQ--SVO-TUS-PHX 
/SVC-ABQ\ 













EXPIANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS IN STANDBY FARE ROtrrINGS 
Abbreviations Abbreviations 
ABQ - Albuquerque, N .M. LNK - Lincoln, Neb. 
AIA - A llianoe, Neb, I.lNT - Lewistown, Mont. 
Ala - Alamosa, Colo, MOK - McCook, Neb, 
Ariz. - Arizona MKC - Kansas City, Mo. 
BFF - Scottsbluff, Neb. Mo. - Missouri 
BIL - Billings , Mont. Mont. - Montana 
CEZ - Cortez, Colo. MTJ - Montrose, Colo. 
CDR - Chadron, Neb. Neb. - Nebraska 
ONY - Moab, Utah N .M, - New Mexioo 
COD - Cody, Wyo. OLU - Columbus, Neb. 
Colo, - Colorado OMA - Omaha, Neb. cos - Colorado Springs o.w. - · One If.Jay 
CPR - Casper, .Wyo. PHX - Phoenix, Ariz, 
CYS - Cheyenne, Wyo. POY - Powell, Wyo. 
DEN - Denver, Colo. PUB - Pueblo, Colo. 
ORO - Durango, Colo. RAP - Rapid City, S. D. 
EAR - Kearney, Neb. RG,NO.- Routing Number 
FIG - Flagstaff, Ariz. RIW - Riverton, Wyo. 
FMN - Farmington, N. M. RKS - Rook Springs , Wyo. 
GJT - Grand Junction, Colo • SAF - Santa FE), IL M. 
GRI - Grand Island, Neb. S.D. - South Dakota 
GTF - Great Falls , Mont •. SW - Salt Lake City, Utah 
GUO - Gu~nison, Colo. SNY - Sidney, Neb. 
GUP - Gallup, N. M. STJ - st • J OS e ph' Mo . 
HSI - Hastings, Neb. SVC - Silver City, N. M. 
INW - Wins low, Ariz. TUS - Tucson, Ariz. 
JAC - Jackson, Wyo. VEL - Vernal, Utah 
lAR - Laramie, Wyo. WRL - Worland, Wyo. 
lBF - North Platte, Nab. Wyo. - Wyoming 
TABLE XXVIII 
ANALYSIS OF HALF FARE PLAN MARKETS FIVE MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 1966 
AND SEPTEMBER 1966 VS. SAME PERIOD 1965 
Feb-June and SeEtsmbsr, 1966 
Passengers Revenue Comparison with Feb-June ·and SeEt, 1 1965 
Half All j. Half Half 1, Half 
Fars Other Fare of Fare Fare of :& Increase 
Total Plan Fares Total Total Plan Total Psgrs. Revenue Psgrs. · Revenue 
Albuquerque-Phoenix 10,399 3,262 7 ,137 31 $208,448 $ 45,834 22 4,624 $107 ,208 125 94 
A lbuquerqus-Tucson 5 ,412 1,209 4,203 22 104,755 16,363 16 3,942 88,320 37 19 
A lliance-Denvsr 1,224 424 800 35 19,282 4,653 24 762 14 ;431 61 34 
Billings-Denver 1,824 1,081 743 59 47 ,125 23,216 49 965 31,978 89 47 
Billings-Great Falls 3 ,194 2 ,304 890 72 34 ,112 23,109 67 889 11,822 259 189 
Casper-Denver 8,961 3,058 5,903 34 152,091 35,185 23 4,198 87 ,919 113 73 
Chadron-Denver 1,718 508 1,210 30 33,284 6,622 20 997 22,222 72 50 
Denver-Great Falls 794 545 249 69 21,882 15,250 70 134 4,557 493 380 
Denver-Kansas City 9,009 2,369 6,640 26 282 ,217 53,433 19 4,125 128 ,880 118 119 
Denver-Lincoln 10 ,354 2,030 8,324 20 285 ,619 36,401 13 6,287 187 ,915 65 52 
Denver-Omaha 5,090 2,823 2,267 55 113,496 53,526 47 1,078 27 ,387· 372 314 
Denvsr-P hosnix 7 ,326 3,436 3,890 47 223,137 90,481 41 3,176 101,269 131 120 
Denver-Rapid City 13 ,433 954 12,469 7 340,345 15,280 4 9,762 258,992 38 31 
Denver-Salt J;,aks City 5,427 3 ,267 2,160 60 106,129 56,843 54 2,100 50,890 158 109 
Denver-Tucson 6,203 1,777 4,426 29 241,775 51,520 21 3,450 149,102 80 62 
Great Falls-Salt Lake 1,817 714 1,103 40 50,803 .14,991 30 875 31,030 . 108 64 
Kansas City-Lincoln 19 ,993 1,054 18,939 5 280,331 10,512 4 14,671 213 ,603 36 31 
Kansas City-Omaha 8,471 882 7,589 10 112,495 8,814 8 4,026 54,404 110 107 
Phos.nix-Salt Lake City 627 315 312 50 18 ,181 8,512 47 205 7 ,768 206 134 
Salt Lake City-Tucson 684 189 495 28 27,969 5,980 21 181 9,283 278 201 
Total Half Fare 
Segments 121,950 32,201 89,749 26'f. $2,703,476 $576,525 21$, 66,447 $1,588 ,980 831 7of. 
Total Other Segments 366,827 7 ,750,416 274,432 5,985,604 341 291, 




DATA APPLICABLE TO FRONTIER'S 
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TABLE XXIX 
HISTORIC LOCAL AND CONNECTING PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN MAJOR MARKETS 
AND ESTIMATED 1967 PASSENGERS BY MARKET 




~ 1960 1961 .1962 .1963 1964 1965 1967. ·lb 1964 
L1>cal 
-Xansas City-Las Vegas 4,890 4,450 4,410 5,430 .6,570 8,130 8,370 10,340 27'f. 
Lincoln-Las Vegas 120 240 250 310 490 310 360 590 90 
Omaha-Las Vegas 1,690 2,000 2,660 3,050 3,410 3,980 · 4,510 6,190 56 
Grand Island, Hastings, Kearney-
Las Vegas 60 -- 60 170 lBO 160 270 460 
Colorado Springs.;,Las Vegas 230 280 240 430 410 560 610 840 
Denver-Las Vegas .]B ,340 20,160 22,520 28,620 30,670 31,640 33,940 44,060 39 
Grand Junction-Las Vegas 930 760 1,150 1,670 2,050 · .. 2,110. 2,240 3,490 65 
Other Frontier Poin'ts Beyjlnd · 
Denver-Las Vegas 1,000 840. 920 1,100 2,140 2,560 2,410. 3,740 
Colorado Springs-Denver 6,670 6,560 7,820 8,220 11,680 13,690 14,780 17 ,740 
Colorado Springs-Grand Junction · 40 30 90 140 320 710 950 2,710 
Denver-Grand Junction 14,420 15,680 17 ,490 18,510 22;050 25,230 . 29,290 35,120 39 
Denver-Los.Angeles 102,760 ll9,990 127 ,470 133,600 159,290 168 ,320 172,550 213,470 27 
· Connecting 
Colorado Springs-Denver 28 ,170 27,040 35,090 40,860 38,150 . 45,630 50,460 61,950 
Grand Junction-Los Angeles 2,580 3,100 3,920 3,960 5,910 6,490 6,910 10,020 
Grand Junction-San Francisco 980 890 990 1,210 1,610 2,010 2,020 2,910 
Grand .Tunction~o. California points 410 330 570 780 1,060 1,450 1;520 2,080 
Lincoln-Los Angeles 1,590 2,470 2,980 2,260 3,200 3,120 3,150 4,480 
Lincoln-San Francisco 980 1,310 1,440 1,570 2,050 2,610 2,790 3,520 
Lincoln-So. California points 470 730 910 860 830 990 1,170 1,410 
~ 11)£ s.ample passengers expanded by a factor of 10. 
Average.of constant rate and constant increment extrapolations 
of least squares lines on 1959-1965 data. !\) 
"" I\) 
TABIE XXX 
HISTORIC I.DOA L PASSENGER. TRAFFIC IN MINOR MARKETS 
















































































































































l! Sample traffic in base period increased by 58i to forecast year, 
based on estimate of composite growth of all markets listed. 
/_g_ Sample traffic in base period increased by 5ot,, based on Grand 
Junction-Las Vegas growth in this -.period of 65i. 
TABIE XXXI 
HISTORIC CONNECTING TRAFFIC, ADJUSTED TO EXC WDE TRAFFIC IN MINOR 
MARKJtJTS, AND ESTIMATED 1967 PASSENGERS BY MARKET 
1o 
Growth Est. 
Conneoting 1964 to 1967 
Point Passengers 1967 Psgrs. 
Kansas City :..Las Vegas 
&. 
Connecting 2,400 
less Las Vegas-Omaha Kansas City 130 
-Lincoln Kansas City 50 -180 
· Total 2,220 27 2,820 
Q..maha-Las Vesas 
Connecting 450 
less ties Vegas-Kansas City Omaha 0 
-Lincoln ..!Q._ -20 
Total 430 56 670 
Denver-Las Vesas 
Oonnaoting 6,680 
less Las Vegas-Kan. City Denver 550 
-Lincoln 10 
-Omaha 0 
-Grand Island 70 
-Hastings 20 
-Kearney 20 
-Colo. Springs 480 
-Casper 40 
-Cheyenne 260 








-No. Platte 30 
-Pueblo 160 
-Scottsbluff 60 
..$ idney, Nebr. 0 
-Williston· 10 -1,860 
Total 4,820 39 6 ,700 
235 
TABLE XXXI (Continued) 
"/.. 
Growth Est. 





Connecting 45,630 38 62 ,910 
less Colo. Springs-
-Grand Junction Denver 200 
-Las Vegas Denver 640 -740 




-Grand J unoti on Denver 200 -200 
Total 7,700 39 10,700 
Denver-Los Anseles 
Connecting 42,240 




-San Diego 60 
-Santa Barbara 10 
-Visa;Lia 10 -1!260 
Total 401980 27 52,040 
/.J! Per 1964 CAB Ce>mpetition Study.· 
TABLE XXXII 
FORECAST OF ADDED PASSENGER TRAFFIC AND REVJ-:NUES ATTRIBUTABLE TO PROPOSED SERVICE TO LAS VEGAS 
Traffic 
Stimulation 1967 Total Frontier 
Estimated Passengers for FL Service Market After --r. 
Year 1967 Improvements FL Service Partici- Rev. Psgr. Passenger 
Local C onns cting_ Total Type Factor Improvement pation Passengers Miles ( 000) Revenue 
Kansas City-Las Vegas 10,340 2,820 13 ,160 E 1.20 15 ,792 20 3 ,158 3,859 248,029 
Lincoln-Las Vegas 590 ~ 590 E l.65 914 60 548 579. 38,771 
Omaha-Las Vegas 6 ,190 670 6,860 F 1.05 7 ,203 5 360 400 28,678 
Grand Island/Hastings/ 
Kearney-Las.Vegas 460 0 460 D 1.30 598 s 138 136 10,246 
Colorado Springs -
Las Vagas 840 0 840 c 2.00 1,680 60 1,008 691 52,779 
Denver-Las Vegas 44 ,060 6,700 50,760 E 1.45 73,602 45 33 ,121 20,535 1,485,477 
Grand Junction-Las Vegas 3,490 ~ 3,490 E 2.50 8,725 75 6,544 2,748 210 ,128 
Casper-Las Vegas 1,170 0 1,170 F 1.05 1,228 s 58 51 3,330 
Cheyenne-Las Vegas 440 0 440 F 1.80 792 s 352 251 19 ,128 
Rapid City-Las Vegas 1,140 0 1,140 F 1.50 1,710 s 570 529 40,880 
Alamosa-Las Vegas 80 0 80 c 3.50 280 s 200 163 11,964 
A lliancs -Las Ve gas 20 0 20 c 8.00 160 s 140 117 9,275 
Bismarck-Las Vegas 240 0 240 c 2.30 552 s 312 358 29,865 
Chadron-Las Vegas 50 0 50 c 4.90 245 s 195 174 13 ,611 
Laramie-Las Vegas 20 0 20 D 2.40 :iS s 28 21 1,608 
McC ook-'Las Vegas 0 0 0 D ~ 28 s 28 24 1,799 
Minot-Las Vegas 130 0 130 c 2 .80 364 s 234 293 24 ,270 
North Platte-Las Vegas 30 0 30 D 2.40 72 s 42 39 2,824 
Pueblo-Las Vegas 280 0 280 c 2.20 616 s 336 242 17 ,593 
Scottsbluff-Las Vegas 90 0 90 c 3.30 297 s 207 164 12 ,886 
Sidney, Nebr.-Las Vegas 20 0 20 D 2 .40 48 s 28 21 l,659 
Williston-Las Vegas 50 0 50 c 4.90 245 s 195 266 21,411 
Cortez-Las Vegas 20 0 20 D 2.40 48 s 28 15 1,274 
Farmington-Las Vegas 260 0 260 c 2.25 585 s 325 190 15,766 
Gunnison-Las Vegas 20 0 20 D 2 .40 48 s 28 15 1,246 
Moab-Las Vegas 20 0 20 D 2.40 48 s 28 14 1,162 
Montrose-Las Vegas 30 0 30 D 2.25 68 s 38 18 1,539 
Vernal-Las Vegas 50 0 50 D 1.80 90 s 40 21 1,780 
Grand Junction-Los Angeles 10,020 10 ,020 F 1.50 15,030 GJT-IAS 50 7,515 3 ,156 243 ,862 
Grand Junction-San Francisco 2,910 2,910 F 1.50 4,365 GJT-IAS s 1,455 611 47 ,215 
Grand Junction-So. Calif. 2,080 2 ,080 F 1.25 2,600 GJT-lAS 25 650 273 21,092 
Lincoln-Los Angeles 4,480 4,480 F l.10 4,928 UlK-IAS s 448 473 32,104 
Lincoln-San Francisco 3,520 3,520 F 1.05 3,696 ll!K-l.AS s 176 186 12 ,612 
Lincoln-So. California 1,410 1,410 F 1.05 1,480 WK-I.AS s 70 74 5,016 f\) \N 
Denver-Los Angeles 213 ,470 52,040 265 ,510 F 1.00 265,510 DEN-IAS 0.5 1,328 823 49,468 O'\ 
Estimated Passengers 
Year 1967 
Local Connecting Total 
Colorado Springs-Denver 
before 17 ,740 61,950 79,690 
after 
added 
Colo. Springs -Grand Junction 




before 35 ,120 10,700 45,820 
after 
added 
ft Connecting traffic forecast separately below. Estimated same as Sidney. Net revenue estimated at 941 of gross. 
TABLE XXXIT (~ontinued) 
Traffic 
Stimulation 





































































































. Jet First Class 
Las Vegas-Denver 






















Jet First Class 
. Las Vegas-Grand Junction 







































Las Vegas-Grand Junction 









ADDED AIRCRAFT MILES, HOURS AND llEPARTURES ATTRIBUTABLE 
TO PROPOSED SERVICE TO LAS VEGAS 
Revenue Aircraft Miles Revenue Aircraft Block Hours Revenue Aircraft De2artures 
Equipment Annual Sched. Annual Scbed. Scbed. Annual 
Flight .Number Flights per Annual Flown per Annual Annual per Annual Flown 
Points Served Sched. Flt. Sched. ~ Flt. Sched. Flown Flt. Sched. ·~ 
B-727 
l Denver-Grand Junction-Las Vegas !l 365 620 . l:46 2 
2 Las Vegas-Grand Junction-Denver !l 365 620 l:40 2 
3 GT&nd Junction-Las Vegas w 365 420 l:06 l 
4 Las Vegas-Grand Junction w 365 420 l:Ol l 
Total B"-727 2,080 759,200 . '144,016 5:33 2,025.8 2,045 '!) 6 2,190 2,146 
~ 
3 Colorado Springs-Denver y 365 66 :22 .l 
4 Denver-Colorado Springs ij 365 66 :22 l 
Subtotal 132 48 ,180 47 ,216 :44 267.7 273 !} 2 730 715 
Denver-Grand Junction !l 365 (200) ( : 5-0) ( l) 
Grand Junction-Denver !l 365 (200) ( :45) (l) 
Subtotal (400) (146,000) ( 143 ,080) (l:35). (577.9) (589)W (2) (730) (7l5) 
Total CV -580 ( 97 ,820) {95 ,864) 3].0 .2 · {316) -0- -0-
!I 
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in the Denver-Grand Junction market. · 
The Kansas City-Denver and Denver-Grand Junction portions of these B-727 flights will be operated in 1967, E!,rid therefore are not 
additional operations herein. _ 
At mileage completion factor of 98% plus factor for in-flight and ground maneuver delays estimated at 3%. 
Additional round trip.Denver-Colorado Springs to provide direct on-line connection to Las Vegas. 




COMPUTATION OF RETURN EIEMENT FOR PROPOSED SERVICE TO l.AS VEGAS 
A-dded Investment per Aircraft 
l. Flight equipment 
2. Related spare flight 
equipment, expendable 
parts, ground equipment, 
and working capital: 
-1., of Flight Equipment 
-Amow:1t 
3. Total Investment per 
Aircraft 
Provision for Return on Investment 
and Taxes per Aircraft 
4. Added Debt 








Amount ( 000) 
Basis 
See Table XXII 
Based on a detailed 
analysis of capital 
requirements 
Assumes a ratio of 
251., equity and 751., 
debt for the added 
investment for the 
proposed services. 










Based on Frontier's 
equipment cost 
experience 
per CAB costing 
method 
Debt is 64.531., of 
investment as 
reported to CAB 
in 1965 






TABIE XXXV (Continued) 
Amount ( 000) 
B-727 Basis· OV-580 Basis Nfrt 
6. Return Requirement• 
91, of added investment 
( 9't, X line 3) $540 $126 
7. Annual interest oost of 
debt ( line 5 X line 4) . $270 $ 48 
8. Net return after interest 
and taxes ( line 6 minus 
line 7) $270 $ 78 
9. Provision for taxes Requires taxable returri Requires· taxable re· 
@ 511,. ( 48'1o Federal and of $551 in order for a turn of $159 in order 
31,. State) $281 net return of $270. ( lirie $81 for a net return of 
8) to be realized $78 (line 8) to be 
(X-.51.X:$270) realized (X-.5U:*-78) 
10. Return Element ( line 6 
plus line 9) $821 . $207 
Estimate for Proposed Service to 
Las Vega~ 
11. Revenue Aircraft Block Hours 2,045 Sea Table XVII (316) See Tablet XVII 
12. Aimual Revenue Aircraft Blk. Utilization estimated Utilization estimated 
Hour Utilization per 3,650 at 10 hours per day 3,394 et 9.30 hours per day 
Aircraft. · for B-727 · for CV-580 
13. Number of ai~oraf~ required ·• 
(line ll line 12) .560 ( .093) 
14. Provision for Retur.n on 
Investment and Taxes $460 $( 19) $441 




DATA APPLICABLE TO FRONTIERvs DOUGLAS, 
ARIZONA ROUTE DECISION 
TABLE XXXVI 
MAINTENANCE BURDEN·FLIGH';r EQUIPMENT, VARIABLE PORTION 
Sub-Account 
Trainees and Instructors 
Unallocated Shop Labor 
Record Keeping and 
Statistical Personnel 
Description 
Compensation for personnel in a training status. 
Pay of direct maintenance personnel which 
has not been assigned to profit and loss 
account Maintenance Labor for time spent on 
specific maintenance projects, and vacation 
or sick leave pay of direct maintenance 
personnel. · · 
Compensation, including vacation and sick 
leave pay, of personnel whose primary 
duties relate to maintaining records or 
conducting economic or other analyses 
required for general management controls, 
such as accountants, economists, statisti-
cians, maintenance record clerks, stores 
recdrds clerks, stores receiving and 
issui~g clerks and file clerks. 
Other Services: Outside -- Charges for maintenance and repair of ground 
property and equipment of all types and 
classes. and other charges for services 
performed by others not provided for else-





where--such as the operation of traffic 
offices or other facilities used jointly 
with the air carrier which do not represent 
reimbursement of specific expense elements 
incurred expressly for the benefit of the 
air carrier. 
Cost of s4pplies and expendable small tools 
and equipment used in maintaining,servicing 
and cleaning property or equipment,the cost 
of which cannot be directly assigned to a 
specific job or type of work. 
Cost of purchased insurance and provisions 
for self-insurance covering liability for 
the benefit or protection of employees, and 
contributions of the air carrier to employee 
pension or other welfare plans. 
All taxes levied against the air carrier 
based upon or directly related to compen-
sation of personnel: 
TABlE XXXVII 
COUPtrrATION OF REGIONAL AND SYSTEM SERVICING EXPENSE 





1965 S tend by_l'_~e_ 
Revenue Ton Miles (000) 22,027 438 
Aircraft Departures Performed 102,536 2,760 
Service and Traffic Index{STI) 
Revenue Ton Miles per Departure~ 214.82 158~70 
Regional and System Servicing 
Expense ( 000) - $ 4,585 $ 110 lf. 
Regional and System Servicing 
Expense per Revenue Ton Mile 
Actual $ .2082 /]!__ $.2511 /]!__ 
Computed .2092 {!! 
1. Actual of Computed - 99 .521.. 
I 
Revenue Ton Miles divided by Departures Performed. 
Regional and System Expense divided by Revenue Ton Miles. 
Per Rand S Formula based on industry data for 1965. 
1. actual of computed X computed. 
Revenue Ton Miles X Actual R and S Expense per RTM. 




- 105 ,296 
213 .35 
$ 4,695 f2... 











$ 5 /.!_ 









$ 4,700 l!!.. 







COMPUTATION OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT AND TAX ALLOWANCE, DOUGLAS SERVICE 
1. A iroraft type 
2. Cost of airoraft inoluding full overhaul 
3. Number of airoraft units required 
4. Airoraft investment allocated to proposal 
5. Total investment allooated to proposal 
o l.50 of airoraft 
System investment as of September 30, 1965: 
6 • Long term debt 
7 • Equity 
8. Total 
9. Ratio of debt to total 
10. Ratio of equity to total 




14. Return on debt o 5. 75"/o . 
15. Return on equity o 16 .oat, 
16. Return on investment 
17. Provision for taxes on equity return 
l8. Return element 
CV-580 













$ 53 ,221 
LE.. 29,644 
~ $ 82 ,865 . 
Average of Frontier •s. aooumulated experience on CV-580's. 
Added revenue aircraft blook hours 1,370 divided by 3,394 estimated 
future annual ~tilization per airoraft. 
Line 15 divided by O .52; then s ubtraot line 15 from this figure. 
Line 16 plus line 17. 
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TABIE XXXIX 
SUBSIDJ A'!TRIBUTABIE TO PROPOSED SERVICE TO DOUGIAS 
Present Added by · Resultant 
~--~~~~~~~~---~~~~-S_y_s-t_e_m~~~--.N_ew Ro .• ut~e~~-S-y~st~e~m __ _ 
R avenue A iroraft Miles Flown 
00-3 Total 
CV -580 Total 
Less Ineligible Miles fl_ 
Eligible CV -580 Miles 
Total, Revenue Aircraft 
· Milas Eligible 
Departures Performed 
00-3 Total 
OV -580 Total 
2,096,601 
12 , 77'3 , 141 
94,444 
12,678,697 
14 ,775 ,298 





117 ,269 · 
Eligible CV -580 Departures 
Total Departures Eligible 
Weighted Departures 00-3 o 1.0 
CV -580 @. 1.2 
Total 
Stations Served 
Number of Days 
Station Days 
Lass one station x number of days 
Stations lass one station x days · 
Weighted departures/station-l/day 
Length of hop 
Length of hop adj. factor 













Standard Available Seat Miles Flown 
Eligible 24 + 40 { 000) 557 ,466 
Rate per Standard Available 
Seat Mile Flown 














. 95 ,102 















$131,170 $8 ,096 ,244 
APPENDIX F 
FRONTIER'S 1965 OPERATING EXPENSES OF 
CONVAIR 580 AIRCRAFT 
248 
Frontier's 1965 Operating Expenses of 
Convair 580 Aircraft 
Operating Data 
Total aircraft flight 
hours 
% Block of flight 











































(% of Direct Labor: 
159%) 
$ 533,474 
Cost per Total 
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